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Abstract 
In recent years, migration studies focused very much on forced displacement, especially after 
the influx of migrants to Europe in 2015. Some European countries accept immigrants from 
non-EU regions. Others blame migrants for taking advantage of Europe’s social systems and 
follow restrictive policy measures. The EU is as divided as never before in its history, and the 
process of migration to Europe has become more critical. In this context, the characteristics, 
fleeing reasons, and refugees’ and asylum seekers’ journeys are relevant. This dissertation 
looks at these factors in the framework of refugee camps. Even though refugee camps are 
frequently an essential part of the journey of asylum seekers and refugees on their way to 
Europe, there is only limited literature in this field. Thus, the research aims to analyze 
migration and refugee movements as a consequence of the miserable and inhumane 
conditions in refugee camps and identifies indicators for (mass) migration to Europe. For this 
purpose, and since everyone speaks about migrants, but not with migrants, I conducted 
quantitative and qualitative research in 192 fully-structured and 17 semi-structured 
interviews. The research provides a comprehensive comparison of the living conditions in 
non-EU and EU refugee camps, analyses their role in the process of migration to Europe, and 
emphasizes the differences between different camps. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of asylum seekers and refugees and their motives for coming 
to Europe were examined. The findings of the study show who these people are and from 
where they originate. There is evidence for the hypothesis that the majority of people flee 
because of severe danger (e.g., armed conflicts) and are not ‘economic migrants’ despite the 
claims of nationalistic governments in the EU. However, there is evidence for the hypothesis 
that improved living conditions in camps could reduce mass migration movements to Europe. 
The dissertation enhances the discussion of refugee camps in migration studies, provides new 
perspectives and insights about the journey of asylum seekers and refugees to Europe, and 
people’s characteristics leaving their country of origin. 
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1 Introduction 
The influx of millions of immigrants from the Middle East and the African continent in 2015  
was a  turning point in  EU  migration policies.  Since then, migration has become a highly 
controversial topic in civil societies and policy-makers, politics, and migration studies. The 
topic divided and polarized the EU into countries that are willing to accept asylum seekers 
and refugees and the member states that are not. Consequently, the conflict can stop the 
European integration process, which itself is already damaged after the Eurozone crisis 
(Manners and  Murray  2016). Other authors even see the Brexit1 movement as a consequence 
of anti-immigration agitation in British media (Goodman and Kirkwood 2019). The process 
of migration to Europe has become a significant challenge for the EU.  
 Thus, to contain and control refugee movements2 to Europe, EU member states are 
building fences and walls, border controls are standard again, and Frontex intensifies its 
surveillance. However, these measures can never solve the problem. Military conflicts in the 
Arabic world will probably continue in the next decades, and many refugees try to escape the 
danger. Many are coming who are not directly affected by war but by poverty. More and more 
people from these third-world countries attempt to find a better life in EU countries that 
provide residents with financial benefits. Besides, global warming, droughts, and other 
climatic changes will produce more refugees than ever before. It is not reasonable to believe 
that walls and fences will permanently stop refugees from coming to Europe. All these 
developments lead to the conclusion that the current migration movements are just the 
beginning and have, without a doubt, the potential to end the integration process in Europe. 
The EU is facing a significant challenge to integrate millions of non-Europeans into European 
society, a society which itself is far from being homogenous and cohesive.  
 However, many people talk about asylum seekers and refugees, but only a few talk 
with them. Who are these people? Where do they come from? Moreover, what were their 
motives for coming to Europe? What are the characteristics of those coming to Europe, and 
are they economic migrants or refugees? The background and journey of migrants coming to 
 
 
1 The ‘Brexit’ stands for the United Kingdom leaving the EU. 
2 Movement in the sense of migration (movement of people; not political movements). 
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Europe is of extraordinary importance if we want to understand the process of migration in 
the year 2020. In this context, refugee camps play a vital role as a safeguard for asylum 
seekers and refugees. Many migrants have had to live or are still living in refugee camps. Due 
to their location, the Mediterranean Sea countries are profoundly affected by the influx of 
fleeing persons. Outside of the EU, the neighboring countries of (civil) war zones (e.g., Syria) 
are the primary destination for refugees. Greece and Italy, as EU countries, and Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan, as non-EU countries, are essential transit countries and the ‘new home’ 
for a large number of migrants. Unfortunately, many of these people end up in improvised 
shelters or camps with inadequate nutrition, health care, security, and other factors. 
Devastating conditions in camps harm asylum seekers and refugees and do not provide 
incentives for staying; in actuality, they increase the probability that people will continue their 
journey to other destinations.  
The consequences are constant inflows of fleeing persons from crisis regions, which 
are, understandably, continuing their journey until their basic needs get satisfied, or until their 
living conditions improve considerably. Camps have the potential to soften (mass) migration, 
or, at least, to regulate and manage movement since providing livable conditions to people in 
camps can improve their situation. In some cases, they may even eliminate the reasons for 
leaving.  
Nevertheless, camps’ importance is often undervalued, and the situation in camps after 
2015 is only barely covered by the literature in migration studies. The following authors are 
rare exceptions: As early as 1998, Crisp and Jacobsen criticized the lack of international 
standards for refugee camps. Authors such as Milton et al. (2013) focused on the security 
aspect of camps in terms of radicalization; others, such as Berti (2015), elaborated on the 
scarce resources in the camps and the burden for the host countries. In total, the health care, 
nutrition, and educational situations are very often insufficient (see Toole et al. 1988; 
Paardekooper et al. 1999; Sharara and Kanji 2014; Sirin and Sirin 2015; Acarturk et al. 2015). 
Even though migration studies’ focus has slightly shifted to asylum seekers and refugees in 
recent years, the camps’ role has not been adequately considered. This dissertation’s 
groundbreaking character is its in-depth research regarding camps by interviewing a 
significant number of asylum seekers and refugees with camp experience. Thus, I contribute 
to migration and asylum seekers and refugees studies by investigating camps in the EU, the 
Middle East, and Turkey. Whereas the authors mentioned earlier, for instance, focused only 
on certain aspects of the debate (e.g., health care or security), I follow a different approach, 
  15 
 
aiming to capture the whole complexity of the topic by providing a comprehensive and 
coherent approach in terms of camps, covering multiple dimensions of the discussion. The 
dissertation’s universal character differentiates it from previous research in this field and 
makes it stand out. In this context, the dissertation provides explanations and insights for 
living conditions in camps, the characteristics of camps’ inhabitants, their journey to the 
camps, and their motives for leaving the camps and continuing their journey to the EU. 
Therefore, this dissertation hypothesizes that reasonable living conditions in refugee 
camps in the EU and outside of the EU could reduce (mass) migration movements. The 
research aims to analyze migration and refugee movements as a consequence of the miserable 
and inhumane conditions in refugee camps. I try to identify indicators for (mass) migration to 
Europe, especially by analyzing refugee camps’ situations. The following research questions 
will be investigated:  
• How does the devastating situation in the perceived reality3 of asylum seekers 
and refugees in camps (including undernourishment, poverty, disease, et cetera) 
affect migration movements to Europe? 
• How does the camp experience [experiences gained in camps] contribute to 
refugees’ and asylum seekers’ decision-making process in the context of 
migration to Europe? 
For this purpose, the dissertation starts with a comprehensive literature review. Over 
100 years of migration studies are covered in this part. It begins with the basic neoclassical 
approach, including push-pull models and the ‘laws of migration.’ After that, the literature 
review demonstrates how migration theories have developed and evolved in the past decades. 
A significant focus will be on the transformation process from classic push-pull factors (why 
people leave their country and why people migrate to others) to the more sophisticated 
aspiration and desire models, which also introduced other dimensions in the form of drivers of 
migration. Other vital theories covered in this chapter are transition and development, the 
historical-structure approach, systems and networks, and the new economics of labor 
 
 
3 Living conditions in camps are perceived very differently, depending on the duration of the stay, the (personal) 
circumstances, and other factors. What is for one person acceptable, could be for another one devastating. 
There is no universal standard for evaluating living conditions, which is why I use the term ‘perceived reality’ 
in this context. 
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migration. The chapter concludes by reviewing works dealing with the issue of refugees in 
camps and what impact devastating conditions have had on their lives. Since refugee camps, 
as a consequence of the events of 2015, are only barely covered by the literature, this 
dissertation provides its own ‘push-stay-pull’ model. Camps are supposed to be primarily 
short-term solutions for fleeing persons and often function, because of devasting conditions, 
only as transit zones on their way to the actual destination. The ‘pull factors’ cannot be fully 
applied here, and people do not go to camps because they see long-term prospects there for 
themselves or their families. In reality, they have simply no other choice and get stuck in ‘no 
man’s land,’ since refugees cannot go back to their country of origin but are also incapable of 
reaching their destination. A new approach is needed. 
After the literature review comes the contextual section, which starts with EU migration 
policies, borders and security, and policy situations. Firstly, I clarify the terms of legal and 
irregular migration. Secondly, I go deeper into the EU migration policy by focusing on the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS). After that, the chapter deals with Schengen, 
borders, counter-terrorism and radicalization, organized crime and human trafficking, EU 
agencies, and the so-called ‘EU-Turkey deal.’ The last part of the chapter describes the EU’s 
policy situation, the growing populism, and the human rights situation by mainly focusing on 
fair burden-sharing issues. 
The next chapter is about the poor living conditions in refugee camps. Since most 
asylum seekers in 2015 came from Syria, the case studies concentrate on neighboring Syrian 
countries, like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Furthermore, the situation of camps in the EU, 
which are the leading destinations for arrivals (e.g., Greece and Italy), will be described, 
including all the relevant numbers, figures, and statistics. Thus, camps inside and outside of 
the EU become comparable, which builds the foundation for more in-depth analysis regarding 
the connection between aid and devastating conditions in camps in the following section. This 
part is intended to make the bridge between theory, detailed case studies, and context. The 
chapter should create a starting point for further discussions. 
The last part of the dissertation is the interview section. In total, I conducted 192 fully-
structured (quantitative research) and 17 semi-structured (qualitative research) interviews with 
asylum seekers and refugees in Germany about their characteristics, their experience in 
camps, and their journey. The research findings indicate that poor living conditions in refugee 
camps definitely affect migration movements to Europe and that people flee mainly because 
of severe threats to their life and health. Improvements in the situation in the camps could 
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significantly reduce the crisis; the importance of satisfying basic human needs such as health 
care, nutrition, or security is stressed. Additionally, the political, economic, cultural, and 
environmental dimensions should also be evaluated when investigating refugee movements 
from camps.  
For the most part, camps since 2015 have been a ‘blindspot’ in migration studies. This 
dissertation attempts to fill this gap and, hopefully, helps to shift the attention of (future) 
researchers to the unique role of camps in the process of migration to Europe or elsewhere. 
  18 
 
2 Methodology and Research Design 
The dissertation tries to answer this question: ‘How does the devastating situation in the 
perceived reality of asylum seekers and refugees in camps (including undernourishment, 
poverty, disease, et cetera) affect migration movements to Europe?’ In other words: ‘How 
does the camp experience [experiences gained in camps] contribute to refugees’ and asylum 
seekers’ decision-making process in the context of migration to Europe?’. The dissertation 
aims to analyze migration and refugee movements as a consequence of the miserable and 
inhumane conditions in refugee camps. The hypothesis is that reasonable living conditions in 
refugee camps in the EU and outside of the EU have the potential to reduce (mass) migration 
movements. The dissertation aims to identify indicators for (mass) migration to Europe, 
especially by analyzing people’s situations in refugee camps.  
 To achieve this goal, I started with a literature review in migration studies, which 
establishes the niche of camps. The next chapter focuses on EU policies and their implications 
for asylum seekers and refugees. After that, I analyzed the conditions in non-EU and EU 
camps. This last part is the interview section, where I conducted quantitative and qualitative 
research. Thus, each chapter builds on the one before, and everything follows a clear 
structure. The different chapters interact and complement each other. 
Table 1: Structure of the Dissertation 
Literature Review This chapter covers migration 
studies, asylum seekers, and 
refugee studies and establishes 
the niches of refugee camps. 
Conceptual framework 
EU Migration Policies, 
Borders and Security, and 
Policy Situation 
This chapter explains EU 
migration policies (including 
the legal framework) and their 
implications for asylum seekers 
and refugees. The debate of 
camps can only be fully 
understood in the context of 
burden-sharing, weak policy 
measures, and the union’s 
Context and conceptual 
framework 
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internal dividedness.  
Conditions in Camps Based on the previous chapters, 
the conditions in camps outside 
and inside the EU can be 
evaluated. The literature review 
and the policy chapter provide 
the conceptual framework for 
the analysis of conditions in 
camps. 
Case studies and context 
Interviews The interviews provide an in-
depth perspective on the 
conditions in camps. For this 
purpose, I conducted 
quantitative and qualitative 
research, which builds on the 
previous chapters and provides 





The research findings indicate that poor living conditions in refugee camps definitely 
affect migration movements to Europe and that people flee mainly because of severe threats 
to their life and health. Many different aspects and push factors in the camps are considered, 
including nutrition, health care, education, job opportunities, income, security, political 
participation, and spare time activities. The improvement of the situation in the camps could 
significantly diminish the crisis. Overall, the research provides a comprehensive overview of 
asylum seekers’ and refugees’ experiences in camps, their characteristics, and their journey. 
2.1 Literature Review 
The literature review covers migration theories and some asylum or EU policy-making 
implications (EU policy-making and asylum will only play a minor role in this section 
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because the whole complex is covered in an extra chapter). 4  The goal is to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the essential theories in over 100 years of migration studies. In 
general, the literature review focuses on the questions ‘Why do people move?’, ‘Why and 
where do asylum seekers move?’, and ‘What is the role of refugee camps?’. It is important to 
note that the literature will always be reviewed with a strong focus on people in camps and 
their living conditions. Indeed, not all, but many arguments will follow this direction. 
The essential question in migration studies is ‘Why do people move?’. There is no one 
universal answer to this question since there are countless reasons and different 
circumstances, which influence individuals and their decision-making processes in terms of 
migration. The following sections include the most important theories that are aiming to 
approach this field. The neoclassical model, transitions and development, historical-structural 
models, systems and networks, and The New Economics of Labor Migration provide the best 
answer to this question since all these models have a substantial focus on the push factors 
(why do people move) of migration and economics. Notably, early scholars like Ravenstein 
(1885; 1889) or Lee (1966) emphasized their research on these factors and the macro 
dimension. Later works in this field build upon their foundation, and newer approaches 
provide more comprehensive answers to more complex questions (e.g., aspiration and ability 
model or drivers of migration). 
Compared to earlier works in migration studies, the case of asylum seekers, refugees, 
and IDPs has gained more attention and importance in the last 20-30 years. The framework of 
the aspiration and ability model (Carling 2002) allows a more detailed look. Many researchers 
have approached this field by asking the question ‘Why and where do asylum seekers move?’. 
Thus, the works of Davenport et al. (2003), Melander and Öberg (2007), Neumayer (2004, 
2005), Moore and Shellman (2004), Tétényi et al. (2018), and others will be covered in this 
section by evaluating the micro-level of the debate. 
Both the micro and macro dimensions build the foundation for the discussion about 
refugee camps, their unique position as a safeguard, and their role as a fleeing destination in 
the context of migration decision-making processes. I emphasize the different approaches 
regarding camps in the framework of IR Theories and elaborate on contributions from 
 
 
4 See chapter four of this dissertation. 
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scholars like Berti (2015), Sirin and Sirin (2015), Crisp and Jacobsen (1988), or Chatty (2009; 
2010; 2017), which explain the devastating conditions in camps, whereas other researchers 
stress the cultural, social, and historical complexity of the topic. Overall, the literature review 
establishes the role of camps in the conceptual framework of migration studies. The chapter 
concludes with the ‘Push-Stay-Pull Model,’ an approach I developed and designed, which 
illustrates the camps’ role in this context and (possible) future migration studies trends. 
2.2 EU Migration Policies, Borders and Security, Policy Situation 
The EU aims to apply humane asylum procedures but struggles to define and establish 
universal standards throughout Europe. Whereas the Mediterranean sea countries and 
Northern EU states are most affected by migration inflows, other EU states such as Hungary 
are unwilling to accept any asylum seeker (Tétényi et al. 2018). Thus, the EU asylum system 
is operating inefficiently and burdens member states unfairly. This chapter examines the 
analytical framework behind EU policy measures on asylum seekers and refugees. It 
emphasizes the deficits in terms of legal and irregular migration, the EU asylum system 
approach, and the Schengen and Dublin regimes. I argue that these EU policy measures have 
become more restrictive and are continuously undermining human rights; I critically reflect 
on the ongoing and current debates in EU policies regarding migration to Europe. 
This chapter considers all these different aspects of the discussion and provides a 
coherent review of the current EU policy implications and the continuing academic criticism. 
Policy measures are insufficient, and a common approach concerning asylum seekers cannot 
be established since the relocation and allocation of refugees among EU member states cannot 
be realized. Most EU members are following their own agendas, which leads to dysfunctional 
burden-sharing and solidarity procedures. Restrictive policy measures and human rights 
violations are the consequences. 
This chapter provides the contextual framework for the following chapters, which focus 
on camps. The situation of camps is only plausible in the discussion of (EU) policies. It 
explains the dividedness of the EU and its inconsistent and insufficient asylum policies. 
Hence, I address three major categories that demonstrate the dilemma in terms of 
inconsistency: EU migration policies, borders and security, and policy situations. Each 
variable is tested by its efficiency, and I elaborate on different aspects of the discussion in 
asylum seekers’ and refugees’ policies. The table below gives an overview of the chapter. 
 




Table 2: EU Migration Policies, Borders and Security, and Policy Situation  
EU Migration Policies Borders and Security Policy Situation 
• Legal Migration and 
Integration 
• Irregular Migration 
• Migrant Smuggling, 
Return, and 
Readmission 
• Common European 
Asylum System 
(CEAS) 




• Reception Conditions 
and Asylum 
Procedures 




• External Aspect 




• Organized Crime and 
Human Trafficking 
• EU Agencies 
• The EU Turkey Deal 
• Growing Populism 
and Human Rights 
• Burden-sharing 
Weak and inconsistent policy measures 
Consequently, the EU is in an identity crisis and incapable of responding adequately to 
significant challenges like the influx of migrants from the Middle East. Inconsistent policy 
measures and non-uniform approaches to migration weaken the stability of the EU 
significantly. Burden-sharing and security issues due to growing populism divide the union, 
hurt the EU-Turkey Statement, and lead to its failure from an EU perspective. There is still a 
need for a common approach regarding asylum seekers and refugees. 
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2.3 Conditions in Camps 
This chapter describes the conditions of refugee camps inside and outside of the EU by 
completing the contextual framework necessary for understanding the interview section in the 
next chapter. Due to financial and time limitations, I was unable to visit any of these camps 
myself. A proper field study could not be conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic.5 
Therefore, I used mainly official information from aid organizations like the UHNCR.  
The idea behind the case selection was to pick some of the current refugee hotspots 
inside and outside of the EU and make them, to a certain extent, comparable. Many refugees 
flee to geographically close countries. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are all countries 
neighboring Syria, which was and still is one of the primary sources for asylum seeker flows. 
On the other hand, Greece and Italy are, because of their access to the Mediterranean sea, 
usually one of the first arrival destinations for refugees in the EU. According to the Dublin 
system (see chapter 4.1.5), this is also where people have to apply for refugee status to get 
asylum. The location of the country and the EU policy implications make these cases 
significant. 
This section aims to identify the differences between camps in these countries. For this 
purpose, I applied an analytical framework based on UNHCR data, insights of the European 
Commission, and coverage from credible reporters and media. The evaluation results allow 
conclusions that emphasize the importance of living conditions in camps in the context of 
migration to Europe. The table below explains the evaluation criteria.  
Table 3: Evaluation of non-EU and EU camps 
Evaluation of living 
conditions in camps 
Turkey Lebanon Jordan Greece Italy 
Figures, Numbers, and 
Statistics 
The first section provides essential data regarding asylum seekers 
and refugees in Greece and Italy, including the number of migrants 
and their countries of origin. Additionally, the data shows the 
 
 
5 I finished this dissertation during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was, of course, a significant 
event. However, since most of this work was already written in the pre-pandemic era, this topic is only barely 
covered in my work. 
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current trend of migration movements to these countries. 
Funding Usually, refugee camps are dependent on funding from international 
organizations, states, or private donors. Whether the camps fulfill 
their funding requirements or not says something about the camps’ 
situation and the living conditions provided. 
The Situation in the 
Camps 
The last section of the case studies elaborates on camps’ living 
conditions using insights from media, NGOs, and other researchers. 
The focus is on satisfying basic human needs such as nutrition, 
health care, education, and housing conditions.  
Of course, the work also has some limitations and weaknesses. The following points are 
legitimate criticism: 
• Subjective evaluation: The evaluation of ‘living conditions’ is, indeed, very subjective. 
There is no universal formula for it since many of these findings base on personal 
opinions and impressions. Everyone experiences’ living conditions’ differently. What 
one person might consider as ‘reasonable’ is for another devastating. The research is 
dependent on sources from international organizations and state institutions and field 
studies from reliable media outlets. According to the World Bank (2018a), almost half 
of the world’s population could not meet basic needs. They live on less than 1.90 USD 
per day.  
• Selection bias: The camps’ living conditions can vary significantly from camp to camp 
since it is nearly impossible to get an overview of every single camp. Thus, the 
‘extreme case’ (negative and positive) may get the most attention in media coverage 
(e.g., camps on Greek islands). It is often hard to make generalized statements, which 
fairly reflect the situation in the whole country. 
• False information: Some of the next section’s information could be basically wrong 
based on insufficient research and field studies.  
• Manipulation/Political Agenda: The migration topic has become highly controversial 
in recent years. There are many different interests, and not everyone might want to 
describe the actual situation but instead follow a political agenda to accomplish 
specific goals.  
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• State Propaganda: This point is related to the previous one. The state, or more 
precisely the government of a state, might use its power to influence various aspects of 
the discussion in its favor. 
The precaution that I have undertaken to avoid these biases were short conversations 
before every interview. I tried to get an overview of who each person is and if she or he was 
seriously interested and serious about the interviews. It does not eliminate every bias, but it 
significantly limits them. The goal was always to get comprehensive, coherent, and 
uncensored responses from authentic people. 
The chapter concludes with a comparison between refugee camps in the EU and refugee 
camps in non-EU countries. The main objective is to determine how people’s lives in camps 
can be improved, but it is also significant what differences there are between camps in EU or 
non-EU countries. What are the impacts on migration flows? Can they be interrupted, and 
push or pull factors be reduced? The basic approach is “if people are not satisfied with their 
situation in camps in non-EU countries, why should they be happy with their stay in camps in 
the EU, especially if the conditions are here devastating as well?” Keeping people in no man’s 
land and preventing them from leaving the camps can be a sustainable long-term solution 
neither from a human rights perspective nor from a development perspective. There is still 
much research that needs to be done in this field.  
 Some data regarding figures, numbers, and statistics or funding is more 
straightforward and easier to compare than the situation in the camps, which can be perceived 
very differently and is, of course, subjective. Nonetheless, the chapter provides some valuable 
findings. It is a high starting point for further discussions before going into the last section of 
the dissertation, which contains some unique firsthand information from people who have 
experienced refugee camps during their journey to Europe.  
The investigations of refugee camps will produce some new findings and enrich the 
discussion in the field of migration studies. 
2.4 Interviews 
The interview section consists of two parts: fully structured interviews (quantitative research) 
and semi-structured interviews (qualitative research). First, I conducted 192 fully-structured 
interviews with asylum seekers and refugees in Germany. After that, I also had the 
opportunity to conduct 17 semi-structured interviews to get a more in-depth look at camp 
conditions. Thus, qualitative research builds on quantitative research. 
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2.4.1 Fully-structured Interviews 
The research is quantitative and based on interview questionnaires with asylum seekers and 
refugees in Germany who migrated to Germany in 2015 or later. The study was conducted in 
Germany’s Bavarian region that receives the second most asylum applications of all 
Bundesländer in Germany (Statista 2020b; 2020c). Regarding the sample size, I used the 
snowball method. My mother, a certified teacher for German as a foreign language, works 
with asylum seekers and refugees in Germany and organized contact with some of her 
students. Thus, the only other person who was involved in the interview process is my 
mother. Without her contacts, the whole research probably would not have been possible, and 
it is one of the reasons why the research was conducted in Germany. The other reasons are the 
high number of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany and, of course, the country origin of 
the dissertation’s author. From this point, participants of the research project recruited friends 
and community members for further interviews. The only prerequisites were that participants 
had to be of legal age and a legitimate asylum seeker or refugee in Germany, making the 
preselection process homogenous. However, these were the only restrictions that existed in 
terms of sample size. In general, I followed a maximum variation/heterogeneous approach.  
The interviews were fully structured, consisted of 23 closed-ended questions, and 
every participant received the same questions. The questionnaires are attached in appendix 
number one (English version) and appendix number two (German version). Overall, 103 
interviews were conducted in person and orally in German or English (pre-pandemic). 
Another 89 interviews were conducted over Skype due to the worldwide pandemic but 
followed the same approach. Usually, the interviews took place in small groups (e.g., with 
families) and in private spaces (e.g., the flat of an asylum seeker). Because of language 
barriers that existed in many cases, various people from the same country as the respondents 
helped with translation during the face-to-face interviews. I asked the questions and filled in 
the questionnaire. In total, I conducted 192 interviews with asylum seekers and refugees from 
spring 2019 until the end of summer 2020. There were no financial incentives for the 
interviews, and every participant was at least 18 years old. The results of the research are 100 
percent anonymous and kept confidential. 
The objective was to analyze and understand refugee movements due to poor living 
conditions in camps in the Middle East and Mediterranean countries. At this point, a primary 
goal is to conduct as many interviews as possible with people who had that experience and are 
willing to share this information to get a deeper understanding of their journey and the 
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conditions in camps. At the end of the research, we should identify indicators for (mass) 
migration to Europe, at least these indicators related to camps (e.g., poverty, hunger, limited 
resources, et cetera). Since I used standardized questionnaires to make the results comparable, 
the research should also allow some comparisons between camps (for instance, living 
conditions of camps in the EU compared to living conditions of camps in non-European 
countries). 
However, not all participants of the interviews spent time in camps. Their answers, for 
two reasons, are included in this section:  
• People who were not in camps are of importance as well. It tells us still something 
about their experience and journey to Europe. Thus, the information that people have 
not been in camps is valuable.  
• 2.) Some questions are not camp-specific. The questionnaires are structured so that 
answers from people with no camp experience can be integrated into the research. 
Again, these people have something to say, and it would be a missed opportunity not 
to take note of their unique experiences. 
2.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
After the quantitative research, I also had the opportunity to conduct 17 semi-structured 
interviews with asylum seekers and refugees from the same sample as in the previous section. 
This was a unique opportunity to get a more in-depth look at the topic. The semi-structured 
interviews were built on the fully structured interviews and aim to provide a more 
comprehensive overview of conditions in camps, migration decisions, and the journey to 
Europe. Despite that, quantitative research does not necessarily capture the topic’s whole 
complexity because of its limitations in research design. In order to fill in this gap, I extended 
the research by qualitative research. Because I had already conducted a significant number of 
interviews, I knew which topics and sections I would like to cover comprehensively. In 
general, I followed a similar approach since all the participants had already participated in 
fully structured interviews.  
 The semi-structured interviews took place between May and August 2020. Because of 
the ongoing pandemic, all the interviews were conducted online via Skype. I followed a 
purposeful sampling approach in the framework of criterion-i (Patton 2002; Marshall et al. 
2008). The focus group was people who stayed in both non-EU and EU camps during their 
journey to Europe. Again, people had to be asylum seekers or refugees in Germany, and the 
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minimum age for participating was 18 years. However, all 17 participants came from Syria 
and fled to Germany in 2015 or after due to the civil war outbreak in Syria. The interviews 
were conducted individually, and all the participants came from the same asylum-seekers’ 
hostel in Bavaria. Every interview lasted about 25 to 45 minutes, and the same Syrian 
translator accompanied each interview partner. Thus, the interviews were conducted orally 
and in German (every participant had studied German). If necessary, the translator helped 
with the translation. All the data were coded, analyzed, and categorized. However, sometimes 
a language barrier existed. Neither the interview partners nor the translator spoke perfect 
German. Therefore, I had to edit occasional sentences to the degree that they sound fluent and 
smooth in German. After that, I translated my German notes into English.6 
Unfortunately, I did not have permission to record and transcribe the interviews, even 
though I have anonymized the interviews’ results.7 Therefore, I took notes during and after 
the interviews. After each interview, I reviewed the material and showed it to the participant 
for permission purposes. Some interview partners feared state authorities and negative 
consequences for themselves. Obviously, this is a highly sensitive topic. Since I promised not 
to record the interviews through my webcam, I could only make notes. The whole COVID-19 
situation was, in this context, not helpful either. In real meetings, full transcriptions might 
have been provided and authorized. 
 I informed all the participants about their rights, including withdrawing from the 
interviews at any time they want. Every interview was entirely voluntary, and I made sure 
everyone understood the purpose of the research. The recruiting process was a mix of 
snowball and network methods since all the participants had already participated in the 
quantitative analyses.  
 Overall, it was my goal to let the participants speak freely without interruption. I had 
only minimum involvement in this process by asking the questions and clarifying 




6 The interviews were in German language. Due to time and practical reasons, my notes were also in German 
before I translated them. 
 
 
  29 
 
2.4.3 Structure of the Interviews 
The fully-structured interviews start with general information, including age, gender, 
citizenship, and profession. It aims to answer the question of who these people are. This 
question’s importance is to determine if certain groups or demographics are more likely to be 
part of migration movements than others. The first four questions are to clarify if and where 
the person was in a refugee camp. The whole questionnaire is conceptualized in a way to 
distinguish between camps in the EU and non-European countries. Hence, if people stayed in 
an EU camp, they follow one path of questions. However, if they stayed in a non-European 
camp during their journey, they follow the other route of questions. Indeed, people who 
stayed in both are supposed to follow both and will be able to provide the most useful data. 
From question five on, the camp-specific questions start. Some questions allow ‘circle all that 
apply’ answers, and others ask more precisely about the real experience in the camps. For 
example, question number five is: ‘Why did you choose a camp in the countries from Q2 & 
Q4? Please circle all that apply.’ The possible answers are ‘Security,’ ‘Accessibility of the 
country,’ ‘I was sent to the camp,’ ‘Higher living standard,’ and ‘Others.’ This is a question 
where people can circle multiple answers.  
On the contrary, question number six asks: ‘For how long did you stay in the refugee 
camp(s) named in Q2 & Q4?’. Of course, there is only one answer possible. The questionnaire 
continues in this fashion until question number 17, which marks the camp evaluation section’s 
end. From question number 18 to question number 23, which is the end of the interview, there 
is no camp experience required, and these questions can be answered by other asylum seekers 
and refugees who have not been in camps. These questions are journey-specific and address 
the topic of where and how people entered the EU. This section focuses on the Mediterranean 
Sea countries of the EU due to their proximity to the Middle East and the African continent. 
Entering the EU by crossing the dangerous Mediterranean Sea and paying smugglers are 
indicators of genuine fleeing reasons. Economic migrants are considered less likely to risk 
their lives on high seas. They often do not have the financial capabilities to pay smugglers. 
Other questions ask about fleeing reasons and why people chose the EU as their destination. 
Finally, the fully-structured interviews conclude by asking the question of people’s intention 
of going back to their country of origin (holidays and short-term visits not included). 
 In general, the questions are supposed to be comfortable and understandable. The only 
thing that might be confusing is the distinction between EU camps and non-European camps. 
However, since all these interviews were face-to-face with the interviewer, who did the job of 
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circling the right answers and navigated through the procedure, it was not an issue. All 
interviews were conducted in a reasonable amount of time (approximately 5 to 20 minutes 
each). 
Concerning the semi-structured interviews, I asked six open-end questions about 
conditions in non-EU camps, conditions in EU camps, the journey to Europe, the reasons for 
leaving their country of origin, the reasons for coming to Germany/Europe, and the stay 
factors in the camps. These are also the six themes for the qualitative research section. 
2.4.4 How do the Interviews answer the Research Question(s)? 
The research is building around the questions ‘How does the devastating situation in the 
perceived reality of asylum seekers and refugees in camps (including undernourishment, 
poverty, disease, et cetera) affect migration movements to Europe?’ and ‘How does the camp 
experience [experiences gained in camps] contribute to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ 
decision-making process in the context of migration to Europe?’. The dissertation 
hypothesizes that reasonable living conditions in refugee camps in the EU and outside of the 
EU have the potential to reduce (mass) migration movements. 
The first part of the fully-structured interviews provides some personal information 
about asylum seekers and refugees, including their gender, age, citizenship, and profession. It 
gives us an idea of who the people are that migrate and what their origin is. The next 
questions are supposed to determine if people have been living in refugee camps during their 
journey to Europe or not. If yes, was it in Europe, outside of Europe, or even both? Questions 
Q5 to Q17 evaluate the camps’ situation and distinguish between EU camps and camps in 
non-EU countries. The distinction is necessary to assess if or not conditions in camps have 
different effects on migration decisions. Interview partners were allowed to say their genuine 
opinion and rate the conditions in the camps based on their own experience. Overwhelmingly 
negative responses would confirm the hypothesis that devastating conditions influenced 
asylum seekers’ decision not to stay in the camps and move forward. Simultaneously, an 
overwhelmingly positive evaluation would disprove the theory since people would have 
found proper living conditions but still decided to continue their journey. Thus, camps’ 
adverse conditions equal higher push factors and increase the probability of mass migration to 
Europe. At the end of the conducted study, we should make some strong statements on the 
connection between asylum seeker movements and refugee camps’ support. The questions 
Q18 to Q23 provide some additional information on asylum seekers regarding their 
  31 
 
background, motive, aspiration moving to Europe, and plans. Therefore, the research also 
allows us to make some further conclusions. 
Furthermore, I extended the research through qualitative interviews. This section’s 
results build on the last part and provide a more comprehensive perspective on camps’ 
conditions. These questions do not correspond to new research questions but rather 
complement and enhance the fully-structured interviews’ quality.  
2.4.5 Limitations and Weaknesses of the Research 
The research has, of course, also some limitations and weaknesses. Because of the snowball 
method that I used, all the interviews were conducted only in Germany’s region (Bavaria).  
Likewise, no classification by specific demographic groups was made (e.g., 50 percent 
interviews with males, 50 percent with females, or grouping by age, origin, time in camps, et 
cetera), which makes the study not wholly representative. Other possible limitations and 
weaknesses of the work are: 
• Language Barrier: Since a translator was sometimes needed, some parts could be 
gotten ‘lost in translation’ based on misunderstandings or wrong translations. 
• Lack of interest or motivation: Some people might have been just not interested in the 
interviews and did not care about their answers. 
• Sabotage: This case is similar to the previous one. We cannot exclude that people lied 
on purpose to sabotage the results of the research. 
• Uncomfortable atmosphere: Some people could have felt uncomfortable during the 
interviews by answering private questions. 
• Politically or culturally motivated answers: Due to personal preferences, some answers 
could be exaggerating positively and negatively (being extreme bias). For example, 
one person does not want to talk badly about another country (cultural reasons), or one 
person dislikes individual governments’ political views (political reasons). In both 
cases, the answers could tremendously differentiate from the ‘truth.’ 
However, the last points are pure speculation and are just possible factors that could have 
influenced the interviews’ results. In general, I aimed to create a comfortable atmosphere for 
the interview partners and let them speak freely without any restrictions. If somebody gave 
obviously preposterous or wrong answers, I would have filtered out the responses (for 
instance, ‘Assad is the Chancellor of Germany’), but this has never happened over the 
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occasion of the interviews. Hopefully, soon, further research with more financial and personal 
backing will be conducted in this field.  
2.4.6 Difficulties during the Conduction of the Interviews 
Unfortunately, some problems occurred during the process of conducting the interviews. 
Some of the main issues are explained in the following: 
• The first problem is pretty much self-explanatory. The interviews were conducted in 
Germany over one year, but I studied in Budapest, Hungary. The organization was 
challenging in many ways and required weeks of planning in advance, including much 
traveling. As described in the previous section, these simple geographic circumstances 
limited the sample size of possible interview partners significantly. 
• In some cases, interview partners were unreliable and did not come to the interview. In 
one particular case, the potential interview partner did not show up for four 
consecutive appointments. 
• The language barrier made communication sometimes complicated. A translator was 
often needed since not all the interview partners spoke sufficient English or German. 
However, sometimes the interaction with the translator was also not accessible, but in 
the end, everything worked out. 
• Sometimes, people refused to give interviews due to a lack of trust or unsubstantiated 
fears. Several people had the impression the interviewer would work together with 
German state authorities to initiate their deportation. Occasionally, some people even 
feared higher state authorities from their origin could become in possession of the 
interview information and take advantage of it. In cases like this, explanations and 
assurances did not help. 
• The main problem was probably the lack of cooperation with institutions, schools, and 
other organizations in Germany. In theory, it would have been easy to interview a 
whole school class of asylum seekers, who are learning the German language, but all 
attempts to improve the interviews’ sample size failed. Most requests remained 
unanswered or got denied. The managers of refugee accommodations in Germany had 
the most restrictive policy. Even individual discussions in private meetings were not 
allowed there, including security checks at the entrance (the questionnaires did not 
pass that obstacle). Thus, the only way to conduct the interviews was outside of public 
buildings (e.g., schools) in individual, private meetings.  
  33 
 
• A new problem that occurred during the dissertation’s finalization process was the 
spread of the worldwide pandemic Covid-19. Countries shut entirely down, borders 
were closed, and no social interaction with other people was allowed, which harmed 
the dissertation’s interviews. Without Covid-19, a higher number of participants 
would have been possible. Nonetheless, I continued the interview process online, and I 
was able to increase the number of participants.  
2.4.7 Ethical Standards 
The first section of the fully-structured interviews includes the following paragraph: ‘All of 
the answers you provide in this survey will be kept confidential. No identifying information 
will be provided to the Corvinus University of Budapest or any other institution. The survey 
data will be reported in a summary fashion only. They will not identify any person.’ Every 
participant was informed about the survey standards, and none of them was younger than 18 
years old. The data is kept 100 percent confidential. Even for the dissertation’s author, it is 
impossible to identify any person based on the interviews since the questionnaires do not 
include identity-specific questions and were shuffled afterward. After the interviews were 
conducted, I kept the responses in a closed cupboard, and they have never left the room. None 
of the information was shared with anybody. All the interviews were voluntary, and nobody 
was coerced. Each participant could withdraw from the interviews at any time or refuse to 
answer specific questions. 
Furthermore, I made no payments or other financial commitments, except for offering 
some drinks or snacks to the interview partners. If some drinks or snacks were offered to me, 
I accepted them due to cultural reasons and politeness. For instance, refusing offers like this 
could be considered as impolite or disrespectful in some cultures.  
Since the semi-structured interviews build on the fully-structured, they follow the same 
ethical principles. However, I informed every participant about their rights again. 
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3 Literature Review 
This literature review reflects the situation of migrants, refugees, internally displaced people, 
and asylum seekers. The topic’s complexity and emotionality often do not make it very easy 
to distinguish between these terms since migration has become one of the most controversial 
issues among EU member states in recent years. Consequently, before going deeper into the 
literature, I start with the definition and differentiation of those terms to be as precise as 
possible.  
The discussion for finding a universal definition for the term ‘migrant’ is not new. In 
1966, researcher Lee (1966) struggled to find a proper explanation. Lee’s definition of 
migration is very inclusive. Migration can be short-term or long-term. It can be from one 
continent to another or even moving from one apartment to another in the same building. 
Until this day, there is no uniform legal definition for the term ‘migrant’ on the international 
level. Many countries and organizations use the word as an umbrella term, encompassing both 
migrants and refugees. Another common form is the term’ international migrant’, which also 
includes refugees or asylum seekers. This circumstance can often lead to confusion because 
migration can also occur voluntarily, while ‘forced migration’8  is the opposite. Therefore, the 
UNHCR separates between the terms’ migrant’ and ‘refugee’ (UNHCR 2018). In this 
dissertation, we will rely on Lee’s widely broad definition but also distinguish between 
migrants and refugees.  
Compared to the term ‘migrant,’ the terms’ refugee,’ ‘internally displaced person’ 
(IDP), and ‘asylum seeker’ are very well-defined. According to the UNHCR, a refugee is 
‘someone unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion’ (UNHCR 1951; 1967: 16).9  IDPs are those who ‘stay within their 
own country and remain under the protection of its government, even if that government is the 
reason for their displacement. They often move to areas where it is difficult for us to deliver 
 
 
8 There is also no general definition for the term ‘forced migration’ since the term has been used in the past for 
many different types of displacement such as natural disasters, conflicts, or famine (UNHCR 2018). 
9 This is the short definition of the term ‘refugee’. The actual definition is much longer and can be accessed at 
the website of the UNHCR (UHNCR 1951, 1967). For reasons of space I do not quote the whole definition 
here. 
  35 
 
humanitarian assistance. As a result, these people are among the most vulnerable in the world’ 
(UNHCR 2019a), and ‘an asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to 
be processed. (…) However, during mass movements of refugees, usually due to conflict or 
violence, it is not always possible or necessary to conduct individual interviews with every 
asylum seeker who crosses a border. These groups are often called ‘prima facie’ refugees’ 
(UNHCR 2019b). 
Overall, except for the term ‘migrant,’ the UNHCR defines the terms correctly, and these 
are the definitions used in this dissertation. 
3.1 Migration Theory 
Migration has always been an essential part of humanity, has, without a doubt, considerable 
implications in the present, and probably will continue to do so in the future (McNeil and 
Adams 1978). King (2012) argues that human motivation to move or migrate is, to a certain 
extent, intrinsic: ‘the need to search for food, pasture, and resources; the desire to travel and 
explore; but also to conquer and possess’ (2012: 4). Furthermore, migration is also an 
innovation driver since people moving from one area to another are distributing their 
inventions. However, the debate concerning immigration has changed in the last 30 years. 
Castles and Miller (1993; 2009) describe the actual era as ‘The Age of Migration’ and 
concluded that international migration ‘has accelerated, globalized, feminized, diversified and 
become increasingly politicized’ (2009: 10-12). Urry (2000; 2007) wrote that Western 
societies’ typical structures such as social class, static residence, and stable employment have 
been disrupted, and mobility has become more critical.  
At the moment, there are approximately 272 million migrants worldwide (UN 2019a). 
Seventy-one million of them are categorized as ‘forcibly displaced people’ (IDRs10, refugees, 
and asylum seekers) (UNHCR 2020a), which means a total increase of 51 million migrants 
compared to 2010 (UN 2019a).11 Even though this figure is tremendously high, it is still 
 
 
10 Internally displaced persons. 
11 There are two notable issues with the numbers. 1.) Every countries has its own methods to capture ‘migrants’. 
Someone, who is one country seen as a migrant, could be recognized and counted as a normal citizen (non-
migrant) in another country. 2.) ‘Undocumented’ or ‘irregular’ migration makes it impossible to capture the 
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relatively small compared to the world population of 7.8 billion. Therefore, the vast majority 
of people worldwide do not migrate, even though many more of them should migrate 
according to push-pull models and economic circumstances (King 2012). Malmberg (1997: 
21-22) calls this the ‘immobility paradox.’ 
The immobility paradox leads to the question, “why so many people have never 
migrated (King 2012)?” Is it because of incapabilities, or are they basically not willing to? Is 
it their social and professional environment (family, friends, culture, et cetera) that holds them 
back? Or is the willingness extraordinarily high, but people do not have the resources 
(finances) to do so? Are politics such as immigration barriers a threshold that they cannot 
overcome? King (2012: 5) concludes that people have even lost their right to free movement 
in the last decades, while the mobility of goods, capital, entrepreneurship, and media has 
increased. King (2012) also points to another phenomenon in this context: ‘migration for 
some, but not for all.’ Migration aspirations have a lot to do with origin and social status.  
Wealthy persons from the EU or North America are perceived as ‘good’ immigrants. In 
contrast, immigration from impoverished regions (e.g., Africa or Latin America) and not 
wealthy persons are often stigmatized as ‘bad’ immigrants. Carling (2002) investigated 
countries that are traditionally outflow-migration countries. Based on this, he developed his 
famous ‘aspiration/ability’ model and stated that ‘the age of migration’ is for many people 
‘the age of involuntary immobility.’12 
Indeed, migration changes and transforms countries, but it also polarizes societies. On 
the one hand, we have people who welcome migration and see these immigrants’ value in 
contributing to a community with their labor force and cultural diversification. On the other 
hand, we have people who blame migrants for every problem a country might have (drugs, 
prostitution, unemployment, crime, religious extremism, et cetera). King (2012) criticizes this 
polarization and those people blaming mostly migrants for societies’ problems and argues for 
a more objective, fact-based discussion. 
Following Malmberg’s approach (1997), migration operates in time and space and has 
to overcome the obstacles of distance and’ time in migration’ (Cwerner 2001). When 
 
 
‘real’ number. Nevertheless, the numbers provided by UN or UNHCR are definitely the best statistics 
available. 
12 See chapter 3.1.6 for a comprehensive overview of the aspiration/ability model. 
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speaking of international migration, a border needs to be crossed to migrate from one 
sovereign state to another (if there is no border-crossing, it is internal migration). Although 
this appears at first glance obvious, it is not. Borders are abstract concepts and have been 
determined by humans. There is no ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ law, which defines borders13. 
Thus, borders can suddenly change or disappear overnight. The examples of the former Soviet 
Union and the former Republic of Yugoslavia demonstrate how quickly these changes can 
happen. There are also vast differences regarding the permeability or density of borders, free 
movement in the Schengen Area, and closed external borders (King 2012). Concerning the 
time factor, a person usually needs to live at least one year in the host country to get 
recognized as an immigrant14. However, the range reaches from one year to ten years or a 
permanent settlement. Otherwise, temporary migration is very often connected with return 
migration to the country of origin, while permanent settlers only visit their original country 
(ir)regularly (King 2012: 7). 
Furthermore, there is often the wrong perception that people can only migrate between 
two different countries (back and forth). Hence, cases where people move forward to a third 
country (or get stuck somewhere between) are often ignored. Nevertheless, this form of 
‘onward’ migration becomes more significant and common since migrants spend a significant 
amount of time on their journey in countries that are not intended as their destination. Suter 
(2012), who investigated the routes of Sub-Saharan migrants, concluded that Morocco, 
Turkey, and Libya were nothing more than transit countries for most people on their way to 
Europe. Collyer (2007) came to similar results by tracing back the routes (first crossing the 
Sahara, then the Mediterranean Sea) of West African migrants to Europe. Another example is 
Somalian immigrants in the Netherlands (confirmed refugees), who moved on to the United 
Kingdom because of more prominent Somalian communities there (Liempt 2011). 
Cohen (1996) and King (2002: 90-91) have elaborated on migration binaries, 
dichotomies, or dyads to provide additional typologies in terms of migration. Although the 
authors themselves say further research is needed, the dualities enrich the discussion. The 
following ones have already been covered in this literature review: internal vs. international, 
 
 
13  Natural barriers like rivers, mountains, or lakes back are historically “natural borders”. However, this 
perspective seems to be out-dated since many borders were made randomly by humans (e.g., the Sykes-Picot 
agreement from 1916). 
14 See also Chapter number three for the definition of the term ‘migrant’. 
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temporary vs. permanent, and regular vs. irregular migration. A more complex one is the 
distinction between voluntary (e.g., ‘economic’ migrants) and forced migration (e.g., 
refugees) since classifications can change. Most migrants, for instance, are both: internal and 
international migrants (migration within the EU or other political/economic unions). 
Alternatively, migration, which is only supposed to be temporary, can become long-term and 
turn into a permanent settlement (e.g., the case of foreign guest workers in Germany and 
Switzerland during the 1960s) (Castles et al. 1984).  
A second one is the distinction between regular and irregular migration. Irregular 
migrants can become regular (legal) through political processes, and, vice versa, regular 
migrants can become illegal through bureaucratic procedures (e.g., no extension of residence 
permit) (Fakiolas 2003). Finally, the last distinction between voluntary and forced migration 
often seems too simplistic (King 2012: 8). Sales (2007: 47) stresses that (armed) conflicts are 
a severe economic struggle factor and might result in a mass-outward migration. Thus, the 
collapse of state structures and infrastructure makes economic and political fleeing reasons 
very likely to occur during or after an armed conflict. However, this form of ‘economic’ 
migration is not covered by the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees15 . A well-researched 
example of such ‘economic’ emigrant movements is the case of Albanians after 1990 due to 
political and economic state failure (Barjaba and King 2005). 
Overall, migration studies cover a wide range of fields, from economics, politics to 
social sciences, et cetera, making the subject genuinely interdisciplinary16. In general, we can 
identify three dominant forms of migration: labor migrants, settler migrants, and refugees. 
(King 2012) This basic framework has been enriched during ‘The Age of Migration’ by new 
types of migration and international mobility (King 2002; King et al. 2010; Martiniello and 
Rath 2012). Thus, due to improved infrastructure and versatility, we can observe worldwide 
migration movements, which have no historical ties (Bangladeshi migration to Italy) (Knights 
and King 1998). Other new forms are local scale-cross-border shuttle migration (Engbersen 
2001; Morawska 2001), residential tourism (e.g., extended holidays due to seasonal sports 
like skiing or surfing (Myklebost 1989), and business visits and work contract migration (Salt 
 
 
15 See chapter three for the definition of the term ‘refugee’ according to the UN Convention on Refugees. 
16  According to King (2012: 10) the terms ‘cross-disciplinary’, multidisciplinary and ‘postdisciplinary’ are 
snynonyms and are also often used in this context. 
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1992). Nevertheless, there are many other forms of movement, including family reunion, 
marriage migration, student migration, highly-skilled migration and brain drain, 
environmental and climate change migration, and human trafficking and sexual exploitation 
(Martiniello and Rath 2012; King 2012). New conceptional frameworks such as ‘mobility’ 
(Urry 2007), ‘transnationalism’ (Glick Schiller et al. 1992), and ‘diaspora’ studies (Cohen 
2008) make the field of migration studies more sophisticated. All of these different concepts 
introduce different approaches. 
The discussion of an interdisciplinary approach to the field of migration is not new. 
Jansen (1969: 60) stressed that migration studies include many social science disciplines. 
According to King (2012), geographers, sociologists, and economists have the most lengthy 
history in this field. Still, many other researchers from other specializations such as social 
psychology, political science, anthropology, history, demography, law, the humanities, 
literary, media and cultural studies have tackled the field of migration over time. King 
criticizes these ‘narrow disciplinary boundaries’ and states that most universities are 
fragmented in discipline-based degrees and research programs (King 2012: 9-10). Many other 
scholars support this argument. Castles (2000: 15-25) emphasizes that disciplinary approaches 
are ‘the enemy’ in terms of analyzing human migration, and Arango (2004: 15) argues that 
single disciplines cannot fully cover the complexity of the topic and have limited the building 
of comprehensive theories. Thus, several researchers have stressed the importance of an 
interdisciplinary approach, such as Hammar et al. (1997), Favell (2008), King (2002; 2012), 
Bretell and Hollifield (2008), and Samers (2010).  
It has become clear that migration studies cannot be treated as a single discipline, and a 
combination of various theories is crucial to developing a solid overview of migration 
theories; the next section is divided into several parts. Frankly, the massive amount of 
different models and theories does not allow us to cover them all. For example, highly skilled 
labor migration or retirement migration will only play a minor role in this literature overview 
since the dissertation’s focus is mainly on refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore, the 
structure of this work follows similar approaches as other researchers such as Massey et al. 
(1993), as well as Arango (2004), Morawska (2007), de Haas (2010), Fussell (2012), and 
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King (2012), who previously investigated migration from poor to rich countries.17 However, 
the dissertation is written in the context of the events of 2015 and other recent developments 
(e.g., climate change).   
3.1.1 Neoclassical Economics and Push-Pull Theory 
It is nearly impossible to find the genesis of migration studies since migration has always 
existed, but the Industrial Revolution raised awareness. Consequently, early work in 
migration theories was strongly influenced by predominately economic factors in the 18th and 
19th centuries when landowners or farmers were forced to move from rural regions to cities to 
find work in factories. During this time, one key scholar was E.G. Ravenstein, who 
formulated his ‘Laws of Migration’ (1885; 1889).18  According to Ravenstein’s model, people 
prefer moving short distances and only rarely make exceptions to that rule. In compliance 
with the historical context, people moved to commerce centers and were employed by 
industries (I: 198-199).  Rural regions that they left filled up with other migrants. Therefore, 
‘each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current’ (I: 199). 
Ravenstein further states that inhabitants from towns are less migratory than those from rural 
regions (I: 199), as are males compared to females (II: 288). 
Furthermore, technological factors like the improvements in transportation or 
manufacturing and commerce affect the amount of migration (II: 288). In conclusion, 
economic reasons are the main factor for migration (II: 286). Ravenstein’s work was written 
from a British perspective and focused on internal rather than international migration (King 
2012). Samers (2010: 55-56) describes the ‘Laws of Migration’ as ‘economically 
deterministic,’ ‘methodologically individualist,’ and ‘dreadfully antiquated.’ Other scholars, 
especially geographers (Ravenstein himself was a cartographer at the British War Office), 
valued his model much higher. White and Woods (1980: 6) called his approach ‘the 
cornerstone of geographical thought on migration,’ and Boyle et al. (1998: 5) wrote 
Ravenstein’s work ‘provided the hypotheses upon which much future migration 
Research and theorization were built’.  
 
 
17 The migration from poor to rich countries is probably the most dominant research topic in the field of 
migration studies and many theories build on that.  
18 ‘I’ refers to Ravenstein’s paper from 1885 and ‘II’ to the 1889 paper. 
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Although Ravenstein’s works are over 100 years old, they are still current to a certain 
extent. The attractiveness of cities or centers has even increased and will continue to do so in 
the future (UN 2019b). The same applies to technological progress (e.g., the Silicon Valley 
region) and the importance of economic reasons. Nevertheless, Ravenstein’s theories are, of 
course, in many ways, outdated. The main criticism here is that our perception of distance has 
changed. Economic factors are not predominant in mass migration from civil war countries 
like Syria in 2015 to Europe. In general, mobility has increased, and even long-distances are 
covered in a relatively reasonable amount of time for a fair price. 19  Indeed, economic 
differences between origin and destination remain a significant issue. Still, it is evident that 
these articles reflect a completely different period (even before WWI and II) and neglect the 
consequences of armed conflicts.  
The first attempts to develop a more generalized theory in migration studies that do 
not focus extensively on economic factors were decades later. In this context, one of the most 
groundbreaking papers is Lee’s ‘A Theory of Migration’ (1966), which developed a 
completely different and more comprehensive approach with its ‘Push-and-Pull’ model.20 Lee 
breaks it down to a comfortable and understandable formula, emphasizing the similarities that 
all migration movements have in common: origin, obstacles to overcome, and destination. In 
general, whether one decides to migrate or not is based on individual decisions and 
circumstances. Every area or country has its list of advantages ('+ factors') and disadvantages 
('- factors'). In this model, push describes the causes of flight, while pull examines the 
destination’s attractiveness by defined factors. Push factors are socio-economic (hunger, 
poverty, demographic issues, et cetera), political (war, dictatorship, discrimination, et cetera), 
and environmental (natural disasters, scarce resources, et cetera) based. Accordingly, pull 
factors include the following aspects: economy (booming economy, higher income, social 
welfare-system, et cetera), society (security, housing, education, et cetera), demography 
(sufficient space, social networks, infrastructure, et cetera), and politics (freedom, the rule of 
law, democracy, et cetera). Another important part of the model is the ‘intervening obstacles’ 
 
 
19 The term ‘fair’ price is still relative, and many people cannot afford it (World Bank 2018a). 
20Actually, Lee has never used the term ‘Push-pull model’ by himself (Passaris 1989), but his approach is 
commonly understood as 'Push-pull’. de Haas (2010: 4) criticizes this circumstance as ‘undeserved’. Other 
scholars, such as Peterson (1958) have already used the term before. 
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(e.g., distance or restrictive immigration laws), which every migrant has to overcome to reach 
the destination. Furthermore, Lee formulated a list of hypotheses concerning ‘the volume of 
migration,’ ‘streams and counter-streams,’ and ‘the characteristics of migrants.’ 
In comparison to Ravenstein’s model, the Push-and-Pull model is definitely a step 
forward and is, until now, a frequently cited work in the field of migration studies. However, 
earlier studies, which were much more focused on economic factors, remain noticeable. Other 
aspects, e.g., push factors such as armed conflicts, natural disasters, or political persecution, 
did not find any noteworthy mention in the paper, even though Lee’s concept made a more 
comprehensive approach possible as previously described. In general, Lee’s approach lacks in 
terms of not being specific enough. Of course, the idea was to formulate a generalized theory, 
but many aspects were vague and focused too much on the argument’s economic issues. One 
could also argue that Lee is trying to describe the unexplainable. Not every decision is 
rational (Lee was aware of that), but in 1966, he could probably not predict the invention of 
the internet and smartphones. People are overstimulated continuously with information and 
tend to develop preferences for specific countries or areas they have never visited before or 
have limited knowledge about it.  
Thus, especially in relatively well-developed countries, the phenomena can be 
observed that people make their migration decision based on cultural preferences or just the 
willingness to travel (having an adventure), but not on harsh life circumstances. The same 
applies to information networks and mobility. Distance is not a significant issue anymore, and 
high-speed internet connections make it easier to communicate globally. Overall, the Push-
and-Pull model was still a significant starting point for discussion, and numerous scholars 
elaborated on specific aspects of the model. According to King (2012: 13), Push-pull models 
dominated the whole mid-twentieth century regarding migration theories and ‘reflect the 
neoclassical economics paradigm, based on principles of utility maximization, rational choice, 
factor-price differentials between regions and countries, and labor mobility.’  
Massey et al. (1998: 18-21) distinguished the neoclassical approach between the 
macro and micro levels. While the macro-level focuses on spatial differences between two 
regions in terms of economic power, labor, and capital, the micro-level focuses on individual 
decisions and evaluating the pros and cons made by ‘rational actors.’ Lewis (1954) elaborated 
on the macro-level of this framework. He developed his dual-sector development model, 
which says the industrial sector grows substantially by labor migration from the agricultural 
industry. Kindleberger (1967) used this approach to explain labor migration from the South-
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European and Mediterranean countries to the North-West-European countries. King et al. 
(1997) described the transformation process of the South-European countries from labor-
exporting countries to labor-importing countries after the 1970s based on Lewis’ (1954) and 
Kindleberger’s (1967) research. Other essential works in this field are from Todaro (1969) 
and Harris and Todaro (1970). They examined urban-rural migration, which also applies to 
international migration (Borjas 1989; Todaro and Maruszko 1987; de Haas 2010). On the 
other hand, the neoclassical model’s micro-level aspect was assumed to be migration based on 
the return on investment in human capital (Sjaastad 1962; Bauer and Zimmermann 1998) and 
cumulated in the development of ‘the international immigration market’ model by Borjas 
(1989).  
Although the criticism concerning Push-pull and neoclassical models is 
overwhelming, it is even not clear if these two approaches should be observed separately from 
each other or not. King (2012) treats the Push-pull model as a part of the neoclassical 
framework, while de Haas (2010) distinguishes between these two approaches, which shows 
the subject’s diversity and complexity. However, there is some form of unity in the extensive 
formulation of criticism. Malmberg (1997: 29) criticizes the ‘internal logic’ and ‘simplicity’ 
of the theory. For Arango (2004: 19-20), the lack of explanation why only a minimal amount 
of people migrate, even though incentives are given, is the ‘achilles heel’ of the neoclassical 
approach. His second point is the theory’s incapability to explain why countries with similar 
structural backgrounds and resources have different out-migration. The approach fails to 
consider socio-cultural factors, the political reality (e.g., migration barriers), colonial roots, 
and the world economy's structure. According to King (2012), these developments lead to a 
theoretical fragmentation in Marxist political economy, historical developmentalism, systems 
theory, and the ‘new economics’ of migration during the 1970s and 1980s. 
On the other hand, de Haas (2010: 4), who distinguishes between Push-pull and 
neoclassical models, censures Push-pull and is more pleased by neoclassical theories. For de 
Haas, the model is too static and not specific enough. It does not measure the relative weight 
of migration decisions and does not consider the interaction with other factors affecting 
people’s lives. In comparison, the neoclassical approach is more sophisticated and examines 
‘migrations as a function of geographical differences.’ Overall, the neoclassical approach is 
more dynamic and can be understood as a process. de Haas explains that with the ‘factor price 
equalization’ (Heckscher-Ohlin theorem), which is supposed to create a convergence of 
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wages and reduce migration (Harris and Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954; Ranis and Fei 1961; 
Schiff 1994; Todaro and Maruszko 1987). 
Furthermore, de Haas stresses that both models derive from functionalist social theory, 
which says an equilibrium between rich and developing countries in terms of wages, for 
example, will decrease migration (2010: 5). In conclusion, he states that equilibrium-based 
models struggle to explain real-world migration because individuals do not have access to all 
information and do not operate under perfect market conditions. They cannot make 
independent decisions that are not affected by the framework of push-pull macro-level 
implications.  
Overall, the neoclassical approach is fundamental in migration studies and builds the 
foundation for in-depth macro- and microanalysis. Even though many of these approaches 
seem to be ‘outdated,’ they provide a comprehensive set of primary migration reasons. 
Indeed, the focus is very much on the economic perspective, but other scholars such as Van 
Hear et al. (2018) were influenced by these theories and extended the basic model by 
considering new nuances (e.g., migration complexes in the framework of drivers of 
migration). Asylum seekers and refugees studies cannot be covered and understood without 
these essential contributions to the field.  
3.1.2 Migration, Transitions, and Development 
Zelinsky (1971) invented ‘The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition,’ which is in sharp 
contrast to the rational decision-making contrast of the neoclassical approach. The author 
linked migration and mobility to different stages in the modernization process. His article's 
central message is that ‘there are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal 
mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential 
component of the modernization trend’ (Zelinsky 1971: 220-222). King (2012) compares 
Zelinsky’s model with demographic transition theory and Rostow’s (1960) ‘growth’ model 
stages. de Haas (2010: 6) emphasizes that Zelinsky suggested a ‘Spatio-temporal’ model ‘by 
integrating demographic transition theory with the theory of the spatial diffusion of 
innovations.’ He came up with the concept of ‘vital transition,’ which focuses not only on 
demographic factors but also on economic growth and modernization.  
Thus, ‘vital transition’ can also be understood as ‘development’ or ‘modernization.’ 
Zelinsky’s model is a five-stage model taking the individual phases of ‘vital transition’ into 
consideration: 
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1. Pre-modern or traditional society: migration only occurs very rarely, high fertility and 
mortality, and mostly short-distance migration movements (e.g., marriage). 
2. Early transitional society: mass rural-urban migration, a decline of mortality and 
population growth, and emigration to other countries for settlement or colonization.  
3. Late transitional society: less rural-urban migration and emigration, lower fertility 
rates, and improved mobility (e.g., commuting).  
4. Advanced society: rural-urban migration gets replaced by inter-urban migration, 
immigration from poor to rich countries (e.g., low-skill labor force), international 
migration of high-skill labor force and professionals, low fertility and mortality rates, 
and stable population-level. 
5. Future ‘super advanced’ society: improving infrastructure and communication, less 
human circulation, labor-force migration from emerging countries, low fertility and 
mortality rates, and immigration control mechanisms.  
Many researchers, such as Skeldon (1977), who initially investigated the urbanization 
process in Peru, were inspired by Zelinsky’s work. The two following articles by Skeldon in 
this context (1990; 1997) implemented the spatial dimension of transition theory in world 
migration: ‘There is a relationship between the level of economic development, state 
formation and the patterns of population mobility. Very generally, we can say that where 
these are high, an integrated migration system exists consisting of global and local 
movements, whereas where they are low, the migration systems are not integrated and 
mainly local’. (Skeldon 1997: 52) de Haas (2010: 7) elaborated on this and called the new 
dimension ‘structure’ since Skeldon did not only focus on demographic and economic 
transition but also on nation-state formation in Europe, colonization, cultural and linguistic 
roots, and structural interdependencies and inequalities (e.g., migration from Africa to the UK 
or France). Massey (1988) followed the same argument by stressing the relationship between 
capitalist development and migration. He also argued that improved infrastructure and 
consistent differences in wages would increase movement among people who are seeking 
better living conditions elsewhere. Hatton and Willamson (1998) confirmed Massey’s 
analysis from 1988.  
In a later article, in 1983, Zelinsky addressed some of his critics and presented an 
updated version of his model by integrating the dependency theory, policies, decision-making 
of governments, and corporations in developed countries and their role in terms of migration 
patterns. Nevertheless, as King (2012: 15) stated, Zelinsky’s research was, at least to a certain 
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extent, visionary because he ‘anticipated the current debate on migration and development,’ 
which is, indeed, true. Almost 50 years later, many parts of his initial theory are still relevant. 
Zelinsky linked the concept of time and space with mobility and migration. Thus, he was one 
of the first scholars who knew what an important role technology, infrastructure, and 
communication would play in the future. Unfortunately, many other researchers ignore this 
aspect in their theories, which makes the criticism of the neoclassical approach legitimate. 
However, it is worth discussing if both arguments can easily co-exist. Zelinsky merely 
implemented this approach by introducing the concept of time and space. However, one of his 
work’s shortcomings is that it is very much long-term oriented and does not address short-
term events such as conflicts, wars, or natural disasters. In this regard, push-pull models, for 
example, are superior.  
3.1.3 Historical-structural Models 
The ‘historical-structural’ models describe a set of related approaches and theories concerning 
migration. Many of these models are heavily influenced by Marxists and their interpretation 
of the capitalistic system. Therefore, inequality and the capitalistic system's exploitive nature 
play a significant role in international migration's genesis (Morawska 2012: 55). According to 
King (2012), the three most influential models in terms of structural theorization and reasons 
for international migration are dual and segmented labor markets, dependency theory, and 
world-systems theory. 
Piore (1979) analyzed the labor market’s structural framework in terms of migration 
and concluded that pull factors dominate over push factors in this situation. Especially in 
highly-developed, mostly Western societies, there is a high demand for a cheap and flexible 
labor force. This trend is the foundation for the ‘dual labor market.’ According to this 
theory, 
the labor market is fragmented into two different labor markets. The first labor market is for 
the domestic population and offers well-paid jobs, security, and better jobs overall for its 
citizens. The other one is the secondary labor market. This labor market is primarily for poor 
migrant workers and offers low-wages, insecurity, and worse working conditions. In other 
words, migrants do the low-skilled and very often dangerous work that the local workforce is 
unwilling or unable to do. Of course, this separation of labor also has other implications. The 
cheap labor force’s presence lowers the domestic population's wages as well, which causes 
tensions between citizens and migrants because doing badly-paid work is usually still better 
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than what they left behind. Nieswand (2011) calls this ‘the status paradox of migration.’ The 
reputation of migrants in their home country is very high due to the constant financial support 
of family members; the migrant’s status in the host country is usually very miserable. 
Consequently, the secondary labor market becomes very ‘segmented’ due to race, 
nationality, religion, et cetera, and migrants take these jobs (Samers 2010: 65). The 
phenomena of the ‘segmented’ labor market are mainly observed in well-developed countries. 
The recruitment process also tends to be network-based since foreign recruiters prefer co-
workers of their own ethnicity (Fussell 2012: 28). Sassen (1988; 1991) extended Piore’s 
(1979) work and transformed his approach to the post-industrial era. Sassen analyzed the 
emergence and growth of megacities like New York or London and concluded that corporate 
headquarters, financial centers, and producer services played an essential role in the genesis of 
them. Global cities are full of extreme contrasts. The super-rich lives alongside the very poor. 
Therefore, the work that has been done by the rich people themselves previously is now done 
by immigrants, who are working in restaurants or hotels, cleaning offices, and healthcare, et 
cetera., so-called low-end jobs done by the ‘precariat’ (Standing 2011).  
Piore (1979) and Sassen’s (1998; 1991) approach is related to another theory within 
the Marxist framework: the ‘dependency school.’ It is the complete opposite of the 
neoclassical approach. The neoclassical school assumes that migration is self-correcting, and 
migration balances out over a certain period, which leads to a new equilibrium. For example, 
wage-differences are supposed to diminish until they vanish entirely. On the other hand, neo-
Marxists argue that ‘migration is self-perpetuating, reproducing inequality through the 
mechanism of cumulative causation’ (Myrdal 1957; Petras 1981). 
Compared to other scholars such as de Haas (2010), who negatively link migration and 
development, dependency theorists see migrants as part of the global labor force from the 
more impoverished regions of the world in the context of exploitation by the capitalistic 
system. (Morawska 2012: 60) King (2012: 17) concludes that dependency theorists reflect 
this process as something that makes millions of people homeless and forces them to leave 
their original countries. The dependency theory approach was very successful during the 
1960s and 1970s in Latin America. Frank (1969, 1978), with his ‘development of 
underdevelopment’ claim, was one of the most influential researchers. Wise (2008), who 
investigated Mexican migration, is a more actual representative of this school.  
The third and latest approach within the historical-structural models is the ‘World 
Systems Theory.’ It is similar to the previously mentioned approaches. However, the world-
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systems theory is supposed to be more comprehensive when considering the global capitalist 
system's success and influence from the 16th century (Wallerstein 1974; 1979). At the 
beginning of the 20th century, the end of colonialism can be seen as the origin of the World 
Systems Theory. Even though decolonization dominated the post-war era, the links between 
former colonies and superpowers remained strong. So did the permanent circulation of people 
between these countries because of infrastructure, transportation, linguistic, and cultural 
connections (Morawska 2007: 3). Thus, Wallerstein (1974) distinguished countries by wealth 
and their economic power. According to this model, the dominant capitalist powers were 
North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. These countries formed ‘the 
core’ and were surrounded by countries from ‘the periphery.’ Those periphery countries were 
highly dependent on the core in terms of trade, capital, and migration. Wallerstein’s model 
also included ‘semi-periphery’ countries like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, or South 
Korea. 21  However, all these countries were embedded in the framework of the ‘new 
international division of labor’ (NIDL) (Froebel et al. 1980). The NIDL derives from 
capitalist exploitation in rural regions and creates a considerable amount of available 
workforce (‘reserve army’), which allows the core countries to use the underclass wherever 
and whenever they need them. In other words, the capitalistic system created a self-preserving 
source of low-wage and low-status people for the upper-class in the core countries to maintain 
their high living standards. Authors like Cohen (1987) or Potts (1990) elaborated on the 
endless hunger of the capitalistic system and its need for ‘slave-like workers’ (King 2012).  
Reception to the Marxist approach has been widely mixed as well. Arango (2004: 27) 
criticizes that historical-structural models consider migrants as ‘little more than passive pawns 
in the play of great powers and world processes presided over by the logic of capital 
accumulation.’ He further criticizes historical determinism as ‘univocal, reductionist 
interpretations of history in which all countries pass through… as if following a grand script’ 
(Arango 2004: 27).  
King (2012: 19) has three significant criticisms. First, he argues that migration flows 
do not always follow the money but often appear spontaneously as a reaction to specific 
 
 
21 The rise of new superpowers like China, India or Russia in recent years shows that this classification is, of 
course, not correct anymore. 
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events or developments. Second, historical-structural approaches often do not recognize the 
successful examples of migration (e.g., immigrants in the U.S., who accumulate wealth) and 
pay attention only to capitalism’s exploitatory aspect. Third, the role of the state is ignored by 
all, not only by Marxist theorists. The political economy dimension of immigration receiving 
countries needs to be considered in terms of ‘quota and admission systems, regulations of 
entry, duration of stay, work permits, citizenship rights, etc.’ (King 2012: 19).  
According to Morawska (2007: 4) and her ‘hegemonic stability’ model, only a small 
group of political and militarily powerful nations dominate the global economy. Thus, these 
‘hegemonic receiver-states regulate global trade, finance, and international migration’ (King 
2012: 19). Castles and Miller have already linked global migration to the political economy 
framework in 1993 and explained it in later works with transformational changes (Castles 
2010) or massive shifts in the global economy, political, and military power dynamics 
(Castles and Miller 2009: 54). However, Castles and Miller also recognize the disruptive 
character of international migration and ‘transnational societies’ in the context of hegemony 
(2009: 12). 
Regarding asylum seeker and refugee movements, historical-structural models add a 
new dimension to the debate by emphasizing the role of inequality and armed conflicts in 
migration decisions. They supplement the classic push-pull theories and provide a coherent 
explanation of why specific destinations attract people.  
3.1.4 Systems and Networks 
Systems theory may be the most flexible approach among migration studies since it delivers 
an analytical framework for structure, linkage, and migration (King 2012). Thus, the systems 
approach covers a wide range of different topics due to its adjustable and its less stringent 
character of the model in terms of ideology: village migration systems (Mabogunje 1970), 
inter-urban migration (Poot 1986), the European labor migration system (White and Woods 
1980: 49-55), the global migration system (Kritz et al. 1992), or the world systems theory of 
Wallerstein (1979) can be all categorized as a part of systems theory. Faist (1997: 193) 
emphasizes the advantage of the systems approach compared to the linear Push-pull models 
as ‘circular, multi-causal, and interdependent,’ which makes specific changes of systems 
traceable.  
King (2012: 20) summarizes systems as self-feeding (like chain migration), self-
regulating (correcting themselves in response to a ‘shock’ to the system), or self-modifying 
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(e.g., shifting to a different destination when one is blocked off).‘ Mabogunje’s (1970), who 
investigated the rural-urban migration situation in West Africa, developed the following 
model: 
1. The environment: all critical parameters for a person to include living 
standards, culture, politics, economics, et cetera. 
2. The migrant: the capability of a migrant to move. 
3. Control subsystems: determining the volume of migration by decision-making 
processes. 
4. Adjustment mechanisms: social, economic, and political forces, which react to 
the departure and arrival of migrants. 
5. Feedback loops: positive and negative feedbacks of the destination decide if 
the migration flows continue or stop.  
Mabogunje’s work has received mixed reactions. While Kritz et al. (1992) stressed the 
model’s flexibility and argued for an adaptation to international migration studies, other 
researchers reviewed his 1970 article negatively. Boyle et al. (1998: 77-79) criticized that 
Mabogunje’s systems approach failed to explain several systems such as ‘apartheid migration 
system’ or the ‘Gulf migration system.’ According to King (2012), Mabogunje’s systems 
approach lacks research design and data availability, making it easy for critics to point to the 
theory's mechanical and positivist character. Nevertheless, systems and networks have been 
established in the field of migration studies. Thus, a great deal of research has been done in 
the meanwhile. Arango (2004: 28) calls networks ‘one of the most important factors for 
migration.’  
Massey et al. (1998: 42-43) argue that networks lower the costs and risks for migration 
since networks consist of migrants, former migrants, or future migrants who operate in the 
same social environment and connect through individual ties like friendship or family. 
Therefore, these groups provide and share information concerning migration and movement. 
Tilly (1990) came up with the following statement in this context: ‘it is not people who 
migrate but networks’ (1990: 79). Faist (1997) and Goss and Lindquist (1995) see networks 
as the ‘bridge’ between individuals and socio-structure, which makes them, in their opinion, 
superior to Push-pull or gravity models. Fussell (2012) has identified three more relevant 
contributions to the systems-network approach: First, they differentiate migration by 
dynamics. Second, they can predict future migration streams or developments. Third, they 
distinguish between causes of migration and its perpetuation and its diffusion in time and 
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space. This approach’s historical roots date back to Thomas and Znaniecki (1918-1920), and 
they also play a significant role in the development of chain migration theories (MacDonald 
and MacDonald 1964).  
Most of the emphasis has been on investigating family networks because the common 
understanding and perception is that those ties are the strongest. However, Granovetter’s 
research from 1973 showed that also ‘weak ties’ can promote migration. Such weak 
relationships can be derived from common culture or values, same race or ethnicity, or even 
just loose friendships, et cetera. All these factors and circumstances can be enough to build up 
trust and establish a network-related movement (Tilly 2007). Liempt (2011), who researched 
Somalian migration to the United Kingdom, is an excellent example. Boyd and Nowak (2012: 
79-83) differentiate between three significant network styles: family and personal networks, 
labor networks, and illegal migrant networks. The authors also added gender to the topic by 
stressing women's importance in establishing and maintaining such networks (2012: 83-86). 
King (2012: 22) states that migration networks are overwhelmingly reviewed positively in the 
literature from a migrant’s perspective. These networks provide information, guidance, 
financial assistance, housing and help them with everything else that new migrants have to 
deal with at their destination. Arango (2004: 28) attributes a multiplier effect to networks and 
assumes they perpetuate migration movements. However, King stresses that these network 
effects are not endless and cannot continue forever due to natural limitations (2012: 22). 
Samers (2010: 87-93) addressed the issues of smuggling, human trafficking, and other 
criminal activities in the context of networks, which shows that networks do not have only 
positive effects for migrants but can also harm them. 
The latest effort in the field of networks and systems comes from Barthel and 
Neumayer (2015). The authors argue that network effects increase asylum seekers’ numbers 
since other migrants from the same origin can provide information and assistance. These 
network effects extend borders and also affect other geographically proximate source 
countries. A common language has the same indications, but the implications are relatively 
small. On the other hand, the authors could not find evidence for network effects for countries 
with the same colonial history.  
These findings contradict some of Neumayer’s earlier research results (2004), where 
Neumayer found that asylum seekers often come from former colony countries and prefer 
destinations with the same language or one close to their origins. However, restrictive 
immigration laws and other anti-migration measures lead to more asylum migrants in 
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neighboring destination countries. Indeed, the opposite effect is observed if a destination 
country lowers its entry barriers. Their research shows that once a destination has become 
popular among migrants from a specific origin, it will last for quite a while due to network 
effects. This is similar to Neumayer’s earlier findings. He was able to confirm ‘network 
effects’ (a high share of asylum seekers from a particular country means a higher level of 
attractiveness of other asylum seekers from the same origin) (Neumayer 2004). Thus, a ‘race-
to-the-bottom’ is likely to appear between destination countries by lowering migrants’ 
standards. 
The study of networks is of extraordinary importance for this dissertation. Chapter six 
will show evidence for the theory that actual asylum seekers and refugees in Europe are 
influenced by networks of families, friends, or communities of the same origin.  
3.1.5 The New Economics of Labor Migration 
The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) emerged during the 1980s and connects the 
neoclassical approach with family decision-making. The most influential representative of 
this theory was Oded Stark (1991; Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark and Bloom 1985). This theory 
permanently added two meaningful aspects to the discussion of migration. First, the migration 
decision-making process should not be observed separately but preferably seen in the context 
of close family members and relatives. Usually, these decisions are made in groups and 
depend on who goes, for how long, to which place, et cetera. Massey et al. (1998: 21) also 
extends the group of family members to include (close) friends and other persons significant 
to the individual making a migration decision. Second, decision-making processes in terms of 
migration are not only about finances and making more profit by receiving higher wages or 
generating a higher income in general; it is also about ‘income diversification’ and ‘risk 
aversion.’ The need for risk reduction is given primarily in developing countries, which 
cannot adequately handle natural disasters like droughts or floods due to a lack of financial 
resources. 
King (2012: 23) concludes that the NELM perspective is a diversification of risks by 
considering both significant aspects of the theory. Families, households, or communities take 
control over the finances and resources by sending group members where they are needed and 
generating the most value for everyone. Therefore, for instance, it can be beneficial for some 
family members to stay. In contrast, other family members could be more ‘valuable’ at other 
places, including internal migration, as well as an international movement. One of the 
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significant advantages of this ‘diversification strategy’ in allocating family members is that 
those successful abroad, respectively, at their destination, can support family members left 
behind. Besides the positive effect of risk aversion, it also helps to cover the costs of daily life 
(nutrition, accommodation, clothing, et cetera) and to invest in future projects (property, 
businesses, investments, et cetera) (2012: 23). 
The main difference between the NELM theory and the neoclassical approach is, for 
King (2012), the perception of ‘return migration.’ In the neoclassical framework returning to 
the origin means ‘failure’ because of miscalculation or other events. Nonetheless, cases of 
return migration are not covered at all. On the other hand, in NELM theory, return migration 
is perceived as something positive or right and not a failure. People who return to their origins 
have been successful and achieved their goals. Thus, they are coming back with more than 
they possessed (Cassarino 2004).  
One of the critics concerning NELM comes from Arango (2004: 23), who argues that 
the theory is very much dependent on the supply side of labor and works best in rural regions 
(e.g., Mexico or Botswana). Kings (2012: 23) further criticizes that families are treated as a 
‘black box.’ NELM does not say anything about the tensions, conflicts, or other problems, 
which some families might have and influenced their decision-making process. NELM 
models expect ‘harmony’ within families but do not pay enough attention to the other side of 
the coin. Finally, NELM can explain why individual family members migrate but cannot 
describe the situation when the whole family decides to leave their origin, which is often the 
case.    
A new aspect was recently added to the debate by introducing refugee studies to 
NELM, networks, and world-systems theory. FitzGerald and Arar (2018) explained in their 
research the development of the sociology of international migration. They emphasized the 
lack of refugee studies, which has become a relatively new field in academics. The field 
sociology of migration emerged during a period of relatively free immigration, and refugee 
studies developed during a period of high selectivity. The recognition as a refugee helped in 
cases of resettlement or restraining deportation. Therefore, according to the authors, it is 
essential to understand this evolution to fully grasp the current debates about the so-called 
‘refugee crisis’ and policy responses. FitzGerald and Arar refer to realistic approaches and 
elaborate on how models like the new economic labor migration provide a framework for 
refugees’ decisions. The same applies to the world-systems theory concerning mass hosting, 
asylum, transit, and resettlement.   
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3.1.6 Aspiration and Ability Model / Drivers of Migration 
This section of the dissertation shows how migration studies have developed and evolved. 
While theorists such as Ravenstein (1885; 1889) or Lee (1966) tried to formulate some 
universal theories about migration, the reality showed the limitations of their approach. They 
are often criticized as too ‘static’ or ‘mechanic.’ The aspiration and ability model attempts to 
overcome these limitations by introducing a more comprehensive, nuanced, and flexible 
approach. One could argue it tries to combine the rational neoclassical with the flexibility of 
the NELM and systems theory to resolve migration's complexity. The concept of ‘drivers of 
migration’ illustrates this since it is not supposed to follow only a simple push-pull pattern but 
tries to conceive the whole complexity of ‘migration complexes’ (Van Hear et al. 2018). 
Thus, later works, which examined the Push-and-Pull model, instead analyzed certain 
aspects of the theory rather than developing new generalized models. Davenport et al. (2003) 
criticized earlier works in migration studies for ignoring internally displaced people in the 
context of forced migration and not considering the situation of people at home and in other 
countries in terms of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.  In general, the authors argue that there is too 
much emphasis on the ‘push’ aspects and aimed to develop a micro-foundations theory. The 
difference between this approach and prior studies is that people choose to stay or leave and 
are not just the outcome of a ‘stimulus-response mechanism.’ The empirical research 
conducted shows evidence for political threats as a flight reason, while the authors could not 
find support for other factors such as economic threats. 
The contrast to previous works is distinct. Davenport et al. investigated IDPs’ situation 
by conducting empirical research and focused primarily on political threats as a reason to flee. 
The authors developed a new concept by distinguishing between ‘state violence,’ ‘dissident 
violence,’ and ‘state-dissident violence’ (Davenport et al. 2003: 32). This approach describes 
the actors in an armed conflict or (more precisely) in a civil war. In comparison to earlier 
studies, economic reasons were not the main fleeing reasons anymore. Davenport et al. do not 
deny the importance of economic factors but emphasize that political threats have a much 
more significant influence on migration movements. Even though the study focuses mostly on 
IDPs, the implications for the migration movements to Europe since 2015 are still current 
since most refugees came from civil war countries (e.g., Syria).  
However, it is also essential to keep in mind that people are more flexible because of 
the enormous infrastructure and communication possibilities. In the past, many people from 
emerging countries were not fully aware of the living conditions in the Western world, and 
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not everyone is simply satisfied by getting geographically away from the conflict zone but are 
seeking a better life elsewhere. This observation also applies to refugee camps. Poor living 
conditions might not be enough anymore to prevent people from leaving for more developed 
countries ( e.g., the EU). 
Furthermore, this study tells us also something about life in Western societies. The rise 
of autocratic and populistic movements can be observed everywhere in Europe. Without a 
doubt, we are leaving in times of turmoil. Climate change, digitalization, mass migration, et 
cetera affect the lives of many people. State violence and violence from dissidents are also 
phenomena, which can be experienced in the EU, like, for example, the ‘Yellow-vest’ protests 
in France recently. Indeed, we are far from a civil war situation in the EU, but the first signs 
are already alarming.  
A similar approach was made by Melander and Öberg, who investigated in their study 
‘The Threat of Violence and Forced Migration: Geographical Scope Trumps Intensity of 
Fighting’ (2007) the relationship between forced migration and any form of violence (e.g., 
civil wars) by applying new indicators. Similarly, Davenport et al. (2003) focused more on 
human rights. Thus, the authors examined ‘the geographical scope of fighting’ and the 
‘intensity’ of conflicts. For that purpose, the authors analyzed refugees' empirical data and 
internally displaced people affected by civil wars or armed conflicts. The results of their work 
showed no evidence that the intensity of conflict increases the number of displaced people 
significantly. Hence, the authors concluded that it is more critical where the battle takes place 
and not how intense it is. According to their findings, Melander and Öberg state, ‘the larger 
the fighting's geographical scope, the higher the number of forced migrants’ (Melander and 
Öberg: 168-169). 
The results of this empirical study might be surprising. Still, since we are talking 
mostly about IDPs again, people probably do not have the financial capabilities to go 
anywhere they want. People who do not have financial resources cannot simply leave, 
whether or not the conflict is very intense. In this case, it is very likely not relevant. The more 
interesting question here would be: where would people go without significant financial 
constraints? The authors also struggle to explain the term ‘intensity’ adequately. It remains 
unclear where the tipping point is or where the line between a very intense and less intense 
conflict is. It might even be impossible to measure ‘intensity’ because everyone perceives a 
conflict differently; this is very subjective. However, we should also consider that new forms 
of warfare and radicalism have occurred in the meanwhile. For example, the U.S. drone 
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program might not be the most ‘intense’ one but is a constant threat. On the other hand, the 
Islamic State has brought extremism to a whole new level. This aspect of the study might not 
be current anymore and needs reexamination. 
While previous studies focused primarily on push factors, Neumayer elaborated with 
his article ‘Asylum Destination Choice: What Makes Some West European Countries More 
Attractive Than Others?’ (2004) on the question of which particular preferences asylum 
seekers have concerning their destination (pull factors). His findings show that richer 
countries receive a higher per capita share of asylum seekers, and economic factors such as 
growth rate or unemployment rate do not significantly affect attractiveness. Neumayer’s 
results showed evidence that countries with left-wing governments are, according to their 
recognition rate, more migration-friendly than right-wing governments, which are perceived 
to be more restrictive.  
The rise of new populistic movements (usually right-wing) raises the question of how 
relevant the classic ‘right-left’ pattern still is. After 2015, Angela Merkel (chancellor of 
Germany) was perceived as a liberal person for her refugee policy. However, she is still part 
of Germany’s conservative party, which has a long tradition of being migration-skeptical. In 
fact, in 2015, there were initially plans to close the border when the significant migration 
movement reached German territory.  The only reason for not taking any action was the fear 
of bad publicity by shutting down the borders and violence against helpless children, women, 
and men. The Brexit, President Trump election, and other successful right-wing movements 
in Europe have shifted the debate tremendously into the populist corner. In general, left-wing 
governments might still be more open regarding migration, but it is hard to test this 
hypothesis in 2019 because there are almost none left. 
Furthermore, we can say that 2015 had nothing to do with language and geography. 
Germany barely has any historical ties with Syria and is also several thousand kilometers 
away. There are also no similarities between the main languages, but translation apps make 
the language barrier easier to overcome. However, network effects played a role after the first 
refugees arrived in Germany. Many new immigrants tried to bring their family members left 
behind in the original country into the EU. An open question remains if network effects might 
also exist in transit-zones or refugee camps. The last aspect of Neumayer’s research is the 
implication on EU policy. Neumayer argues that some countries will always be more 
attractive than others (especially for migrants). His findings also seem to support Davenport et 
al.. (2003) empirical study concerning economic factors since economic performance, such as 
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unemployment rate or growth rate, has no significance in the decision-making process of 
migrants. This might be, to a certain extent, definitely true, but, again, migration decisions are 
based on personal preferences, and these can be very subjective and change over time. Even 
though Germany might be, for instance, an attractive destination for asylum-seekers at the 
moment, it does not mean this circumstance cannot change rapidly.  
Neumayer (2005) analyzed the reasons for asylum seekers going to Western Europe 
and addressed the policies required to reduce migration inflows. Neumayer used a more 
comprehensive approach to determine if the political regime and violent political conflict are 
relevant or not in terms of asylum migration. Neumayer’s findings show that countries of 
origin's economic conditions are relevant factors for asylum seekers coming to Western 
Europe. The same applies to the political regime, threats to personal integrity like human 
rights abuses, dissident political violence, civil/ethnic warfare, state failure, and external 
conflict. According to his variables, the lack of democracy in the country of origin also 
increases asylum migration. On the other hand, he could not find any evidence for the so-
called ‘migration hump.’ 
Overall, Neumayer’s findings meet the expectations. However, he states that his 
variables for genocide/politicide, famine, and natural disaster turned out to be insignificant 
because of the events’ short-term character. In 2019, due to the climate change debate, it 
might be questionable if natural disasters can still be classified as ‘short-term’ since climate 
change played a role as a ‘multiplier’ in the Syrian civil war (Selby et al., 2017).  
The so-called migration hump is an ongoing discussion in the field of migration 
studies like de Haas (2010: 11) elaborated on. The original theory dates back to the time when 
NAFTA passed. The expectation was that trade liberalization would reduce migration from 
Mexico to the U.S. (Martin 1993); Martin and Taylor (1996) argued that trade and 
immigration could be complements. Thus, in the short or medium run, migration flows might 
even increase. Neumayer’s findings could not confirm the migration hump. Still, the original 
theory focused on international trade and migration, which often go hand in hand with 
liberalization on the labor market (e.g., EU expansion 2007). In other words: two competitive 
economies agree on a trade agreement, not on sustainable and structural development for the 
weaker partner. The balance of power should also be kept in mind since the stronger 
negotiating partner is very often able to determine the conditions of such deals. This factor 
makes a huge difference because these deals are not prepared to create an equilibrium 
between two partners and increase profits (mainly for multi-national enterprises). Neumayer, 
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on the other hand, argues more from a long-term perspective. His approach was to find 
structural terms, which cause migration.  
Moore and Shellman (2007) also asked if refugees are ‘bogus’ or not by providing the 
first global analysis of refugees' destinations. Their findings show evidence that fear of 
persecution, wages, culture, and relocation costs do, indeed, play a role in migration decision-
making processes. According to the authors, refugees do not decide on the level of violence 
concerning their destination (except for genocides). They also do not flee primarily to 
countries supporting (political) freedom or offering significant economic opportunities. 
However, some examples, like the U.S. or Germany, are always among the top fleeing 
destinations. Moore and Shellman conclude that refugees mainly seek asylum in neighboring 
countries, especially if their origin is affected by war or civil war, and refugees fleeing to 
other countries follow their colonial ties. 
Moore and Shellman made one of the most prominent studies concerning refugees’ 
destinations by analyzing pull factors. The main difference to Neumayer’s findings (2004) is 
the greater data-set that the authors used. They conclude that most refugees are incapable of 
realizing their preferences (e.g., higher wages or political freedom) because the relocation 
costs are too difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, one could argue that the analysis is too 
expansive and not precise enough since it took all refugee movements on a global scale in the 
past into consideration over a substantial period (from 1965-1995).  
Again, times have changed radically since this study. The technological progress 
regarding communication, infrastructure, mobility, et cetera. is tremendous. That is also why 
this research cannot be compared to 2019 (or only allows a few derivations to the present). It 
is also questionable if global trends are relevant for migration flows to the EU. Every in- and 
out-migration has its reasons and purposes. A generalization seems to be inappropriate here.  
Apart from that, Moore and Shellman's suggestions fit into the narrative that refugees 
are in the overwhelming majority, not ‘bogus.’ Neumayer (2005) came to a similar 
conclusion. The vast majority of people are fleeing from severe threats concerning life and 
freedom. Even though there are some exceptions for destination countries such as Germany or 
following colonial ties, they stay in the region mostly caring about their well-being and not 
about any financial benefits. Unfortunately, many policymakers and rising populistic 
movements within the EU ignore these findings. 
Tétényi et al. (2018) analyzed why Hungary was the most popular destination for 
entering the Central and Eastern European countries between 2002 and 2016. Further, the 
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authors tested the Hungarian government’s claims that refugees are not refugees but rather 
economic migrants. Their findings show clearly that the main reason is Hungary’s recognition 
rate and Hungary’s geographical position, and its role as a transit country of the so-called 
‘Balkan route.’ Other factors, such as unemployment, trade, aid, or Hungary’s harsh border 
policy, did not play a significant role. Thus, Tétényi et al. conclude that the government's 
claims are false, and people entering Hungary are, indeed, fleeing as victims of violent 
conflicts from their country of origin. As long as these conflicts continue, refugees will 
continue applying for asylum in Hungary. 
Tétényi et al.’s (2018) findings fit in the framework of the other conclusions, such as 
Neumayer (2004; 2005) or Moore and Shellman (2007). While the other studies covered a 
wide range of various countries, Tétényi et al. focused only on one country (Hungary), which 
played an extraordinary role during the refugee crisis from 2015. Since Hungary is now 
known for its restrictive immigration laws, the country remains embedded in the EU policy 
framework, respectively, the Dublin system (people have to apply for asylum, where they first 
touch EU ground).  
However, Hungary has never been the leading destination for asylum seekers or 
refugees, and people preferred to move on to the North (e.g., Germany or Sweden). Thus, the 
high number of asylum applications has very much to do with the country's geographical 
position and EU legislation, rules, and regulations and the lack of knowledge about the EU 
from asylum-seekers who were very likely not aware of them. It is also unclear how many 
people might have already sought asylum in other countries located more closely to their 
origin (e.g., Greece or Bulgaria). In 2015, the Dublin system did not function well. 
Nevertheless, the most interesting open question remains: ‘Under which circumstances 
would people have preferred to stay in Hungary?’. Tétényi et al. could not find any evidence 
for the claims of the Hungarian government. Still, the research also does not answer whether 
better living conditions or higher living standards in Hungary might have motivated people to 
stay and not move on to other countries like Germany.  
Carling and Collins (2017) provide one of the most sophisticated literature reviews in 
migration studies by analyzing the terms ‘aspiration’, ‘desire,’ and ‘drivers of migration’ over 
time and how they have emerged. While aspiration and desire are synonyms, drivers of 
migration are an analytical framework that describes the world. 
Nonetheless, all three terms explain how migration is ‘initiated, experienced, and 
represented.’ On the other hand, ‘determinants of migration’ and ‘causes of migration’ have 
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declined consistently in academic publications and been replaced by the relatively new term 
‘drivers of migration.’ Carling and Collins conclude that their selection of articles in 
migration studies show conceptual promise of re-engaging drivers of migration, building on 
long-standing criticisms, and responding to social sciences interest in the future. Carling and 
Schewel (2018) analyzed the aspiration/ability model from Carling (2002) and its 
implications for migration studies since then. Many researchers have adapted this basic 
framework by using a ‘two-step approach,’ which argues that aspiration is the desire to 
migrate and ability describes the capability to migrate. However, aspiration can vary between 
‘choice’ and ‘coercion.’ Thus, this approach distinguishes between ‘involuntary non-
migrants’ and ‘voluntary non-migrants.’ 
Consequently, the two-step approach explains migration and immobility in terms of 
preferences to stay or the inability to do so. Furthermore, the model was used in many 
surveys, such as the GWP (2008)22 poll, to describe migration aspirations. This empirical 
approach makes it more challenging to develop a universal theory in an already fragmented 
field. In general, the aspiration/ability model is not supposed to be superior compared to other 
approaches but rather complementary.  
The latest approach for inventing a more generalized theory, which refers to the neo-
classical approach by Lee (1966), was made by Van Hear et al. (2018). They invented the 
‘Push-pull plus’ model based on existing frameworks and models in migration theories. It is 
supposed to be a more comprehensive and nuanced model than Lee’s approach. Push-pull 
plus presents an analytical framework that describes the factors that influence people’s 
migration and decisions. These factors – often appearing in various combinations - are 
described as drivers. These drivers and dimensions shape migration complexes or 
configurations. Therefore, the authors introduce a new framework for analyzing drivers and 
implement the ‘concept of driver complexes.’ Drivers of migration should never be analyzed 
relationless but rather in combination with several factors. According to the authors, 
migration flows can be understood by considering the following categories: predisposing 
(structural disparities between origin and destination on the bases of macro-political-
economy), proximate (effects bearing directly on migration, e.g., down- or upturn in 
economic), precipitating (outbreak of war, natural disasters, the collapse of social welfare 
 
 
22 Gallup (2008). World Poll Questions. Washington, DC: Gallup. 
  61 
 
systems, et cetera) and mediating drivers (presence or absence of infrastructure, 
communication, information). Whether one person decides to leave or to stay depends on the 
combination and the real importance of these factors. The complexity of this model is to 
distinguish and evaluate relevant and less critical circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that proximate and mediating drivers show more 
significant potential for intervention than structural and precipitating spheres. Thus, the 
authors identified some other dimensions of drivers, like locality (e.g., demographic or 
environmental pressures), scale (different social and geographical scales), duration or 
timeframe (different timescales from sudden to acute to chronic), and depth of tractability 
(drivers on the surface of society and hidden drivers). Again, the combination of these drivers 
is crucial in determining if migration happens or not. These factors should not be considered 
in isolation but rather in context (Van Hear et al. 2018). 
In comparison to Lee (1966), Van Hear et al. recognize the complexity and different 
dynamics of migration flow by introducing the concept of inward migration, outward 
migration, and the journey (driver complexes). While Lee’s approach was still very static and 
basic, Van Hear et al. developed a more flexible model by including other push factors like 
undernourishment, natural disasters, or human rights violation into their model. Lee’s original 
thoughts were still very much influenced by economic push factors and authors like 
Ravenstein (1885; 1889). This development shows how the Push-and-Pull model has shifted 
over time from a strictly neoclassical approach to a more generalized theory, recognizing 
various fields and disciplines.  
Overall, the push-pull (plus) theory is probably the most comprehensive approach in 
migration studies (Paul 2019). However, the argument is focused more on a permanent 
settlement, or long-term migration, while refugee camps are supposed to be a short-term 
solution. Indeed, Lee (1966), who came up first with this model, has included ‘obstacles for 
migration’ in his theory. Still, he is not dealing with the issue of people who are forced to flee 
for serious reasons (e.g., war) and cannot overcome these obstacles to migrate to another 
country, nor can they go back to their country of origin. The pull factor does not exist here 
since the only appealing reason for fleeing is security. Of course, safety is the primary human 
demand, but it does not satisfy any other basic human needs. Therefore, the push factor 
remains tremendously high while security is the only pull factor; a factor which should not be 
taken into consideration at all if it is the only reason for leaving an area since it is natural that 
no rational (civilian) person wants to risk its life in armed conflicts. In this case, people are 
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locked in no-man’s-land, respectively, in camps or transit zones. Consequently, people are 
pushed farther, or in other words, people will continuously seek alternative living and survival 
situations. The theory is based on the thinking that people are migrating from one country to 
another, which is initially valid.  
However, the reality is that people are mostly fleeing from one country to camps or 
transit zones, which makes a big difference (Paul 2019). While states are following migration 
policies and trying to control the in- and out-flow of migrants and citizens, camps are 
improvised solutions, often run by international institutions. Furthermore, although camps are 
mainly outside of the country where the armed conflict takes place, they are, in fact, small 
complex socio-microeconomics in themselves and often referred to as “a state in a state.” In 
particular, the examples of refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan (see chapter 5) show that 
these countries are entirely overwhelmed by significant refugee movements from Syria and 
can no longer control their borders. Thus, local governments in these neighboring countries 
are incapable of adequately dealing with this situation, while camps are developing their 
infrastructure and identity. Extended versions of the push and pull model are now considering 
more migration drivers, but the issues remain the same.  
Therefore, a more profound approach is required, which considers short-term 
settlement, i.e., camps and transit zones, as an identifiable entity in the model. Additionally, 
this approach offers new opportunities in spatial planning as a part of urbanization processes. 
It can transform short-term into long-term sustainable solutions by satisfying basic needs 
(nutrition, fresh water, security, et cetera) and making cultural, political, and economic 
participation for its inhabitants possible.  
Hence, I took the existing shortcomings in terms of camps and developed and designed 
an approach that considers camps’ unique situation. The classic push-pull model could be 
added to by the factor ‘stay,’ which is supposed to reduce flight causes. The following table 
illustrates this model: 
Table 4: Push-Stay-Pull Model (Paul 2019) 







The satisfaction of Basic Human Needs 
Development Program / Urbanization 
Process 
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Employment 
Area Country A Transit-zone / Refugee Camp Country B 
Timeframe Long-term / 
Short-term 
Temporary with the Outlook for long-term Long-term 
Direction of 
Migration 
→ With Obstacle (↓ ; →) ↓ 
→ Without Obstacle (→) ↓ 
The suggested ‘Push-Stay-Pull’ model is another attempt to connect neoclassical approaches 
with drivers of migration theory to create a more comprehensive model by addressing people 
in refugee camps.  
 The interviews in chapter six will reflect on this model based on the elaborations in 
this section. The qualitative and quantitative research findings show that people might see 
opportunities in camps if they provide sufficient living conditions.  
3.1.7 The Role of Refugee Camps 
The unique role of camps requires a different approach, which cannot be fully understood by 
only covering migration studies. For that reason, different disciplines with different models 
are relevant. Specifically, International Relations (IR) Theories provide coherent analytical 
models since camps have to be seen in a global context and are often the result of 
international cooperation or solo-national efforts.  
The refugee camps’ role can be considered from three different IR theories 
perspectives: the (neo)realist perspective, the (neo)liberalist perspective, and the constructivist 
perspective, 23  which are also the most dominant and influential IR theories. Since the 
UNHCR and other international organizations run many refugee camps, camps result from 
international cooperation. Thus, the camps that we can see in the media (for example, in 
Lebanon or Jordan) are a (neo)liberalist idea and embedded in the framework of theorists such 
 
 
23 IR Theories is a whole discipline in itself. This dissertation only provides a basic overview on the debate of 
refugee camps in IR Theories since the focus is on migration studies and camps. 
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as Keohane (1984), Nye (1971), Krasner (1985), or Kindleberger (1973). The liberalist 
approach regarding camps can be understood as international burden-sharing. The hosting of 
refugees and asylum seekers becomes the international community’s task, supporting states 
affected by the influx of fleeing persons with resources.24 The ideology’s basic idea is that 
states gain more benefits from cooperation than from opposing each other, even though the 
world base is an anarchical structure. International organizations such as the UNHCR are the 
vehicle to accomplish this goal. 
 However, not all camps result from international cooperation, as the Turkish state 
demonstrates (see chapter 5). Many refugee camps run by the UNHCR are continually 
underfunded, making Turkey establish its camp infrastructure without aid organizations' 
adequate support. Compared to states such as Lebanon or Jordan, Turkey is relatively wealthy 
and can finance refugees' and asylum seekers’ accommodations. Whereas poorer states are 
dependent on international funding and follow a neoliberal approach, more prosperous states 
can operate in the framework of realism.25  
The presidency of U.S. President Trump illustrates another form of realism in the 
debate of camps. Because of his ‘America First’ policy, President Trump significantly 
reduced (financial) support for refugees (Shear and Kanno-Youngs 2019) and withdrew from 
several international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, the UNESCO, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and the UN Human Rights Council (CNN 
2019). These actions are in line with classical realist theorists’ approaches, such as 
Morgenthau’s ‘Politics among Nations’ (Hilz 2007), Carr’s ‘The Twenty Years Crisis’ 
(1939), and Waltz’s ‘Man, the State, War’ (1959).26 Trump’s (foreign) politics builds on 
power and dominance, which Ettinger (2019) describes as ‘populist sovereignty.’ This nation-
state-oriented approach affects the debate about the camps because some states are not willing 
(or are unable) to fulfill their obligations in the international community, which is, from a 
realist perspective, a desirable goal. 
 
 
24 In reality, also UNHCR camps that are results of international funding are constantly struggling financially 
(see chapter 5). 
25 One could argue the EU-Turkey Statement is a form of international cooperation. However, despite the fact 
that the agreement is already suspended, the deal was never truly cooperative since both sides tried to take 
advantage of the other.  
26 Indeed, Trump’s current politics are difficult to classify. The times have drastically changed in the meanwhile 
and cannot fully compared to Morgenthau’s or Waltz’s works. 
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The third perspective is the constructivist approach, which also considers sociology and 
identity factors. The most prominent advocate of this discipline is Alexander Wendt 
(1992;1999). Wendt (1999: 1) himself described constructivism as: ‘that the structures of 
human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 
that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather 
than given by nature.’ For constructivists, the world cannot only described by anarchy, 
hierarchy, or struggle for power and (economic) interdependency between states. IR theories 
are ‘socially constructed’ in terms of constructivism. Thus, authors such as Finnemore (1996) 
or Katzenstein (2005) focus their research on the study of culture, religion, identity, and 
regionalism.  
In terms of camps, Chatty (2009; 2010; 2017), Farah (2006), and White et al. (2013) 
can be seen as constructivists since they are also applying social, cultural, and historical 
aspects in their works about asylum seekers, refugees, and camps (see below in this chapter).  
The following table sums the different camp approaches in IR Theories up. 
Table 5: Camps and IR Theories 
Dominating IR Theories 
Liberalist approach Realist approach Constructivist approach 
Camps are the result of 
international cooperation, 
including the work of 
organizations such as the 
UNHCR 
Camps are the result of single 
national efforts; only minimal 
support from international 
organizations 
Camps are the result of 
social, cultural, and historical 
characteristics 
• Anarchy is a key 







(funding of camps) 
• Anarchy is a key 
element of the theory 




funding for UNHCR 
camps) 
• Social identity is a 
key element of the 
theory 
• The world is socially 
constructed (factors of 
identity determine the 
design, success, and 
establishment of 
camps) 
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In general, refugee camps are essential destinations for refugees and are supposed to 
function as a safe place by providing security, health care, and nutrition. In many cases, 
refugee camps become the ‘new home’ for several months or even years for their inhabitants. 
Thus, camps become complex socio-economic environments, including infrastructure, 
housing, small businesses, and markets. Nonetheless, camps are supposed to be an immediate 
short-term solution for fleeing persons and often function, because of devasting conditions, 
only as transit zones on their way to the actual destination. People do not go to camps because 
they see a long-term future there for themselves are their families. In reality, they have simply 
no other choice and get stuck in ‘no man’s land’ since refugees cannot go back to their origin 
country but are also incapable of reaching their destination. The question is if camps can 
become a long-term solution by providing sufficient living conditions? Even though 
migration studies’ focus has slightly shifted to asylum seekers and refugees in recent years, 
the literature regarding camps is still lacking. 
The literature regarding refugee camps deals with questions of security, health, and 
living conditions. Milton et al. (2013) elaborated on whether refugee flows contribute to 
terrorism in the host state. The authors focused primarily on people in refugee camps and 
found statistical evidence that terrorism can originate from refugee populations. Milton et al. 
argue that poor living conditions and isolation in camps make any form of radicalization more 
likely to occur. The fight over scarce resources with the domestic population in deprived 
regions raises conflicts, and the lack of prospects causes frustration. Furthermore, refugee 
camps are usually located in transnational areas or even in war zones, making it easier for 
terrorists to recruit new members. However, it does not mean that all people in refugee camps 
automatically radicalize and stress that further research is required to learn the exact reasons 
for this phenomenon.  
The authors tackle a highly sensitive topic. The exact reason for this form of 
radicalization remains unknown. Indeed, poor living conditions and frustration might be, in 
theory, the perfect hotbed for terrorism, but what we do not know is at what point in time this 
radicalization happened? Did it happen during the time in camps or even before? Fleeing 
people have usually experienced hardship many times already. The research also says very 
little about the radicalized persons’ mindset, and there is no information about their religion, 
political views, social status, family background, et cetera. Since radicalization does not 
happen overnight, it seems to be a simplification to correlate refugee camps (or refugee 
populations) and terrorism.  
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Since the war in Syria started – and therefore, the ‘European Refugee Crisis’ emerged – 
the attention of migration theories has also shifted to this issue. The neighboring countries of 
Syria are still the most affected countries by asylum-seekers – not Europe. This development 
is also reflected in recent literature by considering people in refugee camps fleeing from 
armed conflicts in Syria. According to Berti (2015), the critical areas of refugee camps’ 
intervention include protection, shelter, health and education, and employment. Those needs 
have to be sufficiently satisfied to provide a proper standard of living. However, the situation 
is problematic for the people in refugee camps and is also a burden for the hosting country. 
The refugee crisis negatively affects social services and labor markets, housing, electricity, 
sanitation, and water resources. 
Consequently, many developing countries suffer a fiscal deficit, international trade 
decrease, and loss of tourism income. Overall, the whole infrastructure and welfare system (if 
one exists) is put under extreme pressure. These economic and political tensions lead to social 
tensions within society since distribution battles become common. Another result is cultural 
conflicts, especially between groups that support different sides in the Syrian civil war. 
Therefore, massive refugee movements lead to economic, political, environmental, and 
security (food, health care, rising conflicts) instability (Berti 2015).  
The debate concerning refugee camps is not new in the field of academics. In 1998, 
Crisp and Jacobsen already gave some mentionable-worthy input for the discussion by 
identifying constraints on implementing international standards in refugee camps. These 
limitations are environmental constraints (inhabitable living space), social constraints 
(refugees usually settle down close to their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic preferences), 
political constraints (the government has the final decision over its refugee policy), and 
logistical and financial constraints (limited capacity and resources). Nevertheless, the authors 
argue that refugee camps are necessary to protect people from armed conflicts. Governments 
have to apply a more liberal asylum policy. Humanitarian agencies like the UHNCR need 
more financial support to provide the highest possible supply of nutrition, necessary materials, 
and security (Crisp and Jacobsen 1998). Regardless, even when all these requirements are 
fulfilled, it is unlikely that camps will suddenly be abolished. Refugee camps are complex 
socio-economical structures that develop their urban infrastructure, character, and identity. 
Thus, because of self-sustainability, market towns will develop, and refugees could refuse to 
go back to their country of origin by becoming permanent settlers (de Montlocs and 
Kagwanja 2000). 
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Newer studies in this field of research mainly focus on the mental health and 
educational situation in camps. The Sirin and Sirin (2015) study ‘The Educational and Mental 
Health Needs of Syrian Refugee Children’ stresses children's extremely terrible refugee camp 
conditions. According to their study, Syrian refugee camps are at considerable risk for mental 
health problems, which might affect their development negatively. Another issue is the 
inadequate and insufficient supply of high-quality education for these children. Both mental 
health care and education are essential parts of successful integration, but many host 
countries’ funding problems make it nearly impossible to meet these requirements (Sirin and 
Sirin 2015).  
The study from Paardekooper, de Jong, and Hermanns (1999), which analyzed South 
Sudanese children’s situation in refugee camps in Northern Uganda, came to a similar 
conclusion. The vast majority of South Sudanese refugee children showed depressive 
symptoms and behavioral problems. In general, refugees have mental health issues more often 
than the host community and other groups of migrants (Acarturk et al. 2015). The Syrian civil 
war has demolished every health care system in the country and lead to the spread of 
infections and epidemics like poliomyelitis, measles, and cutaneous leishmaniasis – not only 
in Syria but also in its neighboring countries (especially in camps), because of the high 
vulnerability of the Syrian population during the crisis (Sharara and Kanji 2014).  
Consequently, it is not very likely or reasonable that people would prefer to stay in 
areas where they are denied health care since most camps’ situation remains devastating. 
Therefore, the push factors are increasing significantly, and people are more likely to leave. 
According to Toole et al. (1988), who investigated in their article ‘The Association 
Between Inadequate Rations, Undernutrition Prevalence, and Mortality in Refugee Camps: 
Case Studies of Refugee Populations in Eastern Thailand, 1979–1980, and Eastern Sudan, 
1984–1985’ the situation of Tigrayan refugees in Eastern Sudan and Cambodian refugees in 
Thailand, pointed out the importance of nutrition in refugee camps. While the mortality rate 
for Cambodian refugees in camps has declined significantly, the mortality rate for Tigrayan 
refugees in camps remained extraordinarily high. Specifically, young children (less than five 
years old) suffered from undernourishment. Furthermore, international relief agencies failed 
to distribute a sufficient amount of food to starving people. Thus, the authors concluded that 
anticipation of refugee movements is necessary to procure and organize enough nutrition. 
Another dimension in the discussion of camps is the cultural aspect. The Middle East 
countries have been affected by the phenomenon of mass migration movements for over 100 
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years (Watenpaugh 2016) and call the concept of hospitality ‘Karam’ in Arabic. (Chatty 
2017). If people decide to go or stay in a camp is very much influenced by the person’s 
cultural background. Karam is challenging to understand from a Western perspective, but it 
describes the Arab world’s attitude to treat guests as friendly as possible. Even though people 
do not possess much, they are willing to share with strangers. Chatty (2009; 2010; 2017), who 
investigated the influx of Iraqi and Syrian refugees into other Middle East countries, states the 
UNHCR and other aid organizations did not anticipate that people would refuse their camps 
and prefer living as self-settled refugees in the host communities. Many people consider 
seeking asylum in a camp disgraceful. The refugees clearly denied the ‘separation’ approach 
(separating ‘hosts’ from ‘guests’). White et al. (2013) stress the issue of aid organizations, 
often ignoring people’s needs outside the camps, and promote an approach that considers the 
Middle East’s unique history. In this context, the Middle East’s mass migration movements to 
Europe are also a consequence of ‘the house is full’ since states like Lebanon or Jordan were 
overwhelmed with the number of Syrian refugees in 2015. Nevertheless, asylum in the 
Middle East is hospitality, whereas UNHCR camps are emergency facilities. Chatty 
concludes: 
‘The international humanitarian aid regime’s prioritizing of protection to a category of people 
who fit the legal definition of ‘refugee’ is a rigid, rights-based construction that leaves many 
gaps in its implementation. Those who do not wish to be categorised as legal refugees or who 
fail to meet the formal criteria fail to access international support. Local and regional Middle 
Eastern constructions of duty-based obligations to the guest, stranger, and person-in-need can, 
with strategic support, offer a wider range of people sanctuary and asylum sanctuary. A holistic 
approach that taps into the social and ethical norms of hospitality in local contexts can only 
improve and extend the delivery of rights-based asylum provided by international humanitarian 
organisations. ‘(Chatty 2017: 196) 
Farah (2006), who investigated Palestine refugee camps, states that camps can also give 
people an identity since they see their ‘origin’ through the camps. 
‘Over time, the camp as a territorial unit became a space upon which the inhabitants mapped out 
a Palestinian identity. In the narratives of refugees, the camp is not a ‘place for refugees’ but is 
portrayed as an exiled fragment of Palestine, a temporary substitute universal village, and a 
suspension bridge from where Palestinians look simultaneously to the past and the future return, 
or to ‘here’ and ‘there.’ The village of origin looms as ‘neighbourly’ when contrasted with 
relationships in the camp; in turn, the inhabitants boast of a culture of sharing instead of the 
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‘colder’ relationships that characterize the wider Jordanian society. In the narratives, the camp 
is demarcated as a place for ‘peasants,’ and often refugees would refer to Jordanians as 
‘bedouins,’ representing national differences through modes of livelihood.’ (Farah 2006: 243) 
The latest approaches in discussing camps and asylum seekers and refugees studies 
create a ‘Utopia’ and envision ‘a new transnational polity.’ Van Hear and Cohen founded the 
so-called ‘Refugia Project’ in 2015 (Compas 2020). The authors criticize the insufficiency of 
current policy measures to address increasing refugee numbers worldwide. Thus, 
displacement cannot be solved by conventional methods such as repatriation of refugees, their 
local integration, or their resettlement (Cohen and Van Hear 2019). Although the concept of 
establishing new nations, city-states, regional initiatives, and free zones for refugees and 
asylum seekers is not novel, Van Hear and Cohen prefer a different approach: 
‘[…] Refugia: a confederal, transnational polity emerging from the connections built up by 
refugees, with the help of sympathizers. Unlike many of the proposals that we have reviewed, 
we do not envisage this as an island or other bounded territory. Rather, Refugia would be a 
linked set of territories and spaces connecting refugees into a polity that is neither a new nation-
state nor simply an international organization, but has some characteristics of both: a new kind 
of transnational polity, governed by refugees and migrants themselves. There would be mobility 
among the constituent parts of Refugia, which would link refugee and migrant communities 
globally: moreover, the whole would be greater than the sum of its parts.’ (Compas 2020) 
In their opinion, the transnational polity regarding global mass migration movements is 
imperfectly prefigured: 
‘[…] Camps and communities in countries neighbouring conflicts, neighbourhoods in global 
cities, transnational political practices and money transfers, emergent communities in disparate 
locations en-route: all are fragments that taken separately do not seem to promise much. But 
cumulatively, they could add up to Refugia, imperfectly prefigured. Consolidating them into a 
common polity might prove to be a way out of the current impasse.’ (Compas 2020) 
Therefore, Van Hear and Cohen suggest a more comprehensive and coherent approach 
to the refugee question. In their vision, camps are part of a concept that entitles refugees and 
restores self-determination. However, Van Hear’s and Cohen’s conceptual framework has 
received a wide range of criticism, including ‘Refugia Lets Nation States off the Hook,’ 
‘Refugia Assumes a Commonality Among Refugees That Does Not Exist and Is Not 
Desirable,’ ‘Refugia Would Be a Mechanism of Containment: Another Nauru,’ ‘The Viability 
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of Such a Transnational Polity Is Doubtful,’ and ‘Refugia Does Not Address Global Structural 
Imbalances and the Violence They Embody’ (Van Hear 2018). Overall, the critics see the 
‘Refugia’ approach as science-fiction and doubt the project’s applicability in the current and 
intermediate-term.  
3.2 Current Status of Migration Studies 
The previous overview attempts to provide a comprehensive guideline through decades of 
migration studies and the various theories. King stresses that ‘there is no single theory that 
captures the full complexity of migration, nor will there ever be’ (2012: 24), which is true 
since there is no universal agreement about the classification and categorization of the certain 
sub-theories. Van Hear et al. (2018) and the concept of ‘driver complexes’ is one example of 
this because it refers to different authors and theories; the name of the argument ‘Push-pull 
plus’ is derived from Lee (1966), while the concept of the debate relates more to Carling 
(2002; Carling and Collins 2017; Carling and Schewel 2018). Ten different researchers will 
probably come ten to different conclusions or results. Van Hear (2010: 1535) stated that the 
importance of finding a generalized theoretical model in migration studies has decreased over 
time. Van Hear addresses migration as ‘mixed migration,’ which means there are different 
forms of migration streams. Every individual has his motivations for migrating, as seen by 
comparing students with workers or tourists with migrants, et cetera. (2010: 1535). 
According to King (2012), Castles (2010), Faist (2010), and Portes (2010), there are 
currently two significant trends observable in migration studies. The first one is the approach 
of bringing migration studies out of isolation and integrating them into the field of social 
change and social transformation. Thus, migration is part of national and global social change. 
However, there is a certain level of disagreement regarding the depth of these changes. While 
Portes argues these changes exist, the impact of migration on the host country's social 
structure and its society is relatively small (2010: 1556). Castles emphasizes that movement 
transforms social structures, institutions, and the whole global economy. Therefore, Castles 
argues for deeper integration of migration studies into social sciences by demanding an 
interdisciplinary approach since migration affects ‘all dimensions of human experience’ 
(2010: 1596; see also chapter 3.1). The second trend goes in a similar direction. King (2012) 
states that migration theories were very much influenced by qualitative sociology, 
anthropology, human geography, and cultural studies beginning in the early 1990s and has 
shifted ‘from quantitatively inclined population geography to qualitatively-minded cultural 
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geography’ (2012: 24, Blunt 2007) This development did not focus so intensely on the 
migration reasons anymore, but rather on the migration ‘experience’ (King 2012: 25).  
In general, in the last 20 to 30 years, migration studies have developed a 
‘transnational’ perspective. The two most influential works following the transnational 
narrative are probably ‘Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration’ (Glick Schiller et 
al. 1992) and ‘Nations Unbound’ (Basch et al. 1994). Other valuable research was conducted 
by Portes (1999; also Portes et al. 1999) and Vertovec (1999, 2004). Portes’ (1999) well-
recognized definition for transnationalism is ‘that migration takes place on a recurrent basis 
across national borders and that requires a regular and significant commitment of time by 
participants… These activities are not limited to economic enterprises [such as sending and 
receiving remittances, or setting up a business ‘back home’] but include political, cultural, and 
religious activities as well.’ 
Nevertheless, transnationalism in terms of migration should not be overestimated since 
not every international migrant has a ‘transnational life’ or occupies ‘transnational social 
space’ (Faist 2000; King 2012). Portes (2003: 876) emphasizes that only a minority of 
migrants fit into the transnational approach and sees a bias for research, which focuses mainly 
on transnational migrants. King (2012) concludes that the transnational approach, which 
derives from networks (see also chapter 3.1.4), is a challenge for the push-pull model and 
criticizes the overwhelming amount of literature concerning integration and assimilation of 
migrants at their destination.   
The conflict model of Sirkeci (2009) shows the complexity of the topic since 
economic migrants also have to be considered as a result of the conflict. Whereas Koser 
(2007) neglects the role of the refugees and asylum seekers in transnationalism studies, 
Sirkeci (2009) sees refugees and asylum seekers as ‘the prime examples for development of a 
conflict-oriented model of transnational migration because these two groups exemplify few of 
the various conflict situations’ (Sirkeci 2009: 5). Sirkeci’s conflict model distinguishes 
between ‘seeking human security’ and ‘avoiding human insecurity,’ as well as between 
potential, latent, and violent conflicts. The transnational space (Rummell, 1976) is 
continuously influenced, changed, and restructured by certain factors regarding migration and 
conflicts. Thus, transnational mobility operates at macro, mezzo, and micro levels of conflict. 
In conclusion, ‘migration is a search for (human) security’ (Sirkeci 2009: 12). 
Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) describe migration as fluid processes in a dynamic 
environment. The ‘culture of migration’ is the result of this conceptual framework. It 
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considers economic and political aspects (e.g., social expectations, opportunities, conflicts, 
security, and insecurity), the dimension of space and time, and social-cultural influence. 
Local, transnational, and macro-level processes are at the center of conflicts. As the example 
of migration from Turkey to Germany illustrates, national and transnational conflicts, 
differences in socio-economic developments, ethnic conflicts, and socio-economic 
deprivation had a significant impact on migration decisions in the past decades (Cohen and 
Sirkeci 2012: 34). Consequently, migration between these two countries has transformed from 
a cooperative to a conflict-based approach (Cohen and Sirkeci 2012; Sirkeci 2009).  
3.3 Future Challenges of Migration Studies 
The previous chapters provided an overview of migration studies' essential theories over 100 
years, respectively, from Ravenstein’s ‘law of migration’ to the transnational approach. 
However, there are still many challenges for the future. First, Arango (2004: 30-34) changes 
the perspective and asks why so many people do not leave.  He criticizes this ‘black spot’ in 
migration studies. He suggests adding ‘retain’ and ‘repel’ to the push-pull framework, which 
would have direct implications ‘on the social, family and cultural structures of (non-
)migration at the micro and mesoscale, and on the (geo-)political dimensions of international 
relations and migration control on the macro-level’ (King 2012). Except for the political 
economy, the state and politics are almost neglected in migration studies (Hollifield 2008). 
Indeed, it should consider this more, but without moving to other ‘extreme’ and covering 
international migration mainly from a nation-state perspective (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
2003). 
Second, the availability and capability of mobility between social structures are crucial 
for migration; between countries and within countries. King (2012) sees the need for a 
stronger emphasis on wealth, status, or connections in migration studies research. Kaufmann 
et al. (2004) describe a person’s mobility to move in geographic and social spheres as 
‘mobility capital.’ According to King (2012), ‘mobility capital,’ including possibilities to 
travel, migrate, circulate, and return, will become a more critical factor in the field of 
migration studies (see also networks in chapter 3.1.4). 
Third, the vast majority of migration theories dealt with labor migration in the past. 
Hence, it has been the dominant topic in the field of migration studies for decades. However, 
this narrow perspective ignores other forms of migration, such as a family reunion, marriage 
migration, student migration, brain drain, lifestyle migration, and ‘mixed-mode’ migrations 
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(King 2012: 26). Researchers have barely covered these migration types, even though they 
have some important implications, on network migration, for example. There is also a need 
for more specialized theorization regarding refugees (Kunz 1981, Richmond, 1988). In this 
regard, King (2012) suggests more comparative migration studies (point four).  
The fourth point is gender: another much-ignored topic in the field of migration 
studies. Even though Ravenstein wrote about the differences between men and women 
regarding migration over 100 years ago, it has not been a very well covered field since then – 
at least not to the extent required. For the last 40 years, the main emphasis has been on 
patriarchial family structures and their influence on migration (Mahler and Pessar 2003; 
2006). One famous quote comes from Bjerén (1997: 226): ‘the mobility of men will be 
misunderstood if not seen in relation to the [im]mobility of women,’ which fits into the 
narrative of ‘men migrate, and women stay behind.’ Other noteworthy scholars who 
researched this field are, for example, Morokvasic (1984) or Silvey (2006). King (2012) 
argues that women and men are usually migrating for different reasons and under different 
conditions. He also stresses that it is crucial to understand to what degree and how gender 
relations change over time due to the migration process; for instance, migration can empower 
women (King 2012: 27). Overall, Mahler and Pessar (2006), who have conducted several 
studies in this field, noticed remarkable progress in ‘bringing gender into the core of 
migration studies.’ However, there is still much work needed (e.g., the role of masculinity in 
migration) (King 2012: 27).  
The fifth is another change of perspective challenge for the future. The recognition of 
anthropological and cultural studies in the context of migration ‘experience,’ which has been 
mostly underappreciated or overlooked so far, becomes crucial. Researchers such as Ahmed 
et al. (2003), Chambers (1994), Papastergiadis (2000), and Rapport and Dawson (1998), as 
well as cultural geographers such as Blunt (2007), are well-known representatives of this 
school. Fielding (1992), another cultural geographer, suggests two primary cultures of 
migration: the ‘stairway to heaven’ (migration as freedom, new beginnings, going places, 
opting-out, et cetera); and the ‘rootlessness and sadness of migration’ (migration as an exile, 
displacement, rupture, sacrifice, failure, et cetera) (King 2012: 27). Hage (2005: 471) 
describes the mindset of people who are willing to migrate as follows: ‘it is when people feel 
that they are existentially “going too slowly” or “going nowhere,” that they are somewhat 
“stuck” on the “highway of life,” that they begin contemplating the necessity of physically 
“going somewhere.”’ 
  75 
 
Here is an abstract of the currently ongoing debates in the field of migration theories. 
In my opinion, it is hard to ignore the actual ‘climate debate’ in 2020, which brought millions 
of (young) demonstrators onto the streets worldwide (Paul 2018). The consequences of 
climate change will be devastating, and migration theories need to focus on that. The latest 
prediction comes from the World Bank (2018b). According to their report, ‘Groundswell: 
Preparing for Internal Climate Migration,’ there will be, in the worst case, 143 million climate 
refugees (around 86 million from Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million from South Asia, and 17 
million) from Latin America by the year 2050. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank has also made some more optimistic scenarios. In the 
‘more inclusive development’ scenario, the figures vary from 65 to 105 million refugees, and 
the ‘more climate-friendly’ scenario predicts between 31 and 72 million refugees. However, 
in all cases, the regions that will be mainly affected by climate change and its connected 
implications are Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Therefore, 55 percent of 
the developing world’s population is under threat of forced displacement in the next decades. 
This is due to reduced water availability and crop productivity in areas that will become 
inhabitable because of rising sea levels and storm surges. Consequently, climate-sensitive 
sectors and infrastructure will be hit hardest by climate change, as well as the most inferior 
part of the population (World Bank 2018b: 9-10). 
The study from Greenpeace and the University of Hamburg ‘Klimaflüchtlinge – die 
verleugnete Katastrophe’ made by Jakobeit and Methmann concluded already in the year 
2007 that the number of refugees who have had to flee because of climate change has already 
surpassed the amount of ‘official refugees,’ meaning those who are seeking asylum for 
political reasons, or who have had to flee from war. The leading indicators of climate change 
are, according to the study, droughts and limited access to water in Africa, and the rising sea 
level, especially in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the authors conclude that not only less 
developed regions are affected by climate change, but also highly developed areas, as the 
example of Hurricane Katrina in the southern United States demonstrates (Jakob and 
Methmann 2007: 26-27). The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015) 
reported that an average of 21.7 million persons had been displaced because of weather-
related issues every year from 1995 to 2015. Unfortunately, a database documenting forced 
migration caused by climate change does not currently exist. Thus, the real problem remains, 
to a certain extent, unclear (EFJ 2017: 14). If climate change cannot be stopped, two billion 
refugees could be the consequence by the year 2100 (Hadlock 2017). 
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Climate change intensifies political, economic, social, and demographic problems 
(Burke et al. 2015; Scheffran 2012). Thus, the tensions within society and the distribution 
battle for scarce resources, food supply, access to freshwater, et cetera will increase and could 
lead to the outbreak of new conflicts, some even with the potential for civil wars (PCC 2014; 
Norwegian Refugee Council 2008). According to Harris et al. (2013), natural disasters 
accelerate existing conflicts. The research paper from Schleussner (2016) found a coincidence 
rate of 9 percent between armed conflicts and disasters (like heatwaves or droughts) between 
1980 and 2010. In ethnically fractionalized countries, the figure was 23 percent higher. 
Almost two-thirds of all armed conflicts since 1946 have been along ethnic lines (Schleussner 
et al., 2016). In 2008, the increase in food prices led to riots and violence in 48 countries 
(FRPI 2014). Therefore, North and Central Africa are potential hotspots for armed conflicts in 
the future since most countries in this area will suffer from climate change and are strongly 
fractionated into different ethnic, religious, and social groups. (EFJ 2017: 29) A study from 
Burke (2009) concluded that climate change and armed conflicts in the Sub-Saharan region 
are highly correlated. Especially in warm years, the probability of wars increases 
significantly. The research paper predicts an increase in armed conflicts of more than 50 
percent by 2030. Werrell and Femina (2015), who have analyzed the Syrian conflict, pointed 
out the importance of climate change in this conflict. Indeed, climate change did not trigger 
the conflict since it is a complex political, economic, and geopolitical battleground, but it 
definitely had some implications and influence (Werrell and Femina 2015). Therefore, the 
main challenge for migration theories in the future is going to be to anticipate all these 
developments and to find sustainable solutions on how to manage all these mass migration 
movements, (armed) conflicts, refugee streams, integration efforts, and the situation of people 
in camps, et cetera. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The most influential migration theories are probably the neoclassical approach, networks-
systems, NELM, and the aspiration-ability model. The neoclassical approach built the 
foundation for future discussions, and many other theories appear based on this method. 
Networks-systems and NELM can be understood as a reaction to the basic neoclassical model 
to describe a more nuanced and flexible approach. Although all these models still have their 
influence today, the aspiration-ability model is very likely the most significant theory at the 
moment, which is also why it got the most coverage in the literature review. 
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However, it is still astonishing to see how little attention has been given to refugee 
camps in the literature since 2015. Overall, the amount of research is minimal, and the few 
studies conducted focused on specific aspects of the living conditions in camps. However, 
they did not discuss ‘if’ or ‘how’ these could sustainably be improved. Indeed, all these 
models can explain ‘why’ (push) people want to flee from there and ‘why’ (pull) they wish to 
go somewhere else, but none of them sees refugee camps as ‘no man’s land.’ The case of 
people who are unable to leave a particular area or territory has even more implications than it 
first seems. Higher mobility and improved infrastructure unquestionably had a significant 
impact on migration worldwide, including tourism. Still, the Coronavirus outbreak in China 
shows, once again, the ‘dark side’ of technological progress since worldwide flights helped to 
spread the virus all over the world. This development will not be the last case of people who 
need quarantined (another example of people who cannot go anywhere, even though they 
might want to) to stop such pandemics. The management of such stressful situations and the 
improvement of living conditions should remain a significant priority of future migration 
studies. 
In conclusion, refugees are more recognized in the literature, and the topic has gained 
more relevance in recent years. Even so, their ‘journey’ and the ones who are ‘stuck’ do not 
get enough attention. The case of refugees, IDPs, and asylum-seekers remain in many ways 
uncovered in the field of migration studies. Notably, people in camps get little enough 
attention, specifically how their living conditions could be improved. Further research is 
needed. 
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4 EU Migration Policies, Borders and Security, Policy Situation 
The following section is about EU policies, borders and security, and policy situations. It 
provides the essential background for the dissertation in the context of migration, including 
some significant findings and results from researchers in this field. 
The world is changing tremendously fast. Never before in the history of humankind could 
people travel from one region of the world to another in a reasonable time. Mobility is 
associated with modernity, freedom, and human rights (de Wenden 2020: 47). On the other 
hand, it is ironic that we also live in an era of borders and restrictive immigration laws. 
Foucher (2007) states that there have never been as many borders since the Iron Curtain's fall.  
It is a trend that started after the First World War (Zweig 1982). Compared to this point of 
view, other authors such as Debray (2010) describe frontiers as necessary for identification 
and identity in Europe. These two perspectives demonstrate the current disputes not only in 
Europe but globally.27 
The 1968 Treaty of Rome and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty changed Europe significantly 
(de Wenden 2020). Borders lost their importance or disappeared, while Europeans gained the 
right to circulate freely in Europe (for employment, for example). Even non-European citizens 
benefited to a certain extent from this freedom and openness, but the refugee crisis of 2015 
changed the tenor of the debate. De Wenden (2020: 48) sums it in the following way up: 
‘distinctions between refugees and migrants have become similarly complicated, as well as 
the relationships between emigration, transit and immigration countries at the border zones of 
Europe, and in the Maghreb28 and Turkey.’  
Thus, regionalization29 in terms of migration is a global phenomenon (Tsapenko 2017) 
but affects mainly the Euro-Mediterranean region (de Wenden 2020). The Mediterranean EU 
countries are in the center of the massive migration movements from Syria, the Middle East, 
and other countries from the Mediterranean region outside the EU. In this context, Libya has 
 
 
27  This reflects only the ‘moderate’ perspectives in the discussion. Unfortunately, extremist opinions and 
radicalization are also part of the ongoing discourse. 
28 The territories of Tunesia, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara. Some definitions also include Libya and 
Mauritania. 
29 Migration from neighboring countries, areas, or regions. 
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an extraordinary role as a transit country for refugees from the sub-Saharan area. These 
refugees are often alleged not to be ‘real’ refugees in the public discourse but are still regular 
asylum seekers (Schmoll et al. 2015). 
Before going deeper into the actual situation, I start with an overview of the most 
important EU policies and migration agencies.30 
4.1 EU Migration Policies 
The EU, specifically the European Commission (EC), has a comprehensive set of rules, laws, 
and regulations for migration-related topics. 31  The EC deals with regular and irregular 
migration (including integration, readmission, and return), as well as with asylum procedures 
(CEAS). Furthermore, border security, the fight against crime and human trafficking, 
terrorism, et cetera. are high priorities. The EU also cooperates with non-European countries 
regarding these questions. 
4.1.1 Legal Migration and Integration 
The EU is seeking a ‘balanced, comprehensive, and common migration policy.’ This 
approach's cornerstones are ‘responsibility’ and ‘solidarity.’ However, this policy section is 
still under development. In the long-run, the EU is hoping for economic progress through 
legal migration and successful integration. The aim is to establish a functional framework for 
legal immigration by considering the need for integration in the host countries. The EU 
classifies migrants into specific categories to achieve this goal, such as highly skilled workers 
(‘EU blue card directive’), students, and researchers. Family reunification and long-term 
residents are also considered in this initiative. In recent years, the EU has started to focus on 
providing information by launching several websites for potential migrants (e.g., the EU 
immigration Portal). Other directives strengthened the rights of non-European workers (e.g., 
 
 
30 Migration policies is a huge discipline itself. Due to the limitations of the work, the whole spectrum cannot be 
fully covered. Thus, this dissertation will only focus on the most important points in EU policy regarding 
migration. 
31 All the tasks of the Migration and Home Affairs department of the EC (actual version) can be accessed at the 
website of the EC under: ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies_en (accessed February 2020), which 
is also the primary source in this section if not otherwise mentioned. 
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the EU Single Permit Directive). Since 2011 the EU is intensifying its dialogue with origin 
and transit countries (Global Approach to migration and mobility).  
The most important and conventional ways of legal migration to the EU are explained in 
the following paragraph: 
• Work32: The EU sees labor immigration as crucial in terms of economic development, 
competitiveness, and upcoming demographic challenges. The main focus is on highly 
qualified workers, seasonal workers, and intra-corporate transferees. For that purpose, 
it provides the ‘EU Blue Card,’ which was intended to make residence and working 
permit procedures easier for skilled labor force from non-European countries. 
However, the Blue Card approach was not successful. The EU is currently working on 
a new version of the Blue Card by introducing ‘more inclusive and flexible admission 
conditions, faster and more flexible procedures, improved rights, and enhanced 
facilitation of intra-EU mobility.’ Furthermore, the EU wants to strengthen the rights 
of seasonal workers and promote the intra-corporate exchange.  
• Family reunification33: The EU considers family reunification one of the main factors 
for successful integration in the host country. The ‘Directive on the right to family 
reunification’ attempts to establish a standard set of family reunification rules. This 
directive gets support from 25 EU member states, excluding the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and Denmark. Nonetheless, the directive on the right for family reunification 
is supposed to make the procedure more comfortable; every EU member state is still 
 
 
32 15/05/2014 - Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer; 
26/02/2014 - Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers; 
13/12/2011 - Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a 
single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of 
a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State; 
25/05/2009 - Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment. 
33 29/04/2004 - Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC; 22/09/2003 - 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification. 
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allowed to determine some of its own rules. Thus, the whole process remains very 
bureaucratic and complicated. Even though the vast majority of the EU members 
supported the directive, many countries still have not implemented it to its full degree.  
• Study and Research 34 : Education is the key to innovation, prosperity, and future 
economic growth. Consequently, the EU wants to promote the European educational 
system to get the most exceptional talents worldwide. The directive, which regulates 
the standard rules for admission of non-European students, is the ‘Directive on the 
conditions of entry and residence of non-EU nationals for the purposes of research, 
studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange, schemes or educational projects 
and au pairing.’ There are some requirements concerning the admission procedure and 
country-specific rules, but, overall, this is probably the sector with the most prominent 
unity among member states. The EU also welcomes non-European researchers by 
making their stay less complicated and allows them (students as well) to stay for nine 
more months in the EU if they are looking for a job or trying to establish a business. 
• Integration35: In a nutshell, the capabilities of the EU are limited on this point. Of 
course, the EU recognizes the need for inclusion for economic, social, and cultural 
development. Still, the integration process remains pretty much in the member states' 
hands and how they define ‘successful integration.’ Nevertheless, the EU contributes 
 
 
34 12/10/2005 - Council Recommendation 2005/762/EC of 12 October 2005 to facilitate the admission of third-
country nationals to carry out scientific research in the European Community; 12/10/2005 - Council Directive 
2005/71/EC OF 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes 
of scientific research; 28/09/2005 - Recommendation 2005/761/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 28 September 2005 to facilitate the issue by the Member States of uniform short-stay visas for 
researchers from third countries travelling within the Community for the purpose of carrying out scientific 
research; 13/12/2004 - Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary 
service. 
35 05/03/2008 - Commission Decision 2008/457/EC of 5 March 2008 laying down the rules for the 
implementation of Council Decision 2007/435/EC establishing the European Fund for the integration of third-
country nationals the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme "Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows" as regards Member States' management and control systems, the rules for administrative and 
financial management and the eligibility of expenditure on projects co-financed by the Fund; 25/06/2007 - 
Council Decision 2007/435/EC of 25 June 2007 establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third-
country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme "Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows"; 25/11/2003 - Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents. 
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by ‘supporting national and local policies with policy coordination, exchange of 
knowledge, and financial resources.’  
• Long-term residents 36 : The EU aims to benefit long-term (legal) non-European 
residents, who integrate themselves into society and contribute to economic and social 
development by granting status and rights similar to EU citizens. This part is regulated 
in the ‘Directive on the status of non-EU nationals who are long-term residents.’ It 
provides long-term residence permits to migrants who have lived at least five 
consecutive years in the EU and also fulfill other requirements (e.g., regular income or 
health insurance; is not a threat to the public security). After fulfilling these 
requirements, long-term residents get access to employment and self-employed 
activity, education and vocational training, social protection and assistance (at least 
core benefits), access to goods and services, et cetera. They are also allowed to move 
under certain conditions from one EU state to another. The United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Ireland are an exception to this regulation since they apply their own 
policies.  
There is a wide range of criticism concerning EU migration policy. Reslow (2010) 
describes the dilemma between migration policy and development policy by identifying the 
‘Global Approach to Migration,’ the ‘Policy Plan on Legal Migration,’ the ‘thematic program 
for the cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum,’ and the 
‘Mobility Partnerships’ as insufficient in terms of building a bridge between these two 
policies. The policies’ main goal is to reduce irregular migration, and inconsistency between 
different policies does not allow a comprehensive approach. Eisele and Wiesbrock (2011), 
who have investigated the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) from 2004 by examining 
mobility partnerships with Georgia and Moldova, argue similarly that EU policies on regular 
migration are not beneficial for non-EU countries. The analysis shows that the top priority of 
the EU is on limiting movement and strengthening border controls. Legal migration 
opportunities remain an issue for migrants. Even though the EU has emphasized its goal of 
negotiating mutual agreements based on partnership, the authors conclude that EU interests 
 
 
36 25/11/2003 - Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents. 
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are overwhelmingly represented in the signed agreements, and cooperation is just a sidenote. 
Reslow (2012) states that EU members see migration as their responsibility even though EU 
institutions become increasingly more supranational organizations. Hence, EU member states 
usually cooperate if it is beneficial for them. In terms of mobility partnerships, the 
Commission plays only a minor role, and the Parliament and Court of Justice are completely 
not involved in the decision-making process. 
As a consequence, some EU members are willing to participate, some others not. In recent 
years, the EU has even started external government initiatives to implement foreign migration 
policy, for example, in Ukraine or Morocco (Wunderlich 2012). Andrade (2013) emphasizes 
that the EU aims for such partnerships, but the ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ 
is underdeveloped due to resistance among member states. She identifies instruments of 
association, improving coordination between EU members, and external action as a key for a 
more comprehensive and useful approach. Thus, Scipioni (2018) concludes that a lack of 
solidarity and weak centralized institutions were major factors during 2015 and after.  
 In the last 20 years, labor migration from non-EU countries has become a crucial 
growth strategy to improve competitiveness (Paul 2013). The current EU migration policy 
focuses on the economic needs of the domestic labor market. Martin and Venturini (2015) 
state that highly-qualified, intra-corporate transferees, seasonal workers or students, and non-
remunerated trainees and researchers are the primary targets for migration from third world 
countries. Asylum seekers or family reunifications are not on the agenda of the Commission. 
Therefore, the EU migration policy is still focused on the economic aspects since the strategy 
builds on the receiving state’s financial benefits and how exploitable people are in the labor 
market. In general, we can say the highly-skilled labor force is welcome, but the rest not. 
Migration in the 21st century is a fight for the most valuable talents. Similar trends can also be 
observed among EU member states, including migration from the South or the East to the 
North or the West of Europe. The ‘lack of solidarity’ (Scipioni 2018) applies to third-world 
countries and other EU member states.  
4.1.2 Irregular Migration 
The volume of irregular migration peaked in 2015 and remained high in the following years. 
According to EU member states, many of these new irregular migrations flows from Africa, 
Asia, and especially from the Middle East were assisted by smuggling networks. The EU 
classifies smuggling as highly criminal and dangerous. Every year, thousands of people are 
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forced to take unsafe routes (mostly over the Mediterranean Sea) and consequently lose their 
lives during their journey to the EU. Thus, in the form of the European Agenda on Migration 
and the European Agenda on Security, the EU actively fights this trend. The goal is to reduce 
irregular migration incentives and stop migrants’ exploitation by making the smuggling 
business as unprofitable and risky as possible. 
In many cases, migrants remain dependent on their smugglers because they are the 
ones who can provide them false documents and fake IDs. These practices make irregular 
migrants more vulnerable. The same applies to human trafficking, which is also a major 
crime. Violaters face sanctions, not only for the human traffickers but also for employers who 
hire these immigrants. Therefore, the external borders of the EU have become more 
significant. In particular, people arriving by the Mediterranean Sea risk their lives. For that 
purpose, the EU state's coastguards and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(FRONTEX) have increased their efforts to protect lives. This is supposed to happen by using 
new technologies like information technology (like the Visa Information System) and 
biometric features (e.g., fingerprints) for identification since one observation is that many 
arrivals are legal because of short-stay visas, however people stay long-term because of 
economic reasons. These agencies and technologies are supposed to stop this trend. However, 
EU states are still obliged to control their borders to build trust in the European migration 
system and respect fundamental human rights. The council and the European Parliament have 
formulated their objectives as follows: ‘1.) Strengthening the mandate of FRONTEX so that it 
can act more effectively at the external border. 2.) Establishing an evaluation mechanism to 
verify the correct application of the Schengen rules. 3.) Intensifying coordination between 
border surveillance authorities (through the European Border Surveillance System – 
EUROSUR) and considering the feasibility of creating a European system of border guards. 
4.) Establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of 
operational cooperation coordinated by FRONTEX.’  
 According to Vollmer (2011), irregular migration has been an issue for decades in EU 
policies. The discussion started in the 1970s, intensified in the 1980s, and continued during 
the 1990s. Nowadays, it is one of the top priorities in EU policies, which also fits into the 
analytical framework of Reslow (2010, 2012) and Eisele and Wiesbrock (2011), who describe 
EU policies as a tool to reduce migration with restrictive policy measures. The two 
dominating topics in this field are ‘threat and criminalization’ and ‘the number games.’ 
Vollmer criticizes the populistic character of the discussion and argues that decision-makers 
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and politicians are taking advantage of the ongoing debates by demonstrating strength and 
control. Other authors, such as Provera (2015) or Bosworth and Turnbull (2015), criticize ‘the 
criminalization of irregular migrants.’ Düvell (2011) states that EU policies’ political and 
legal framework is not functional and often has a contradictory effect; instead of preventing 
irregular migration, some policy measures lay the foundation for illegal movements and 
promote them. Triandafyllidou (2010) emphasizes that EU policies’ character limits legal 
entry opportunities and leads to irregularity.  
 In general, irregular migration is a highly fragmented field in EU policies. Every 
European country is following its interests (Wunderlich 2012), and the geographic position of 
some countries makes them more susceptible to irregular movements or illegal border 
crossing. Notably, the states in the South or South-East are mostly affected by irregular 
migration. In contrast, other members such as Hungary function as transit zones, and the 
Northern states are usually the destination. These circumstances are also reflected in the 
literature since many analytical frameworks elaborate on specific country cases, such as 
Kraler and Hollomey (2010) about Austria, Drbohlav and Medová (2010) about the Czech 
Republic, de Wenden (2010) about France, Futo (2010) about Hungary, Fasani (2010) about 
Italy, or González-Enríquez (2010) about Spain. A common approach in terms of EU policies 
does still not exist, and the events of 2015 divided the EU member states even more.  
4.1.3 Migrant Smuggling, Return, and Readmission 
In terms of irregular migration, migrant smuggling is of extraordinary importance. According 
to the EU, the smuggling business makes several billion Euros in revenue every year, making 
it very lucrative and profitable. These smuggling networks are responsible for massive human 
rights violations and thousands of deaths every year. Furthermore, they are often well 
connected to other dangerous criminal organizations profiting from terrorism, human 
trafficking, and money laundering.  
 Therefore, the fight against migrant smuggling has the highest priority for the EU, and 
the EC elaborated on the ‘EU Action Plan against Smuggling’ from 2015 to 2020. The plan 
includes: ‘enhanced police and judicial response, improved gathering and sharing of 
information, enhanced prevention of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrant, and 
stronger cooperation with third countries.’ In total, a variety of different agencies and 
measurements are in force. Europol, the EU law enforcement agency, has set up the 
‘European Migrant Smuggling Centre’ and supports member states with its operations and 
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investigations. The Common Security Defence System (CSDP) EUNAVFORMED Operation 
SOPHIA is active in the Mediterranean Sea. It intends to destroy the business model of 
smugglers by collaborating with the Libyan coastguard and navy. The same applies to 
FRONTEX, which has since 2016 permission to operate outside of the EU. Other supportive 
agencies are CEPOL, Eurojust, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 
 The EU cooperates with third countries and tries to fight against smuggling at its 
origin by providing financial and technical assistance. The partnership’s objectives are: 
‘assistance in developing anti-smuggling strategies and legislation; building the capacity of 
law enforcement and judicial bodies to investigate and prosecute smugglers; and increasing 
the effectiveness of migration flows and border controls.’ The EU is working together with 
third world countries and several international organizations, host country authorities, and 
networks to achieve these goals. Information campaigns, which are supposed to raise 
awareness for the smuggling issue in origin and transit countries, complement the partnership 
framework. Hence, the EU has established standard rules and directives. ‘Directive 
2002/90/EC’ from 2002 defines unauthorized entry, transit, and residence, and ‘Framework 
Decision 2002/964/JHA’ is a sanction catalog for violating the directive (humanitarian 
reasons excluded). Finally, the EU signed the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Air, and Sea and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime in 2006.  
 Since the outbreak of the civil wars in Syria and Libya at the beginning of the last 
decade, migrant smuggling has gained more attention from the European public. Millions of 
people decided to flee to Europe and paid smugglers to bring them to the European mainland. 
Unfortunately, thousands of people died in the Mediterranean Sea due to adverse conditions 
on the sea, and smugglers, who took advantage of people, did a lucrative business. Reitano 
(2015) calls the Mediterranean Sea crossing ‘the most dangerous border outside active 
conflict zones.’ According to his research, the more restrictive (border) controls get, the more 
likely criminal smugglers get involved. Reitano suggests a more open asylum policy by 
allowing ‘economic migrants’ to enter the EU and improve cooperation in the crisis regions. 
Triandafyllidou (2018) follows a similar argument by stating that restrictive policies have 
increased the smuggling business. Other side-effects include disrupted cross-border flows and 
transformed economies.  
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 A different approach is made by Zhang et al. (2018). The authors conducted a field 
study on smuggling networks and shed light on a new perspective in the debate. Indeed, 
smuggling organizations are often profit-orientated and operate illegally. However, smugglers 
are, in some cases, family members or friends of fleeing persons. Achilli (2018), who 
investigated Syrians’ smugglers, came to the same results and even concluded smugglers 
should not be villainized, at least not all of them. He could not confirm the narrative that 
smugglers’ only goal is to make a profit and describes the relationship between smugglers and 
refugees as ‘rich in solidarity.’ Maher (2018) follows the same narrative after a field study in 
Senegal, and Mengiste (2018) describes smuggling even as ‘socially embedded.’ 
 The latest research findings in smuggling networks and the relationship between 
smugglers and refugees enrich the discussion.37 The topic is more complex and nuanced than 
it seems at first look. On the other hand, EU policy still does not recognize these research 
results and continues to ‘criminalize’ smugglers. Thus, EU policies should start considering 
these findings. 
Nevertheless, according to the EU, every year, 400,000 to 500,000 people are obliged 
to return from the EU to their country of origin due to their irregular status. However, only 40 
percent of the cases get completed. The EU does not see a contradiction between open 
migration policy and the return of irregular migrants. The ‘Return Directive’ from 2008, 
which all member states signed and even found its way into most countries’ national law, is a 
standard set of rules for managing irregular migrants’ returns using reasonable measurements 
in compliance with human rights protection. In 2014, the EC evaluated the success of the 
directive and came to a positive conclusion. However, the directive was also not able to send 
back all irregular migrants, as previously mentioned. In most cases, the reason for this is 
missing documents from non-EU countries, which makes the identification of persons 
problematic.  
 The return process can only be executed efficiently by cooperation among member 
states of the EU. Member states cooperate on ‘assistance in cases of transit for removal by air, 
organization of joint flights for removals, mutual recognition of decisions on expulsion, and 
implementation of guidelines on forced return.’ FRONTEX, once again, also plays a 
 
 
37 See also chapter six (semi-structured interviews), which confirms these findings.  
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significant role in this context. Moreover, the cooperation is not limited to member states. It 
includes third-party countries as well. Therefore, the EU is actively working on readmission 
agreements of irregular migration with non-European countries.  
 Kruse and Trauner argued in 2008 that the EU is using readmission agreements as an 
instrument to force change in neighboring countries (e.g., Ukraine) by offering travel benefits 
in exchange. Hence, the EU policy on return and readmission is nationalized, and it is an 
essential geopolitical tool in terms of foreign policies. The EU aims to respect human rights. 
However, Dedja (2012), who observed the EU readmission policy to Albania, criticizes that 
the EU’s primary goals are effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, safeguarding and human rights 
play only a minor role since EU member states do not control if returnees’ treatment complies 
with EU standards. Carrera et al. (2016) can confirm these observations after analyzing the 
‘EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission’ by stating the EU is ignoring human rights issues 
and trying to take advantage of such partnerships with third-party countries.   
4.1.4 Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
The EU asylum system builds on the Geneva Convention from 1951 and guarantees refugees 
protection. All member states are supposed to share the same values and obligations, 
including fair and efficient procedures. Following this framework, EU member states agreed 
on establishing the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The EU has to deal with 
different sizes of asylum streams. There are not constant and can vary significantly. In 2006, 
for example, the EU had only 200,000 applications from asylum seekers, which is small 
compared to the peak in 2015. Overall, the EU wants to establish common standards, and the 
outcome of the asylum decision should not be dependent on which country the application 
was examined in.  
 The initiative for a conventional asylum system dates back to 1999. Since then, plenty 
of new standards and directives have been adopted. The ‘Temporary Protection Directive’ 
deals with refugees who cannot go back to their origin, and the ‘Family Reunification 
Directive’ is another one specially meant for refugees. Meanwhile, the ‘European Refugee 
Fund’ was founded for the financial support of people in need. After a round of evaluation, 
the EC introduced the ‘Policy Plan on Asylum’ in 2008. The plan is supposed to harmonize 
protection standards, enhance cooperation, and increase solidarity among EU member states 
and non-EU countries. 
 Numerous new standards should treat asylum seekers equally and fair: 
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• The revised Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2013/32/EU): more efficient and 
faster asylum decisions and more excellent protection of minorities. 
• The revised Reception Conditions Directive (Directive 2013/33/EU): ensuring specific 
standards and humane conditions for asylum seekers in the EU. 
• The revised Qualification Directive (2016/0222 (COD)): guaranteeing international 
protection and strengthening of asylum decisions.  
• The revised Dublin Regulation (REGULATION (EU) No 604/2013): clarification, 
which state is responsible for asylum seekers. 
• The revised EURODAC (Regulation REGULATION (EU) No 603/2013): law 
enforcement measures in terms of security threats (e.g., crime or terrorism). 
The CEAS is mired in academic discussions. Lambert (2009), who analyzed the 
different approaches of the United Kingdom and France to the CEAS, discovered the absence 
of a coherent strategy in terms of ‘transnational use of national jurisprudence on asylum 
between judges’; a problem that, after ten years, still occurs. Mitsilegas (2014) criticizes the 
lack of solidarity among EU members in the framework of the CEAS. National solo efforts 
are inadequate to address the challenge of rising asylum seekers numbers in the EU and do 
not respect human rights. Heijer et al. (2016) identified three major weaknesses of the current 
CEAS: 1.) Structural inflexibility. 2.) Unrealistic expectations regarding borders. 3.) The 
incorrect assessment that migration flows outside of the EU could be prevented.  
In general, we can observe two different philosophies: ‘more Europe’ and ‘less 
Europe.’ Lavenex (2018) describes this as an ideological conflict within the EU. A ‘Union of 
Values’ is far from being realistic, which is also reflected in the CEAS. Thus, political actors 
and institutions, by not following the same vision, are not operating efficiently. Lavenex goes 
even one step further and calls these practices ‘organized hypocrisy’ since there is a 
contradiction in protecting asylum seekers’ rights and converse policy measurements. 
However, according to Léonard and Kaunert (2019), the EU has adopted many policy 
instruments in recent years, despite member states’ national solo efforts.  
4.1.5 The country responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin) 
The Dublin system is supposed to be a control and regulation mechanism for asylum seekers 
arriving in the EU. Every member state is obliged to register where and when the asylum 
seeker arrived and first stepped foot on EU ground. The objective is, of course, to make 
asylum decisions more efficient. It provides clarification to questions of responsibility 
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regarding EU member states and urgency regarding asylum seekers. Both irregular and 
regular migration are included in the Dublin regulation.  
 Dublin III was established in 2013 and has important implications in terms of the 
efficiency of procedures and the protection of asylum seekers: 
• Early warning system and crisis management. 
• Protection of applicants by personal interviews, guarantees for underage, and 
reunification with family members. 
• The right to appeal asylum-decisions, including the guarantee to remain in the territory 
until the court makes its final decision. 
• Legal assistance by covering the costs. 
• Under certain circumstances, state authorities are allowed to arrest asylum seekers.  
• Improvement of procedures between member states. Dublin procedures should be 
completed within eleven months.  
As a consequence of asylum seekers' mass arrivals in 2015, the EC is continuously 
working on further improvements. The events of 2015 showed clearly the weaknesses of the 
current CEAS and the Dublin regulations in particular. Thus, the EC proposed reforms in 
2016 by renewing the CEAS and Dublin regulations (Dublin IV): 
• Faster responsibility evaluation and time-limits for take-charge requests and transfers. 
• A new allocation mechanism ensures fairness among member states and reduces 
pressure from profoundly affected areas or countries. 
• Stricter policies for migrants without documents. 
• More robust protection of asylum seekers rights’, especially for minors and families.  
In a nutshell, the EU still wants to make legal and safe immigration possible by 
guaranteeing Europe’s pathways. Nevertheless, the EC concluded that the system was not fair 
enough in terms of burden-sharing in the past. The goal is to implement a ‘fairness 
mechanism based on solidarity.’ The new system would provide a clear, and more 
importantly, a more specified set of rules and standard regulations for asylum applications. 
Therefore, by taking the size and the wealth of a country into consideration, an individual 
reference number is set up. Suppose this reference number gets exceeded by over 150%. In 
that case, an automatic mechanism is activated, and asylum seekers are sent to another EU 
country until the amount of asylum application goes back to ‘normal.’ The last part of this 
regulation includes financial incentives. Countries are allowed to not participate for a certain 
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amount of time in this fairness mechanism by making financial contributions (250,000 EUR 
for each applicant) to the state that is relocating the asylum seeker. 
 The Dublin system’s criticism is overwhelming, making it probably one of EU policy's 
most controversial topics. Raitio (2011) called the system, even before the events of 2015, 
‘unfair,’ ‘ineffective,’ and ‘intransparent.’ Years later, the critics have not stopped, and the 
debate has been enlarged by nationalistic rhetoric (Lovec 2017). Notably, the burden-sharing 
aspect of the discussion is critical. The Mediterranian Sea countries in the South or South-
East are usually the leading destinations for sea arrivals. According to the Dublin regulations, 
these member states have a geographical disadvantage because they have to deal with asylum 
applications. In the past, Greece and Italy, in particular, carried a disproportionate burden. 
Guild et al. (2015) see the EU’s significant challenges in guaranteeing safe travel 
opportunities for asylum seekers and distributing these asylum seekers. The EU is facing an 
efficiency dilemma. In essence, the enforcement of the existing laws may overburden the 
southern states, but ignoring the Dublin rules may overburden the northern countries.  
(Trauner 2016). Kasparek (2016) illustrates the absurdity of the system by interviewing a 
Somalian refugee in Italy. In Italy, he was homeless and living on the streets. Thus, he applied 
in many other European states (e.g., the Netherlands and Sweden), but every asylum 
application got denied, and he ended up on the streets of Italy again.  
 The vast majority of EU members are not satisfied with the Dublin system. However, 
implementing a fair burden-sharing system seems also not realistic since right-wing 
nationalistic powers increase everywhere in Europe and gain more political momentum. The 
Dublin system’s most promising alternative is a quota regulated approach, which could 
increase solidarity among member states.  
4.1.6 Reception Conditions and Asylum Procedures 
The EU has to provide specific standards and living conditions to asylum seekers awaiting 
their decision. These standards are defined in the Reception Conditions Directive from 2013, 
which aims to harmonize European standards concerning housing, food, clothing, health care, 
education for minors, and even access to the labor market. Underage people and other 
vulnerable persons (e.g., victims of torture) have the right to medical and psychological 
treatment. The directive also set up the rules for detention, which must be applied in full 
respect of human rights. 
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 The EC states that there is still some particular uncertainty regarding the definition of 
living standards and conditions. Thus, there are still significant differences among EU 
member states. The European Agenda on Migration is supposed to decrease these differences. 
There is an urgent need for clear reception conditions to improve the European asylum system 
and be better prepared for future crises. In 2016, the EC made a new proposal to revise the 
directive. The aim is more harmonization among member states, fewer incentives for 
secondary migration movements, and promoting migrants’ integration.  
 The ‘EASO guidance on reception conditions: operational standards and indicators’ 
provides the most comprehensive version of existing European standards in asylum questions. 
EU member states are already following these standards and guidelines. It results from several 
organizations, institutions, and civil society organizations, such as the European Commission, 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The objective was to develop a framework of specific 
standards for asylum seekers, which guarantees fundamental rights, protection, and 
appropriate living conditions.  
 Thornton’s (2014) criticism is that the EU does not respect human rights, including 
limitations on freedom of movement, right to work, and denial of children's education. These 
practices are contrary to ‘European values’ and discriminate against asylum seekers unfairly. 
On the other hand, Zaun (2016) emphasizes the implementation of higher standards for 
asylum seekers over the past decades. The Northern states especially promoted such changes 
and were successful due to their dominant position in the EU. However, there is no 
convergence in terms of standards for asylum seekers, which corresponds to EU members' 
different economic powers. Therefore, harmonizing living conditions promotes European 
integration and provides higher standards for asylum seekers in the long-run. 
To overcome some of these limitations, the EU has established asylum procedures, 
which are the framework for fair, efficient, and harmonized asylum procedures. People who 
are fleeing brutal situations are allowed to find international protection in the EU. The 
Asylum Procedures Directive is the principal regulator in this field and decides under which 
circumstances people are granted or denied asylum status: 
• Clear rules for asylum application; everyone who would like to apply for asylum may 
do so. 
• Time-limits for the application process (usually six months). 
• Special treatment for people in need due to age, disabilities, illness, et cetera. 
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• Clear rules for courts and tribunals regarding appeals. 
In 2016, the EC made some new proposals to remove incentives for asylum shopping 
and secondary movements between member states. The aim is to establish ‘a truly common 
international protection procedure within the EU’ by removing dysfunctional procedures and 
replacing them with simple and more unambiguous systems; by guaranteeing the rights of 
applicants, giving them an interview, and providing free legal assistance, interpretation, and 
representation; by more attention for vulnerable persons; by stricter rules to prevent system 
abuse; by including a standard set of rules for safe third countries and the first country of 
asylum concept; by harmonizing rules on safe countries. The proposal and others are part of 
the CEAS reform package discussed by the European Parliament and council. 
4.1.7 Who qualifies for International Protection and Temporary Protection 
The requirement to get asylum in an EU member state is recognition as a refugee or a 
beneficiary of subsidiary protection. The Qualification Directive from 2011 is the regulation 
that defines third-country nationals and stateless people as refugees or persons who require 
international protection. The following aspects are included in the directive: protection from 
‘refoulement,’ residence permits, travel documents, access to employment, access to 
education, social welfare, healthcare, access to accommodation, access to integration 
facilities, and specific provisions for children and vulnerable persons. The EU claims to treat 
people fleeing from war, persecution, and torture fairly and respectfully. To ensure that the 
EU clarifies ground for granting or withdrawing international protection, it improves the 
access of international protection beneficiaries to rights and integration measures. It considers 
the best interests of children and other gender-related aspects. 
 The EU has identified some weaknesses and shortcomings of the existing system and 
concluded that the results of asylum applications or the international protection of people 
could vary significantly among member states, so the EC has proposed reform packages based 
on solidarity responsibility to the CEAS. The new Qualification Regulation from 2016 
attempts to reach convergence among member states regarding asylum decisions and 
international protection qualification. Again, the Parliament and Council did not have made 
any decision yet. 
Concerning temporary protection, the Directive on temporary protection from 2001 
was the direct response to the events of the 1990s when wars and conflicts caused mass 
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migration to the EU. Specifically, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo were the 
reason for these movements.  
 The EU defines temporary protection as follows: ‘Temporary protection is an 
exceptional measure to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries and unable to return 
to their country of origin, with immediate and temporary protection.’ In this context, the 
policies are supposed to reduce disparities and create an atmosphere of solidarity and burden-
sharing. The directive regulates a wide range of different topics, from residence permits for 
the entire duration of the protection (one to three years) to appropriate information on 
temporary protection. It addresses employment, accommodation or housing, social welfare, 
access to medical treatment, education for minors, and families' opportunities to reunite. It 
guarantees access to the regular asylum procedure. The other directive deals with returning, 
treating individuals with criminal records, and minor’s situations. Solidarity among EU 
member states was not considered for nearly 20 years and has only recently become a 
sensitive topic.  
4.1.8 External Aspect 
The EU is working on agreements with non-EU countries and countries of the first asylum to 
anticipate migration flows and improve the country of origin’s living conditions. Therefore, 
the EU has developed the ‘EU Regional Protection Programmes’ and ‘Resettlement schemes.' 
Regional Protection Programmes are providing financial support to countries of origin and 
transit. The goal is to promote return, local integration, and resettlement. Hence, the 
protection of refugees gets improved by these benefits and actions. The programs result from 
cooperation between the Commission and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, countries of origin, transit, and first asylum. Currently, the EU has Regional 
Protection Programmes with Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. 
 However, even though the EU has put much effort into establishing such programs, 
most member states still do not have any resettlement programs for refugees in the EU. In 
response to that, the EC founded a joint Resettlement Programme, which goes the other way, 
supporting refugees’ settlement in the EU since Europe is still dealing with relatively low 
numbers of refugees compared to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the program is 
voluntary. 
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4.2 Borders and Security 
4.2.1 Schengen, Borders, and Visas 
The Schengen area ensures free and safe travel for EU citizens, non-Europeans, and others. 
Since 1985 internal borders between the EU member states and partners have been 
continuously demolished, making passing borders less time-consuming and beneficial for EU 
citizens, tourists and visitors. The focus of border controls has shifted from internal controls 
to common external border protection. Now, more than 400 million EU citizens have the right 
to work, travel, and move wherever they want in the EU. The Schengen area includes every 
EU member state except Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania, and the United 
Kingdom (Bulgaria and Romania are in negotiations for joining). Non-EU members who are 
participating in the Schengen system are Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. 
However, even though border checks for citizens are abolished, state authorities and police 
are, of course, still allowed to apply police checks at the border. Another exception is the case 
of severe threats to the internal security of a country. Under these circumstances, temporary 
border checks are also possible, but only for a limited time. Nevertheless, passports and visas 
are no longer required to pass a border within the EU for the most part.  
 The Schengen rules cover the following topics: 
• A common set of regulations, including visa regulations and policies. 
• Harmonization of the conditions of entry. 
• International and cross-border cooperation between police. 
• Document requirements for travelers in the EU. 
Joining the Schengen area is a political decision. Still, some conditions have to be 
fulfilled, such as external border controls, cooperation with law enforcement agencies, or the 
application of common Schengen rules. Since 2015 there are regular Schengen evaluations 
every year to examine if member states are fulfilling their obligations. The temporary border 
controls are outlined in the Schengen Borders Code. These include foreseeable cases (articles 
25 and 26; e.g., sports events), cases requiring immediate action (article 28; e.g., security 
threats), and cases where exceptional circumstances put the overall functioning of the 
Schengen area at risk (article 29; e.g., severe threats to several Schengen countries). Other 
essential parts of the Schengen system are: 
• Border Crossing: The focus is very much on the external borders of the EU. The 
Schengen Borders code is a clear set of rules that explain who is allowed to stay in the 
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EU and how long. The goal was to establish harmonized regulations for all EU 
member states. Overall, the emphasis is on solidarity and cooperation among member 
states. The EU Internal Security fund is supposed to support the costly investments at 
the external borders, and FRONTEX and EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance 
System) are other forms of cooperation. 
• Smart Borders: In a nutshell, smart borders are a relatively new technology used at the 
external borders of the EU, but also at airports, for example. It is a computer-based 
entry/exit system for registered travelers. It makes border controls more efficient and 
helps in the fight against irregular migration. Initially, it was a pilot project, but more 
and more countries are adopting it. 
• Visa Policy38: The EU and the Schengen states have established a conventional visa 
system and policy. Visa requirements and exceptions depend, of course, on 
agreements with non-EU countries, respectively non-Schengen countries. In 2016, 
almost 14 million Schengen visas were approved. 
At the beginning of the last decade, Monar (2010) described the Schengen as an ‘Area 
of Freedom, Security, and Justice.’ Furthermore, it was also the fastest-growing project in EU 
policies with a high differentiation level since the Schengen area seemed to be continually 
expanding. However, this process has come to an end. Today, the EU is more focused on 
keeping the union together instead of finding new Schengen areas. Börzel and Risse (2018) 
even speak of a ‘Schengen crisis,’ an identity crisis of the whole EU after the mass migration 
influx from 2015. In the fallout of these events, Eurosceptic actors and movements followed 
populistic approaches by demanding more border security to protect Europe.  
 Nevertheless, the abolition of borders for most European citizens is considered a great 
success for the Schengen area. Free movement allows people to cross borders without border 
controls, and economic accomplishments have been tremendous. Ademmer et al. (2015) even 
call Schengen a ‘blessing’ for Europe. Another advantage of the Schengen project is that it 
helped the EU promote European values outside of the Schengen area. Many non-EU 
countries have adopted EU policies and liberal norms. However, Ceccorulli (2018) sees a 
 
 
38 The number of visa applications is important since many refugee enter the EU on a regular way, but make the 
decision to stay after their visa has expired.  
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significant dispute among member states because of the uncoordinated border actions during 
the migration crisis. While some countries followed a restrictive border policy, others left 
their borders open. In terms of security policies, Ceccorulli has a different standpoint and 
cannot find evidence that existing or planned migration policies were violated. Ademmer et 
al. (2015) conclude that the lack of solidarity during the refugee crisis undermined the 
advantages of no internal borders. Nation’s migration policies should not diminish the last 30 
years’ accomplishments. Other authors, such as Guild et al. (2016), also praise the Schengen 
area and argue the border controls during the migration crisis complied with the legal 
framework. Schimmelfenning (2018) makes a comparison between the euro and the Schengen 
crisis. While the euro crisis has strengthened the unity of the EU, the Schengen area's plight 
had the contrary effect and divided Europe even more. 
4.2.2 Counter-Terrorism and Radicalization 
The EU aims to provide freedom, security, and justice to all its inhabitants. However, 
terrorism does not know any borders or restrictions and operates internationally.39 Thus, the 
EU considers the fight against terrorism as one of its priorities by enhancing cooperation and 
responsibility between member states. No state can be prosperous on its own when facing an 
international threat. For that purpose, the EU has developed the ‘EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy’ adopted by the European Council in 2005. The strategy consists of four 
cornerstones: prevent people from radicalization or joining terrorist groups, protect people 
from terrorist attacks, pursue international terrorism, and respond appropriately to terrorist 
acts. Another important initiative is the European Agenda on Security from 2015, which 
describes the fight against terrorism as follows: ‘define and criminalize terrorist offenses, 
prevent radicalization and the spreading of terrorist propaganda, and to cut terrorists’ access 
to the means to perpetrate attacks such as finance, firearms, explosives, etc.’ 
 In 2017, all EU member states signed the ‘Directive on combating terrorism.’ The 
directive attempts to define and set specific standards in the fight against terrorism, including 
the financing of terrorism and the training of terrorists. Member states are obliged to 
cooperate and share their information. The directive also ensures that victims of terrorism and 
 
 
39 Unfortunately, international migration is also very often linked to terrorism or radicalization (see Milton et al. 
2013 in the literature review). 
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their families receive the support that they need. After the events of 2015 (the attack on 
Charlie Hebdo, in particular), the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was founded, 
which can be understood as an extension of Europol and focuses on foreign terrorist fighters, 
explosives, firearms, financial intelligence, and online propaganda. 
Regarding the prevention of radicalization, the EC reacted by establishing the 
Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). The first approach to countering radicalization is 
the identification of propaganda material on the internet. A high-level Commission expert on 
radicalization proposed, in 2018, a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist 
content online. Further measures in this field include protecting civil society and critical 
infrastructure, more security research by funding security projects, and cooperation with non-
European partners. 
 The main questions that arise are ‘Why do people radicalize?’ and ‘Why do they 
become terrorists?’. The classic paper from Crenshaw (1981) distinguishes between root 
causes and trigger causes. Years later, Bjorgo (2005) built his analytical framework around 
these questions and identified four root causes for terrorism: structural causes, facilitating 
causes, motivational causes, and triggering cause. However, there is usually not one particular 
root for terrorism, but it is instead a mix of several reasons. After analyzing various 
government papers from different European states, Bakker (2015) sees nationalist-separatist 
and religious Islamist terrorism as the two dominant forms of terrorism right now. The EU 
focuses very much on network dynamics and, therefore, individual radicalization plays only a 
minor role, as well as the process of deradicalization. The purpose of psychology is 
undermined in EU policy. The EU’s priority is the fight against radical Islam, while other 
terroristic streams do not get enough attention, such as right-wing or left-wing terrorism. 
Bossong (2014) evaluates these EU policies as inefficient, and Bakker describes the EU 
approach as ‘incident driven,’ but the EU has developed a more comprehensive approach in 
recent years. Other critical remarks were made by Sedgewick (2010):  ‘no universal definition 
for radicalization and terrorism,’ Argomaniz (2015): ‘online security versus privacy,’ and 
Mattson et al. (2016): ‘the war on terror decontextualize tensions in the society.’ 
 Martins and Ziegler (2018) studied EU security measures after 2015 and agreed on 
Bakker’s analysis. The EU is following a preventive strategy, which means counter-
radicalization equals counter-terrorism. Other EU policy trends are an externalization of 
knowledge production, a focus on the crime-terror nexus and prisons’ role, more openness to 
the private sector, and an over-emphasis on Islamism. The authors conclude with a warning 
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that ‘the rise of nationalist rhetoric and policies sweeping over Europe will lead to tensions 
that may result in even more politically motivated violence’ (349).  
These findings illustrate the complexity of the topic, a very emotionally driven one. 
Notably, the focus on radical Islam gives European citizens the impression that ‘all Muslims 
are terrorists.’ Ironically, this form of exclusion might lead to radicalization, respectively, to 
tensions between nationalists (or citizens) and Muslims. Unfortunately, prejudices and 
xenophobic attitudes dominate the debate. Finally, the debate’s privacy aspect is also very 
critical since governments tend to constrain fundamental rights (e.g., citizens’ privacy) in the 
fight against terrorism. 
4.2.3 Organized Crime and Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking is a form of organized crime40 and a substantial violation of human rights, 
but unfortunately also a very lucrative business for human traffickers. The ‘EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (Article 5.3) prohibits it, and the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU) defines it as a severe form of organized crime (Article 83). Human trafficking is 
related to immigration policy (Article 79). The relevant legal and policy framework is 
Directive 2011/36/EU on combating and preventing trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims and the EU strategy towards eradicating trafficking in human beings for 
the period 2012-2016. While Directive 2011/36/EU is the dominant framework for the 
victim’s protection, assistance and support, and prosecution, the EU strategy is the basis. It 
shows the direction of the policy by providing regular reports, studies, and publications. The 
main goal was to strengthen victims’ rights and destroy the business model of human 
traffickers by making it less profitable. The other two primary directives in this context are 
Directive 2004/81/EC and Directive 2012/29/EU, which set up some minimum standards for 
the treatment of victims and describes how to deal with non-European victims.  
 According to the Commission, human trafficking is often related to other organized 
crimes such as ‘document fraud, drug trafficking, cybercrime, child pornography, migrant 
smuggling, and benefits fraud.’ It is considered, therefore, to be a severe crime and is a 
 
 
40 This section will only focus on human trafficking, which is a part of EU policy on organized crime. Organized 
crime is, of course, a big topic and includes other serious crimes such as trafficking of firearms, sexual child 
abuse, drug dealing, et cetera. 
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priority in the ‘EU Policy on Organised and Serious International Crime 2014-2017’, the ‘EU 
Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2017’, and the ‘EU Policy Cycle on 
Organised and Serious International Crime 2018-2021’. 
 Indeed, human trafficking is related to migrant smuggling (see chapter 4.1.3.). 
However, according to Herkes (2018: 20-21), there are two crucial differences between these 
crimes: 1.) Human trafficking does not require crossing borders. Human smuggling does. 
Thus, a person can be trafficked without leaving the country. 2.) Human trafficking has an 
exploitive character, human smuggling, on the other hand, not necessarily since the primary 
goal is ‘only’ to cross one or several borders and to bring the migrant to its destination. The 
most common forms of human trafficking are forced labor, sexual exploitation, and child 
trafficking (Jones and Winterdyk 2018). Tallmadge and Gitter (2018) conducted a 
comprehensive study and determined the factors that affect the rate of human trafficking in a 
country. The findings show that a high percentage of immigrants make trafficking more 
likely. Other factors are access to the sea, low GDP per capita, and legalized prostitution.  
Therefore, human trafficking depends very much on demographic, economic and 
legal, and geographic indicators. The location of EU members, of course, cannot be changed. 
However, the researchers’ findings suggest that economic, demographic, and legal 
harmonization among member states might significantly reduce human trafficking. Further 
European integration and efficient asylum seeker allocation mechanisms seem to be a 
promising approach in the fight against human trafficking, as well as international organized 
crime. Thus, national solo efforts are not enough to stop the global exploitation of migrants. 
Unfortunately, the lack of solidarity among member states remains a considerable obstacle to 
overcome, and the implementation of such a policy is probably not going to happen any time 
soon. 
4.2.4 EU Agencies 
Numerous EU agencies are operating in the field of migration and policy-making. These 
agencies aim to support the EU member states by providing information and assisting in 
decision-making processes. The most important agencies are the following: 
• FRONTEX: The European Border and Coast Guard Agency is the external border 
agency of the EU. Their main task is to anticipate and monitor migration flows, 
provide risk analysis, and make recommendations to member states on responding to 
possible threats or developments.  
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• Europol: The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation supports EU 
members in their fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, people smuggling, 
cybercrime, and other organized crime activities. 
• CEPOL: The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training is a relatively 
new agency and is supposed to, as the title indicates, to provide training in questions 
of international crime and security issues. 
• EASO: The European Asylum Support Office is a crucial part of the CEAS and 
supports member states to implement the CEAS obligations properly. 
Apart from these, the EU has also established some networks for home affairs policies and 
their exchange. These networks consist of state authorities, NGOs, and individuals. The most 
critical networks in terms of migration are the European Migration Forum (EMF), the 
European Migration Network (EMN), and the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). 
One of the most important topics associated with the EU border and security policy is 
FRONTEX’s role. Léonard (2009) contributed to the European Agency’s activities and 
institutional issues for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the EU Member States (FRONTEX). According to the author and the EU, FRONTEX is the 
product of the power struggle within the EU. FRONTEX aims to establish ‘institutional 
configurations for increasing cooperation on external border management.’ The European 
Parliament has only limited control over FRONTEX since the agency is not embedded in the 
governmental framework. The primary control mechanism is the budget. 
Consequently, human rights issues have no priority in FRONTEX's work, which 
causes much criticism from human rights organizations. Léonard (2010) also evaluated 
FRONTEX’s activities regarding the securitization of asylum and migration in the EU. The 
author’s findings show that ‘all main activities of FRONTEX can be considered to be 
securitizing practices.’ The two primary securitizing practices are ‘extraordinary activities 
borders’ (e.g., the coordination of joint surveillance and control operations at the external 
border; fits both categories) and ‘activities that have been implemented to security threats’ 
(e.g., training of national border guards). However, FRONTEX is financially highly 
dependent on the EU Parliament and cannot be considered ‘a significant securitizing actor in 
its own right’. 
 Nevertheless, migration and borders have gained more and more by pieces of 
knowledge in recent years. Ambrosini et al. (2020) provided a conceptual framework across 
the policy and public spheres. Cinalli and Jacobsen (2020) explained the role of borders for 
politics and citizenship, de Winden (2020) described the fundamental contradictions between 
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borders and migration, and Müller (2020) investigated the thesis that borders created 
‘solidarity crime’ in France. Even restrictive immigration laws could not stop crime from 
spreading. Other works focused on solidarity in transit-regions (Giliberti and Palmas 2020) 
and the medical staff’s experiences at border hotspots for migrants (Anderlini 2020). Further 
contributions in this field came from De Nuzzo (2020) ‘The Two Dimensions of the Border: 
An Empirical Study France–Italy,’ Ambrosini (2020) ‘The Local Governance of Immigration 
and Asylum: Policies of Exclusion as a Battleground.’ Additional resources include 
Bonizzoni (2020) ‘The Border(s) Within Formal and Informal Processes of Status Production, 
Negotiation and Contestation in a Migratory Context,’ Marchetti ‘Cities of Exclusion: Are 
Local Authorities Refusing Asylum Seekers?’, and Oomen and Leenders (2020) ‘Symbolic 
Laws, Street-Level Actors: Everyday Bordering in Dutch Participation Declaration 
Workshops.’ 
4.2.5 The EU Turkey Deal 
On March 18, 2016, the EU-Turkey Statement was signed to control and limit Syrian 
refugees’ continuous inflow to the EU through Turkey (EU Parliament 2016). Turkey has 
always been an essential transit-country for people fleeing from conflict regions in the 
Middle-East to Europe. Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Turkey’s role as a 
geopolitical power in the region has accelerated. The agreement says that all new (irregular) 
arriving immigrants on Greek islands are sent back to Turkey. The same applies to asylum 
seekers who have been declared inadmissible. For every illegal migrant the EU accepts, they 
agree to resettle one Syrian legally. 
Furthermore, the EU-Turkey statement includes the following aspects: sea and land 
surveillance for irregular migration, activation of a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme, further development of Customs Union, and improvement of the Humanitarian 
situation for people inside Syria. In exchange, the EU has agreed on substantial financial 
support and visa liberalization for Turkish citizens. Under the Facility for Refugees, the EU 
guaranteed Turkey three billion euros and a further three billion euros by 2018. Nevertheless, 
the Facility for Refugees is supposed to be for concrete projects, such as an ‘Emergency 
Social Safety Net’ for the most vulnerable refugees. Primarily women and children, mainly 
orphans, and religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis benefit from these actions. 
Finally, Turkey has also agreed to take back all irregular immigrants from Turkish waters and 
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everyone who does not require durable protection. Thus, NATO has increased its enforcement 
activity in the Aegean Sea, and smugglers are aggressively prosecuted. 
 One year after implementing the EU-Turkey Statement, the number of asylum seekers 
from Turkey had tremendously decreased. Still, questions regarding international law and the 
protection of refugees remained unanswered (Adam 2017). Adam criticizes the EU, which 
does not recognize its responsibilities in terms of human rights, and the EU-Turkey 
relationship has become significantly worse. According to Poon (2016), Turkey cannot be 
considered a safe third country for refugees, and the EU-Turkey deal is not in compliance 
with international law. Turkey is not obligated to EU law and violates the principle of non-
refoulement. Thus, access to fair asylum procedures for refugees in Turkey is minimal. 
Lehner (2018) sees the EU’s externalization approach as a direct consequence of the failure of 
the CEAS in the summer of 2015. The deal itself is risky and morally questionable. 
Tunaboylu and Alpes (2017) state that refugees returning from Europe who get detained fear 
deportation, have only limited access to aid, and do not get guaranteed international 
protection. Following Kfir’s (2017) argument, the EU is further undermining Turkish 
democracy in its efforts to build a barrier against migration flows from Turkey by legitimizing 
President Erdoğan’s autocratic tendencies. 
Heck and Hess (2017), who interviewed stranded refugees in Turkey, observed 
Turkey’s migration movements’ deceleration to the EU. The authors describe Syrian 
refugees’ situation as being ‘trapped’ between Turkey and the EU since many people are still 
willing to move on and, at the same time, do not get treated well by the Turkish government. 
The security situation remains unclear for them. Martin (2019) argues that the liberal values 
of the EU are under stress but stay intact. However, the damage is done and compromises the 
EU’s identity to a certain extent. Thus, European values are flexible and may cooperate with 
autocratic regimes under extreme (geopolitical) pressure. According to Smeets and Beach 
(2019), the EU-Turkey Statement results from ‘effective inter-institutional collaboration,’ 
which makes it the opposite of other initiatives such as the Dublin reform or relocation of 
asylum seekers fail because of a lack of solidarity and burden-sharing issues. In 2020, 
President Erdoğan opened the borders to Greece, which made the EU-Turkey Statement 
obsolete. There are various reasons for the failure, and both sides blame each other for 
breaking the deal. The Tagesschau (2020) concludes that the EU did not fulfill all of its 
obligations, for example, freezing the negotiations regarding a possible Turkey EU 
membership. However, all the financial commitments were fulfilled.  
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Indeed, the relationship between the EU and Turkey has always been complicated. In its 
effort to regulate migration inflows from the Middle East, the EU seeks partnership programs 
with third countries. As one of the most important transit countries globally and the host 
country of over four million refugees, Turkey plays a crucial role in these deliberations. 
However, the human rights issue was ignored and, therefore, strengthened Turkey’s autocratic 
tendencies by legitimizing the Turkish regime. The EU undermined its identity and values by 
its inconsistent approach to migration and human rights. One reason for that development is 
the rise of the new populistic anti-immigration movements, parties, and political actors in the 
EU. The increase of anti-immigration streams is reflected in EU policy decision-making 
processes. Thus, the EU does not apply humane return and readmission principles anymore 
since the primary objective is to decrease, under all circumstances, the influx of asylum 
seekers and refugees to Europe.  
 Besides growing populism, burden-sharing is still one of the biggest problems in the 
EU. The EU-Turkey Statement responded to inefficient and inappropriate policy measures, 
which burdens some countries and regions more than others (e.g., because of the Dublin 
system). There is no functional distribution and allocation mechanism for asylum seekers and 
refugees among EU member states today. Every country is following its unique approach, and 
the consequences are weak and unfair policies. Therefore, EU migration policies are 
reactionary, and standardized proactive measures are rare. The EU-Turkey Statement 
attempted to delegate internal responsibilities to external actors instead of implementing 
efficient regulations regarding migration. The EU has never spoken with ‘one voice’ and 
attempts to balance the different interests among member states. 
 The EU is in an identity crisis and incapable of responding adequately to significant 
challenges like the influx of migrants from the Middle East. Inconsistent policy measures and 
non-uniform approaches to migration weaken the stability of the EU significantly. Burden-
sharing and security issues due to growing populism divide the union, hurt the EU-Turkey 
Statement, and lead to its failure from an EU perspective. There is still a need for a common 
approach regarding asylum seekers and refugees. 
4.3 Policy Situation 
4.3.1 Growing Populism and Human Rights 
The current situation in the EU is highly problematic. There are many different interests, and 
the EU is still struggling to find a joint agreement. De Winden (2020) describes the actual 
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conflict lines between Southern and Northern European states, between Brussels and anti-
immigration states, and among civil societies, which are also very divided on mass migration. 
This result is consistent with Neumayer’s (2004) findings, who found that migrants’ 
recognition rate is higher when left-leaning governments are in charge. The other one is the 
failure among member states to renew the Dublin system in terms of burden-sharing. The 
arrival of refugees over the Mediterranean Sea in the EU is not a new phenomenon. Still, 
discord in finding a common approach made it impossible to find a sustainable and fair 
solution. The consequence was thousands of people drowning in the Mediterranean Sea every 
year. Thus, the migrants themselves have become a factor and demonstrate how dysfunctional 
the EU is since right-wing movements across Europe mobilize and agitate against refugees. 
However, these movements do not always have to be rational. Tétényi (2020) identified 
economic insecurity as a major driving factor for populist demands within the EU (and 
elsewhere), respectively the anxiety of (economic) risk. The mobilization against asylum 
seekers and refugees becomes a catalyst to express these insecurities, often resulting in a 
simple ‘we against them’ narrative. 
Although right-wing governments are gaining more and more influence, they were not 
successful in implementing a more restrictive asylum policy. Kaunert and Léonard (2012) 
investigated the EU asylum policy in terms of ‘venue-shopping.’  While it is often commonly 
assumed that national asylum policymaking was ‘outsourced’ to the EU level to implement a 
more restrictive approach concerning asylum seekers and refugees, the authors came precisely 
to the opposite conclusion. The movement to the EU policy venue has increased the legal 
standards and made the system more liberal. Thus, the EU asylum policy is embedded in a 
broader framework (e.g., other treaties like the Lisbon Treaty), and the consequences are an 
increase of judicialization and communitarization. The advocates of a more restrictive asylum 
policy could not anticipate these changes and could not reply favorably. 
A similar approach was made by Thielemann and Hobolth (2016), who described the 
human rights situation of migrants. The authors analyzed the ‘numbers vs. rights’ model in 
developed countries by elaborating on counter-veiling trade-off dynamics. They found that 
vast numbers of migrants are more likely to be affected by human rights restrictions, while 
smaller numbers of migrants are not and even enjoy more rights. However, the authors found 
little evidence for this hypothesis by looking at data sets from Yugoslavia and Iraq and cannot 
fully confirm such dynamics. In terms of asylum and refugee policies, the model has minimal 
explanatory power. In conclusion, Thielemann and Hobolth argue that the model does not 
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include the importance of non-majoritarian institutions such as the European Commission, the 
European Union Court of Justice, and the European Asylum Support Office. They suggest 
further research in this field of policy decision-making. 
The latest efforts in the field of human rights and asylum seekers have been made by 
Thielemann and Zaun (2018), who argue that developments since 2015 have not decreased 
refugees’ rights in the EU, but rather ‘safeguarded’ and ‘enhanced’ the existing standards. The 
authors base their hypothesis on the principal-agent theory and back it up with empirical 
research. The delegation of tasks to the supranational level makes non-majoritarian 
institutions more resistant to nationalist or populistic movements by embedding them in EU 
policies’ framework. Overall, non-majoritarian institutions' influence has increased, but 
member states remain in charge of implementing EU policies, leading to highly diverse 
outcomes. Nevertheless, these dynamics often tend to be the lowest standard denominator 
solution, which usually strengthens refugee rights instead of restricting them. Following this 
explanation, even the so-called ‘EU-Turkey deal’ fits into this argument since many member 
states delegated power to the supranational level. However, this development is not 
unproblematic as the rise of right-wing or eurosceptic movements in Europe shows, even 
though many of these far-right claims could not be confirmed (see the findings of Tétényi et 
al. (2018), Moore and Shellman (2007), or Neumayer (2004; 2005) for instance).  
In general, the EU is still seeking a common approach in terms of migration. The 
implementation of the CEAS was one attempt to reach such an agreement, but it failed. The 
‘anti-migration,’ respectively ‘anti-asylum seekers’ atmosphere in many EU member states do 
not follow a common approach. Therefore, the priority is for the central part to reduce refugee 
movements under all circumstances, including human rights violations. 
4.3.2 Burden-sharing 
The previous chapters on EU policies demonstrate that the EU struggles to find sustainable 
and fair solutions regarding burden-sharing. Even the Commission does not deny that, and 
more or less, all allocation efforts of migrants have been failures to this day. According to 
Hatton (2016), who studied a significant amount of asylum applications in the Western world, 
the primary reasons for people to flee are war, violence, human rights abuse, and adverse 
economic conditions. However, he also addresses the ongoing discussion on a too-liberal 
asylum policy that would automatically lead to uncontrolled mass migration and argues that 
improving the living conditions at origin would have little effect. Therefore, from an EU 
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policy point of view, Hatton says that only ‘draconian policies’ like in Australia will 
tremendously reduce asylum applications. The EU needs to focus on poor host countries and 
should encourage resettlement programs from refugee camps. Nevertheless, the capacities for 
refugees in developed countries need to be increased. At the moment, the burden-sharing in 
the EU is insufficient and very unequally spread among member states. More cooperation is 
required. 
In this context, Germany’s migration policy illustrates the vast differences from other 
countries’ policies. Thielemann (2018) refers to Germany’s open border policy for Syrian 
refugees in 2015 and emphasizes that traditional approaches are struggling to explain this 
policy. Thus, Thielemann focuses on the public goods theory to elaborate on the events of 
2015. He argues that the Dublin system is free-riding and burden-sharing insufficient, 
respectively, even undermining fair practice efforts. Some countries have to carry a more 
substantial burden than others. 
Furthermore, the EU institutions could contribute to multi-level dimensions by 
offering, for example, financial incentives for burden-sharing initiatives. Weaker EU member 
states should not feel that more prosperous EU member states can easily buy themselves out 
from any obligations. Overall, the EU needs to strengthen its unity and solidarity by 
implementing a new EU asylum system based on ‘real’ cooperation among member states. 
However, burden-sharing is not the only issue and is not limited to EU countries. The 
burden should be shared with non-EU or non-European countries. Hampshire (2016) 
emphasizes the asymmetrical character of negotiations between vibrant (destination) and 
weak (origin) countries. Thus, Hampshire analyzed the EU’s Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM) and its impact on external and internal relations and international 
cooperation. Because of complex frameworks, many different institutions, and last but not 
least, endless diverse interests among EU member states, the EU struggles to reach satisfying 
and sustainable agreements with third countries. Three internal factors play a pivotal role in 
this context: ‘contrasting approaches of the Commission and Council to the external 
dimension,’ ‘diversity of member states’ interests in migration policy,’ and ‘different policy 
agendas of the European agencies’ (572-573). As a result, many regulations are not enforced. 
Therefore, Hampshire calls the EU ‘a less promising vehicle for international migration 
cooperation than bilateral interstate negotiations’ (584). 
Last but not least, international organizations and cooperation with them become more 
and more critical. Lavenex (2016) sheds light on the increasing importance of EU cooperation 
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with international organizations such as the IOM or UNHCR in the context of multi-leveling 
migration policies. Both the IOM and UNHCR have become significant strategic partners 
over time, and the EU now cooperates with them daily concerning legal migration, irregular 
migration, and development. In general, the author distinguishes between three main 
strategies: ‘counterweight, whereby international organizations act as independent 
complement or corrector to EU policy; subcontracting, referring to the outsourcing of EU 
project implementation to international organizations; and rule transmission, a process in 
which international organizations engage in transferring EU rules to third countries’ (555-
556). Thus, the UNHCR and IOM are highly involved in EU migration policies by 
subcontracting and rule transmission. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Although some accomplishments, without a doubt, have been made since the implementation 
of the ‘common’ EU migration policy, many uncertainties remain. Several studies suggest 
that migrants’ rights have improved in the EU (see chapter 4.3.1). Still, the recent trend of 
anti-immigration governments gaining more influence can also not be ignored. In general, the 
perception of migration is always very negative. Indeed, the EU is trying to fight for the best 
talents worldwide to increase its competitiveness globally. However, unqualified refugees or 
asylum seekers are very often not welcome. 
 An utterly blind spot in the EU migration policy is which role the EU and its member 
states play in the ‘production’ of migration flows. Global warming, armed conflicts, and 
poverty are neither new nor surprising developments. In many ways, the EU is even 
benefiting from that but is also unwilling to deal with the consequences. For example, the 
current economic growth rates and the living standard in the EU can only be sustained 
because of exploitation and waste of resources, which accelerate global warming.41 Moreover, 
the consequence of global warming is more and more migrants. As yet, the EU has not 
developed a plan for stopping this trend, and previous approaches to manage migration were 
not successful.  
 
 
41 Indeed, the EU growth rates have recently slowed down, and the EU is also investing a lot of resources in the 
implementation of renewable energies. 
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Another surprising point is that the EU has not defined a response on the issue of 
demographic problems. While some rural regions are bleeding out, metropolitan areas 
continue to grow (Rink et al. 2014). The consequences are growing disparities and more 
tensions among civil society. On the one hand, in many EU countries, the population is 
shrinking. On the other hand, countries with a shrinking population like Poland deny 
migration from the Middle-East but promote movement from Asia or Ukraine to keep their 
living standards high. Even tourism has become a problem in certain regions since some 
popular holiday destinations are just overwhelmed by tourists and visitors, leading to many 
tensions with locals (The Guardian 2020a). 
 To begin, the whole EU, every single member state, should start to define goals in 
terms of population size for every country, every region, and every city. Based on this, the EU 
could start discussions for upcoming migration issues by developing a fair balance 
mechanism, considering both external and internal migration. By no means should people be 
‘forced’ to move to different places — however, the EU can provide incentives and foster 
migration destinations.  
The following ‘Migration Balance Model’ that I created explains this approach. 
Table 6: Migration Balance Model 
EU Policy Measures 
Burden-sharing Security Actual Policies 
Burden-sharing, security, and actual policies lay the foundation for efficient, fair, and 
appropriate policy measures in terms of migration. 
Predetermined Migration 
Inflow: The amount of in-
migration needed to sustain 
the system in terms of GDP, 
productivity, innovation, 
health care, social security, 
and living standard. 
Migration Equilibrium: The 
optimum ratio between in- 
and out-migration, which 
does not harm or give any 
member states an advantage. 
Predetermined Migration 
Outflow: The amount of out-
migration that a system can 
tolerate without reducing life 
quality, or the amount of 
out-migration needed to 
improve living conditions 
(e.g., because of over-
population). 
The combination of adequate policy measures and predetermined migration approaches in 
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terms of in- and out-migration leads to stability and balances the internal migration system. 
Migration Balance 
After identifying the migration balance, the allocation process of asylum seekers and 
refugees comes into place. The next table explains how asylum seekers and refugee 
allocations build on the ‘Migration Balance Model.’ Firstly, states are supposed to identify 
poorly or overly populated regions. Based on this, the allocation process takes place, 
considering different hard and soft factors (see Migration Balance Model). Thus, fair and 
efficient burden-sharing measures can be established according to my Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees Allocation Model. 
Table 7: Asylum Seekers and Refugees Allocation Model 
Countries, regions, and 
places that are proportionally 
over-affected by out-
migration. 
Number of Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees 
Countries, regions, and 
places that are proportionally 
over-affected by in-
migration. 
                      ↓                                                   ↓                                                  ↓ 
Allocation Mechanism based on economic power, life quality, and the ratio between in- and 
out-migration (migration balance) 
                      ↓                                                   ↓                                                  ↓ 
On the EU-level: fostering and promoting the settlement of asylum seekers and refugees 
based on fair quotas. 
Fair and efficient burden-sharing among member states 
In general, this chapter analyzed the main EU policy measures and debates on asylum 
seekers and refugees, including legal and irregular migration, the CEAS, and the Schengen 
and Dublin regulations. The findings show that the EU’s initial efforts promoted migration for 
the domestic labor market and reduced asylum seeker movements. Many member states 
approach migration as part of their sovereign rights and do not apply conventional European 
approaches. In the past 20 years, migration, both internal and external, has continuously been 
a significant issue among EU member states. Whereas some European countries benefit from 
well-educated, young, and skillful migrants, other member states are suffering from brain 
drain and intellectually ‘bleed out.’ Notably, the Southern and Eastern European nations are 
negatively affected by this migration. Hence, migration in the 21st century is highly selective, 
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and the competition is for the most exceptional talents in every discipline. Migrants are 
evaluated by their economic exploitability and their value on the domestic labor market. 
On the other hand, asylum seekers and refugees are often ‘not welcome,’ and even EU 
member states with old demographics do not accept them because of cultural, religious, or 
economic reasons. Therefore, the EU is in the paradoxical situation that some parts of the EU 
are proportionally overburdened by migration influx from the Middle East and the African 
continent, while others desperately suffer from out-migration. 
The EU aims for partnership programs with non-EU countries as an instrument to 
reduce migration movements significantly. These programs grant beneficial treatment in 
terms of economic advantages in exchange for agreements on migration issues. Partnership 
agreements have become crucial geopolitical tools and are one opportunity to influence 
foreign governments, decision-makers, and politicians. Regarding irregular migration, the EU 
focuses mainly on smuggling and human trafficking and seeks to destroy their business 
models. However, the smuggling business is not a black and white situation since many 
migrants have a close relationship with their smugglers. 
Moreover, the EU consistently worsens asylum seekers' situation by implementing 
restrictive policy measures for entering the EU legally and pushing them into irregular 
migration. Some of these actions even have a contradictory effect and increase irregular 
migration instead of decreasing it. The consequences are human rights violations of asylum 
seekers and insufficient policy measures. 
Consequently, the application of a functional CEAS does not exist. EU institutions and 
actors are not speaking with the same voice as member states, making the EU’s approach to 
migration inconsistent. Nevertheless, authors like Zaun (2016) see some slow progress 
concerning human rights in the long-run, whereas others, e.g., Thornton (2014), emphasize 
the negative aspects of asylum seekers’ treatment in the EU. Overall, the ‘Schengen crisis’ 
(Börzel and Risse 2018) and the inadequate Dublin regime need reforms towards more 
consistency, fair burden-sharing, and solidarity. 
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5 Conditions in Camps 
This chapter investigates the conditions in camps. To describe the situation in the camps, 
articles and reports from journalists, reporters, and others are referenced. Refugee camps from 
non-EU countries Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan will be covered. Refugee camps from Greece 
and Italy (EU countries) will complete the coverage. Every country section starts with an 
overview of all the crucial data. It delivers numbers, figures, and statistics by explaining how 
many refugees currently live in the country and how many of them live in camps. Secondly, 
the funding of refugee camps is a priority. Refugee camps are continually struggling with 
funding and do not have enough resources to provide to living persons. The third part goes 
into more detail and aims to analyze the camps’ living conditions. The relevant criteria are 
basic human needs. Thus, nutrition, freshwater supply, education, and security are germane 
factors.  
Furthermore, it should be considered that notoriously shocking cases or extraordinarily 
positive cases enjoy more coverage in the media than the usual daily average life in the 
camps. A highly sensitive topic like this does not make it easy to find reliable sources, but 
existing constraints do not allow another procedure. However, I tried to describe the situation 
in the camps as fairly and objectively as possible. Last but not least, each country’s sections 
end with a short conclusion. This chapter builds the foundation for chapter number six, which 
looks into camps’ conditions by elaborating on conducted interviews.  
The chapter concludes with a comparison between camps and further discussions, 
including some recommendations for improvement.  
5.1 Non-EU Camps 
Before I start with the analysis of living conditions in camps, it is important to note that 
refugees' and asylum seekers’ legal status is diverse, which also has some implications 
regarding living conditions. Frangieh (2016) states that most Middle East countries have not 
signed the Refugee Convention (1951). He criticizes the lack of refugee protection and the 
legal framework’s ineffectiveness regarding asylum policies. However, Middle East countries 
still conform to international human rights treaties. They operate in the bilateral Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs) framework, signed between the UNHCR and governments of states 
like Lebanon and Jordan. The MoUs includes and regulates mainly three aspects of asylum 
policies: 
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• Non-refoulement: A refugee’s status recognized by the UHNCR does not prevent 
people from being deported since Lebanon and Jordan constantly maintain the threat 
of refoulement. In 2012, Lebanon suspended the deportation of Syrian refugees. On 
the other hand, Jordan followed a more strict asylum policy and even deported 
children or injured people back to Syria. 
• Legal status: Legal refugee status does not grant residency in the host country. 
Although refugees can obtain a temporary stay in both countries, their status remains 
precarious in practice. Refugees are under the constant threat of arrest for immigration 
law violations.  
• Right to work: The UNHCR is responsible for providing aid for refugees in Lebanon 
and Jordan. Refugee’s capacity to work is strictly limited due to labor market reasons 
(competition for cheap labor), which keeps them dependent on aid organizations. In 
reality, refugees often make their living through the black labor market, and they are at 
risk of getting arrested for working illegally. 
The domestic legislation dealing with asylum seekers and refugees is the ‘Law Regulating 
the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country’ from 1962 in 
Lebanon, and ‘Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs’ in Jordan 
(Saliba 2016a; 2016b). International organizations criticize both Lebanon and Jordan for their 
asylum and refugee policies: ‘Refugees enjoy few, if any, legal rights in Lebanon.’ (UNHCR 
2010) 
Or: 
‘Jordanian law makes limited references to asylum seekers and refugees.  Despite having the 
highest ratio of refugees to citizens in the world, Jordan has not signed the Refugee 
Convention of 1951 or its subsequent 1967 Protocol.  Several concerns are usually cited over 
Jordan’s non-signatory status, including the politically and socially complex—and yet 
unresolved—Palestinian refugee issue, popular sentiment against refugee integration, lack of 
resources and capacity to provide for refugees, and misinformation about the perceived social 
and economic burden of refugees and related questions of national security. […] In practice, 
Jordan avoids the official recognition of refugees under its domestic laws and prefers to refer 
to Syrian refugees as ‘visitors,’ ‘irregular guests,’ ‘Arab brothers’ or simply ‘guests,’ which 
has no legal meaning under domestic laws, and was the same for Iraqi refugees under the 
MOU.  This was further confirmed in an interview with the MOL [Ministry of Labour], 
Labour Inspection department.’ (ILO 2015) 
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Frangieh (2016: 43) concludes, ‘The refusal of Jordan and Lebanon to assume long-term 
responsibility for refugees is the major obstacle against establishing a stable and favourable 
refugee protection regime.’ The other major issue is, once again, burden-sharing between the 
host states and the international community. Lebanon and Jordan are willing to provide 
minimum living standards based on state-to-UN responsibility (MoU), but only if their 
responsibility ends at some point, and the international community shares this burden with 
them.  
Regarding Turkey, the case is slightly different. Even though Turkey signed the Geneva 
Convention in 1951, the Turkish state did that with the limitation of only granting asylum 
status to European refugees (after World War II). According to Zeldin (2016), Turkey’s 
migration policy focuses on Europeans and people with Turkish roots (Turkish Law No. 
2510). Thus, current asylum seekers only get ‘temporary protection’  and usually are not 
allowed to apply for citizenship. After completing a successful interview with state 
authorities, asylum seekers are placed under ‘temporary protection’ for six months. The 
‘temporary protection’ status is supposed to satisfy refugees’ basic needs and provides social 
services, translation services, IDs, travel documents, access to primary and secondary 
education, and work permits. The state authorities decide whether and where applicants have 
to live in reception centers (camps), and people are obliged to report their location regularly. 
However, Zeldin also describes some of the interviews between asylum seekers and state 
authorities as ‘misleading on purpose,’ leading to the rejection of some asylum applications. 
İçduygu (2016) criticizes the Turkish asylum and refugee policy as follows: 
‘Turkey allows the […] (UNHCR) to operate and conduct refugee status determination [RSD] 
procedures whereby refugee status is jointly granted by the UNHCR and the Ministry of 
Interior with the underlying condition that accepted refugees do not locally integrate but 
instead resettle in a third country. Considering its geographical proximity to conflict-ridden 
states, Turkey’s geographical limitation disqualifies a vast number of asylum seekers and 
refugees seeking permanent protection from the Turkish state.’ (Zeldin 2016) 
Finally, in the EU, the AMIF and ISF funds provide financial assistance for states 
hosting refugees and asylum seekers in camps. Furthermore, a comprehensive set of rules, 
laws, and migration policies manages migrants’ inflow and status (see chapter 4). 
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5.1.1 Turkey 
Figures, Numbers, and Statistics 
The number of registered Syrian refugees living in Turkey was 3,285,533 in 2017 (UNHCR 
2017a). In comparison to 2015, with 1.7 million Syrian refugees, the number of refugees has 
almost doubled. From the nearly two million refugees in Turkey in 2015, 250,000 were living 
in one of the 25 refugee camps (the rest were spread across the country). The WFP provided 
food and clean water for 154,000 people in eleven camps (2015). In 2020 (January), there 
were 3,576,344 registered Syrian refugees (4.1 million refugees in total) in Turkey, which is a 
significant increase. The actual number of Syrian refugees living in South-East Turkey camps 
is approximately 65,000 people (UNHCR 2019c). Figures for the entire country are not 
available. 
Funding 
The reason for the relatively high standard of living in Turkish refugee camps is not due to the 
efforts of the UNHCR, but due to the Turkish state initiative. The Turkish government 
received guidelines (minimum distance between tents, et cetera) from the UNHCR and then 
designed the camps independently. This approach has the advantage that Turkey remains in 
control of every detail. This procedure is cost-intensive but also highly effective. While 
NGOs, who are usually running refugee camps, often have to deal with local bureaucracy, 
inefficient structures (many countries are involved), and insufficient funding, a relatively 
wealthy state can quickly fulfill the requirements (McClelland 2014). The actual figures 
concerning the UNHCR funding requirements in 2020 confirm this observation. The data 
available are currently for the years 2012 to 2018. The international community could not 
fulfill the funding requirements in this period, even though funding has increased 
tremendously in recent years. In 2018, Turkey received almost 1.5 billion USD, which was 
still not enough to close the gap (UNHCR 2020b).  
The Situation in the Camps 
According to the New York Times (McClelland), in 2014, Turkey‘s refugee camps were in 
pretty good condition. The Turkish government built container camps at record speed with at 
least minimum standards, including cleanliness, brand new brick paths, street-washing trucks, 
power lines, streetlights, housing maintenance, and playgrounds for children. Furthermore, 
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the camp in Kilis provided education for 2,225 students, sometimes at a higher standard than 
in the school in Syria (McClelland 2014). However, the situation outside the camps remained 
devastating, and many people left the camps. Many of the refugees were living on the streets 
or in shanties. 
In most cases, it is unknown where they lived. According to Onur Burçak Belli (2015), 
a reporter from the FAZ who observed the situation in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and other 
Turkish cities, most Syrian refugees' standard of living is much worse than in camps. She 
reported that children very often became the primary income source for families. Indeed, child 
labor is not a new phenomenon in Turkey, but the level of exploitation was exceptionally high 
since most Syrian children are traumatized and barely speak the Turkish language. Another 
issue was the rising tension within society because of the extraordinarily high number of 
immigrants (Topçu 2015). 
Before Turkey‘s current situation, the Turkish government had anticipated the 
imminent crisis much better than other countries and was, respectively, far better prepared. 
While Jordan or Lebanon have had to struggle with epidemics, diseases, and other urgent 
health issues, Turkey managed to establish a well-functioning and highly-effective health care 
infrastructure to respond adequately to the mass migration from Syria. In fact, the Turkish 
state is economically much more robust when compared to Lebanon and Jordan. Therefore, 
the funding was not such a big issue as in other countries (Sahlool et al. 2012). 
Although the Turkish state covers the basic needs of Syrian refugees in camps, there 
are also some criticisms like food poisoning, insufficient distribution of tents and essential 
goods (e.g., soap or toothpaste), and Turkish soldiers' insults, et cetera. In general, Özden 
(2013) believed that wealthier Syrians prefer to live outside the camps by renting apartments, 
while the not so wealthy stay in the camps. Consequently, especially in Southern Turkey 
(close to the Syrian border), the costs of living and unemployment have increased, which 
might lead to local conflicts between Syrians and Turks (Cagaptay 2014). Many Syrians live 
in extreme poverty or become homeless after running out of money in a short period. 
Nevertheless, compared to 2012, the Turkish government has intensified its cooperation with 
international help organizations, involving FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, and 
UNICEF to provide more assistance for a refugee living inside and outside the camps (Kirişc 
2014). 
Nevertheless, Turkey was overwhelmed by the inflow of Syrian refugees. At the 
beginning of the crisis, almost all refugees lived in camps. By the end of the year 2014, 
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approximately 80 percent of Syrian refugees lived outside the camps, which shows that the 
Turkish government had distribution struggles before the refugee crisis in Europe had broken 
out. İçduygu (2015) stresses that Turkey should not be left alone to solve the crisis. Still, only 
sharing the international community‘s burden can significantly improve Turkey's Syrian 
refugees’ situation. 
In recent years, it has become much more difficult to find any new information about 
refugee camps since Turkey has drastically transformed under President Erdogan. However, 
Turkey’s media are praising their camps' conditions as modern facilities with clinics, schools, 
libraries, mosques, football pitches, playgrounds, and protection centers for children, 
including quotes from satisfied inhabitants (Anadolu Agency 2019). However, the Turkish 
government followed the plan to send one million refugees back to Syria (Gall 2019). Even 
though some skepticism seems appropriate, the overall positive impression can be confirmed 
by Franck Düvell, a consultant of the EU Commission and the EU Parliament.  In an 
interview with German state television, he said that Turkish Camps' conditions are much 
better than, for example, in Greece (ZDF 2020). In March 2020, the Turkish U.S. ambassador 
stated ‘stopping the spread of the Coronavirus is mission impossible’ and demanded help 
from the EU due to the Turkish state's limited resources (De Luce 2020). 
Conclusion 
In 2015, Baban et al. wrote that Turkey's Syrian refugees demanded more rights and even 
asked for citizenship and more participation in society. In December 2019, the BBC quoted 
the Turkish president Erdogan: ‘If the violence towards the people of Idlib does not stop, this 
number [refugees] will increase even more. In that case, Turkey will not carry such a migrant 
burden on its own.’ He continued: ‘The negative effects of this pressure on us will be an issue 
felt by all European countries, especially Greece.’ 
 Although Turkey anticipated the crisis very early and was well-prepared for the 
considerable migration inflow from Syria, the situation remains tense. It is not surprising that 
even a big state like Turkey has reached its limits. The camps’ situation might be relatively 
okay, but Turkish state authorities still call Syrian migrants only ‘guests.’ Therefore, the 
integration in the labor market and other parts of society was not successful, which cannot be 
a long-term solution for anyone since the Middle East conflicts will not end shortly. 
Consequently, migration will not stop either, and Turkey needs to find a way to balance the 
situation. It is not very likely that Syrians will continue to accept their status quo. More new 
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conflicts within society between the home population and the host population might occur as 
well. Erdogan’s recent comments are politically motivated, addressing the Turkish 
community but also Brussels. The President wants to demonstrate strength to Brussels. The 
EU-Turkey deal opened the EU to blackmail. The threat of opening the Turkish borders is not 
new. However, it is still a useful tool to protect Turkish interests, and Europe cannot respond 
to Turkish military offenses against the Kurds. At the moment, Turkey is not sanctionable for 
its actions because Brussels authorities fear the EU could be once again overwhelmed with 
Syrian migration flows with unpredictable consequences.  
 In conclusion, refugees and asylum seekers have become a political issue used for 
political interests. Kelly Greenhill (2010) refers to these practices as ‘Weapons of Mass 
Migration’ in terms of forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy. In an interview from 
2015 (Cicero), Greenhill herself confirmed that Turkey uses methods and strategies described 
in her book; refugees as a ‘weapon’ to destabilize other countries or regions. 
5.1.2 Lebanon 
Figures, Numbers, and Statistics 
According to the UNHCR, 1,001,051 registered Syrian refugees lived in Lebanon in 2017 
(UNHCR 2017b). Compared to 2015, with 1,150,000 Syrian refugees, the number has not 
significantly decreased (Amnesty International 2015). However, the real number is probably 
tremendously higher. For instance, SPIEGEL ONLINE reported in 2015 that Lebanon is 
hosting approximately 2 million Syrian refugees in a country with a population of 4.5 million 
inhabitants (Salloum 2015). Every fifth person in Lebanon is a refugee, which makes 
Lebanon, per capita, the biggest host country for refugees in the world (Rainey 2015). In the 
meanwhile, the numbers have slightly decreased. There are still 914,648 registered Syrian 
refugees living in Lebanon (UNHCR 2019d). The hotspots for refugees are Bekaa (37 percent 
of the total population are refugees), North Lebanon (26.5 percent of the total population are 
refugees), Beirut (24.5 percent of the total population are refugees), and South Lebanon (11.4 
percent of the total population are refugees) (UNHCR 2019d). 
Funding 
Private organizations and institutions like Women Now or Sawa for Syria have assumed the 
state‘s role and built their own refugee camps in Lebanon (Molter 2016). These organizations 
depend on donations, the same as the UHNCR does. Despite worldwide financial support, the 
  119 
 
funding of these help organizations is continuously wanting. For example, the UHNCR has 
only covered 30% of its 2 billion USD funding requirements (November 2017) (UHNCR 
2017b). 
Furthermore, most refugee camps are not official camps but are only tolerated by the 
Lebanon state. Private owners of the land are letting some of their ground for the 
establishment of refugee camps. One family's price per month is usually 100 USD – just for 
the allowance to set up a tent. For a family that has lost everything in war, this is a 
tremendous amount of money, and they still need nutrition and clean water (Molter 2016). 
The latest data available (2018) shows that the situation has become worse (UNHCR 2019d). 
Because the funding has remained more or less stable from 2015 to 2018, the gap has 
increased. The financing received in 2018 did not even cover 50 percent of approximately 2.2 
billion USD requirements. Thus, the biggest host country per capita of refugees is still 
tremendously underfunded. 
The Situation in the Camps 
The state of Lebanon changed its migration policy in the year 2015. Since then, the UHNCR 
is not allowed to register any Syrian refugees. Thus, the Lebanese state is incapable of hosting 
such a considerable amount of fleeing people and provide them sufficient food, water, health 
care, et cetera. The UN reported as early as December 2015 that some 70 percent of the over 
one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon now live below the Lebanese extreme poverty line‘ 
(UN 2015). 
Molter (2016) reported from Bekaa, where approximately one million Syrian refugees 
(temporarily) lived in refugee camps in 2016, that the camp administration can provide 
enough food and clean water. Nevertheless, the situation can change instantly, and everything 
else is in peril. For instance, only 30% of 400,000 Syrian refugee children can attend school 
because of limited classroom capacity. Many children have to work to support their families 
financially. Therefore, child labor is pretty standard, as is prostitution. The UHNCR can only 
provide 13 USD per month for one family, and because of funding issues, the trend is 
negative. Thus, the UN refugee organization is not a big help. Many of the help organizations 
themselves migrate to Turkey because their work registration is easier (Molter 2016). 
Concerning health care, Lebanon did have proper infrastructure, including 165 
hospitals, 158 primary health care centers, and well-educated employees in 2013 (El-Khtatik 
et al. 2013). Ammar et al. (2016) came even to the conclusion that the Lebanese health system 
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did not even sustain its performance but even improved it. Overall, Lebanon‘s primary health 
system was functional but also costly before the crisis intensified in 2015. Regardless, the 
more prevalent, chronic, non-communicable health care needs made the country struggle. 
Lebanon was already over-allocated during that time since the country had to host Palestine 
refugees as well. One of the significant challenges is to provide long-term support, while after 
natural disasters, only emergency help is required (El-Khatib et al. 2013). Thus, Lebanon 
could not fulfill all these requirements anymore, and, consequently, the outbreak of 
leishmaniasis occurred in 2012. Saroufim (2014) concluded that ‘poverty, malnutrition, 
population displacement, weakened immunity, and inadequate housing are all risk factors for 
cutaneous leishmaniasis.’ 
Additionally, Lebanon has a long tradition of distribution battles between refugees 
(mostly from Palestine) and the hosting community. According to Halabi (2004), the camps’ 
population competed for scarce resources, including employment and housing. Palestinian 
traders did not have access to markets surrounding the camp. The markets have been occupied 
mainly by Syrian traders and only offered outdated food products for Palestinians. 
Furthermore, the outbreak of other conflicts in the ‘60s leads to a greater struggle over 
housing. The consequence was the establishment of illegal camps creating structures with 
high conflict potential (Halabi 2004). This problem has never been solved and shows some 
significant similarities to refugee camps’ current Lebanon issues. The global community has 
ignored the demand for help from Lebanon for decades, and considerably underfunding of 
refugee camps still does. 
Recently, the situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon has even become worse. 
Foreign Policy reported in 2019 that the Lebanese government had intensified its repressive 
policy against Syrians, including demolishing buildings in- and outside of camps and 
crackdowns in Beirut. For example, in July 2019, the Lebanese army destroyed 20 Syrian 
shelters in the Arsal region (Human Rights Watch). The order affected around 3,500 to 3,600 
people, who were not able to provide the necessary paperwork to prevent the destruction. 
Human Rights Watch also reported on repression by the army and arrests. Inhabitants of 
shelters claimed that actions were politically motivated.  
Lebanon is struggling economically with high unemployment rates, but the tensions 
within society have also increased in terms of nationalism and xenophobia (Vohra 2019). 
These circumstances resulted in deportations back to Syria, where Syrians can expect, in the 
worst-case permanent arrest, torture, or death. The expulsion of refugees gets criticized by 
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many NGOs. Nevertheless, more and more Lebanese citizens agree with these policy 
measures and practices since the country’s already insufficient infrastructure has suffered 
more after the Syrians’ influx. Lebanon feels still left alone with the crisis. President Michael 
Aoun said in 2019: ‘The wave of Syrian displacement has produced negative repercussions 
that have impacted all Lebanese sectors,’ as well as ‘the return of refugees can’t wait for a 
political solution to the Syrian crisis’ (Human Rights Watch 2019). In 2020, Beech and 
Hubbard reported for the New York Times that camps in Lebanon are running out of soaps 
and other necessary hygienic materials, which makes adequate handwashing nearly 
impossible. Thus, thousands of people are defenseless in times of spreading pandemics.  
Conclusion 
Although no other country in the world has probably more experience with refugees and 
camps, Lebanon is, without a doubt, not able to manage the crisis by itself. Lebanon is too 
small and cannot provide proper accommodation, nutrition, and opportunities. Even the 
necessary funding requirements are not getting fulfilled by the international community. 
Thus, the economy and infrastructure are overwhelmed by the significant number of Syrian 
refugees in the country. Unfortunately, the war in Syria is not likely to stop in the next few 
years. Since the outbreak of the crisis, the number of refugees has only slightly decreased. 
However, the actual number even remains unknown because the Lebanon government has 
stopped cooperation with UNHCR to a certain extent. 
 Pictures and reports from refugee camps are devastating, which is not surprising, 
keeping in mind how bad the country’s funding and overall situation is. It is not very likely 
that mass deportation back to Syria will occur. Nonetheless, the tensions within society are 
rising as well. Distribution battles over scarce resources are nothing new in Lebanon, but 
another conflict's potential is present. If the situation worsens, new migration waves to Turkey 
and Europe will be the consequence. Dionigi (2016), who analyzed the Lebanese situation, 
states that long-term strategies are needed for welfare programs for both Lebanese and 
Syrians. He concludes: ‘Failing to appreciate the urgency of this issue will inevitably expose 
Lebanese governance to further strains and increase the precariousness of Syrian presence in 
Lebanon. This will have the effect of protracting the current crisis and potentially lead to even 
more regional instability’ (Dionigi 2016: 33). 
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5.1.3 Jordan 
Figures, Numbers, and Statistics 
Jordan is the third country in this case study that is profoundly affected by refugee 
movements. According to the UNHCR, there are were 654,877 Syrian refugees in Jordan in 
November 2017 (UNHCR 2017c). Compared to 2015, the number of refugees (620,000; 84% 
in refugee camps) has slightly increased (Francis 2015).  In 2020, the number of Syrian 
refugees in Jordan increased again (655,435 people in total) (UNHCR 2020c). The hotspots 
are the Amman Governorate (193,399), the Mafraq Governorate (162,317), the Irbid 
Governorate (134,651), and the Zarqa Governorate (94,809). One hundred twenty-three 
thousand six hundred fifty-one people live in refugee camps, and 531,784 people live outside 
of camps. Since 2014, the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan remains stable. 
Funding 
The UNHCR funding requirement for 2017 was approximately 1.2 billion USD, which was 
42 percent covered (UNHCR 2017c). Thus, the coverage rate is, compared to Turkey and 
Lebanon, relatively high. However, considering the country‘s tremendously big problems, it 
is still just a drop in the ocean. In 2018, the latest data available, the funding situation has 
improved slightly since the requirements have also decreased (UNHCR 2020d). Overall, the 
situation since 2013 is tense, and no funding requirements have been fulfilled in recent years.  
The Situation in the Camps 
Similar to Lebanon, the Jordan state fails to provide sufficient security for the immigrants. 
Even before the crisis in Syria, Jordan was struggling with massive economic and political 
instability. Therefore, the situation has dramatically worsened since 2015. The Jordan state 
cannot provide proper accommodation for refugees since most people live not in camps but 
rather in ‘host communities’ (Francis 2015).  Since 2014, the Jordan government has highly 
restricted access to the country for Syrian refugees because the Hashemite Kingdom feared 
national instability due to the growing number of refugees and camps along the border with 
Syria. Thus, the tensions between the UNHCR and the Jordan regime have started to rise. 
Jordan's problematic situation makes it difficult for the UNHCR and other organizations to 
improve people's lives in refugee camps (Francis 2015). 
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Jordan has a long history of almost six decades with refugee camps since it is one of 
Palestine's primary host countries. The unclear political situation makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to implement a proper urbanization strategy for those camps. Nevertheless, due to 
the country‘s long hosting experience, some of these camps have developed the character of 
small cities or towns. Indeed, many buildings, streets, and housing opportunities have been 
improvised and do not provide proper accommodation, but there has undoubtedly been some 
development of some necessary infrastructure for inhabitants (Tawil 2006).  However, the 
Syrian refugee crisis exceeded Jordan‘s financial ability to meet the requirements since Jordan 
was already incapable of managing the decades of refugee movements from Palestine. For 
instance, the Zaatari camp, the biggest Jordanian refugee camp for Syrians, had already 
struggled in 2011 to provide enough food, sanitation, and water. The registration process of 
Syrian refugees takes months (El-Khatib et al. 2013). As a consequence of these adverse 
conditions, some refugees went back to Syria or are living now in other (unregistered) 
improvised tenant camps spread over the country – without any access to nutrition or water 
(Achilli 2015). 
Two years later, the dramatic situation in Jordan has not significantly changed. 
Musharbash (2017) claims that aid organizations have only limited access to the ‘improvised‘ 
camps and are still incapable of providing enough support. Compared to Turkey and Lebanon, 
tens of thousands of people (mostly children and women) have no access to clean water and 
food. Furthermore, terrorist attacks happen regularly in the camps. There has been no support 
from help organizations since 2016. 
Consequently, diseases and child mortality have spread through the camps because of 
the lack of health care. At the beginning of the year, there was some small success concerning 
these issues. However, the UNHCR is still many kilometers away, and most of the emergency 
supplies could not be delivered due to distribution problems and bad weather. In addition to 
domestic policy issues and inadequate infrastructure in Jordan, the camps' insecure situation is 
significant. Jordan estimates that ten percent of the refugee camps‘ population are militant 
groups, including the IS. Another issue is a border dispute between Jordan and Syria, making 
it difficult to determine in which country the refugees are currently located (Musharbash 
2017). UN officials call this region no-man’s-land. 
A report from the WFP from 2019 shows that the situation has not become 
significantly better. 40,000 Syrians are ‘caught’ between the border in Northeast Jordan and 
Syria. These people are highly dependent on aid organizations like UN agencies or other 
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NGOs, which try to provide food and fresh water in an insecure environment. Many camps 
are hard to reach. In 2018, the WFP delivered essential aid to a camp in Rukban. Although 
this delivery saved many lives, aid organizations could not supply the region anymore, and an 
unknown number of children died due to preventable reasons. The Zaatari camp, just 16 
kilometers from the Syrian border, has become the second-largest refugee camp in the world 
and the fourth biggest ‘city.’ In total, 78,000 Syrians live here in improvised shelters. 500,000 
Syrian refugees (approximately half of them are children) in Jordan are dependent on cash 
and food vouchers from WFP (the WFP also provides bread to families in camps). 
Nevertheless, some small accomplishments have occurred. The WFP has established a 
‘healthy food program’ by using homegrown food for children and providing women jobs. 
Furthermore, the WFP has supported the Jordan economy with approximately 580 million 
USD since 2016.  
Al Jazira made another interesting observation in 2018. The Zaatari camp has 
developed its own infrastructure and economy (Lee 2018). Life in the camp has become 
‘normal’ to a certain extent. There are supermarkets, shops, cafes, and even restaurants. The 
NGOs’ activities have also become part of their life, and the youngest members of the 
community have never experienced anything else. According to Lee (2018), there are 3,000 
various shops and small businesses in the Zaatari market, which becomes even more 
remarkable by considering the inhabitants’ average young age. Miller and Singh (2020) for 
CBS News quoted a humanitarian worker who has been working since 2012 in the camp, with 
the following words: ‘None of us should ever be okay with calling this normal. But it’s 
become an accepted reality for a lot of people.’ Fafo (2019a; 2019b) concludes that Syrians’ 
situation in Jordan has improved recently after analyzing factors of health, education, 
employment, and prospects for return. However, three in ten are still considering moving to 
Europe. In March 2020, the Jordan government placed the whole camp under lockdown to 
measure the fight against the Coronavirus (Cuthbert 2020), leading to distribution issues of 
essential products. 
Conclusion 
The situation in the refugee camps in Jordan is, in many aspects, extraordinary. First, the 
proximity of the Zaatari camp to Syria. The vast majority of other Syrian refugees preferred 
destinations that are farther away from their origin. Unfortunately, there is no research on 
motivation. However, one possible explanation could be that people originally only planned 
  125 
 
for a short-term stay and still hope Syria’s conflict might end shortly. Another possibility is 
that people had no other choice and are now stuck in the region, as reports from the WFP 
(2019) suggest. Second, the extremely young average age of the inhabitants is unusual. Third, 
the socio-economic character of the Zaatari camp is unique. 
 Dalal (2015) investigated this socio-economic character of the urbanization of the 
Zaatari camp in Jordan. He came to the conclusion that camps tend to develop their character, 
and socio-economic dynamics are emerging. Thus, former empty spaces have transformed 
into markets, cafés, and shops in less than ten years. Or in other words, people have built up 
their own economy and infrastructure from scratch in a short period. Although there have 
even been some terror attacks in the past, social life has developed, too.   
Nevertheless, although people have managed to arrange their presence there, the 
conditions are still appalling in many ways. Again, aid organizations are underfunded, and 
Jordan state does not have the resources to provide proper living conditions for everyone. On 
the surface, it might look like a sustainable solution for the future, but it is not. 
 The country of Jordan is another country overwhelmed by the number of Syrian 
refugees. The majority of the young Syrian population needs support from aid organizations, 
and there are only a few work permits for Syrians in Jordan. However, the case of the Zaatari 
camps remains especially exciting. If people cannot get integrated into the Jordanian society 
and will not get the opportunity to go back to the origin, independence movements could be 
the consequence.  
5.2 EU Camps 
5.2.1 Greece 
Figures, Numbers, and Statistics 
According to the UHNCR, there are currently 112,300 refugees or migrants in Greece, 71,200 
on the mainland, and 41,100 on the islands (UHNCR 2019e). In 2019, the number of new 
arrivals increased significantly by 50 percent or 74,600 people compared to the previous year. 
Most of the new arrivals are families with children from Syria or Afghanistan. The camps on 
the islands are tremendously overcrowded because 36,400 people share the space in camps 
initially designed for only 5,400 people. In December 2019, the UHNCR had to provide cash 
assistance to 67,300 people and 25,500 relief items to people in need. In December of 2019 
alone, the UHNCR contributed 8.7 million EUR. The organization also rents buildings and 
  126 
 
accommodation across the country. In 2019, the UHNCR was able to provide accommodation 
for 25,800 asylum seekers and refugees. 
Funding 
The biggest donor is by far the European Union and its member states (UNHCR 2020e). Two 
significant funds are responsible for the donations to Greece. The ‘Asylum, Migration, and 
Integration Fund’ (AMIF) and the ‘Internal Security Fund’ (ISF) (EC 2019a). The AMIF is 
intended to improve reception capacities, maintain the standards of asylum procedures, 
support the integration process of migrants, and improve return programs’ effectiveness. On 
the other hand, the ISF is a support program to protect borders and fight international crime 
organizations. From 2014 to 2020, Greece received 328.3 million EUR from the AMIF and 
285.2 EUR from the ISF (613.5 million EUR in total). However, this is not all. The EU also 
provides additional emergency assistance. Since 2015, the EU has contributed 816.4 million 
EUR to other international organizations and NGOs operating in Greece. They aim to lower 
the humanitarian crisis for refugees and asylum seekers. Under exceptional circumstances in 
crises, the Commission can apply the ‘Emergency Support Instrument.’ The mechanism is 
designed to support people in need, as well as member states, UN agencies, NGOs, and other 
international organizations that were cooperating with member states during major crises. 
Since 2016, the EC has contributed 643.6 million EUR via this mechanism. 
The latest funding update is from February 2020. Currently, the UNHCR has received 
only five percent of its total funding requirements for 2020 (UNHCR 2020e), which means, 
by using statistical projection, the UHNCR would not be able to reach its requirements by a 
large margin.  
The Situation in the Camps 
Greece already has a long tradition of migration and refugee camps. Papadopoulou did (2004) 
research on Greece as an essential transit-country and its role in Western Europe’s migration 
process. After the outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015, several other scholars investigated 
the Greek situation. Sotiris and DeMond (2017) interviewed 50 volunteers in refugee camps. 
Kousoulis et al. (2016) concluded that the Greek health care system is dysfunctional, and the 
necessary medical care for Syrian refugees has been insufficient. Hermans et al. (2017) stated 
there is a crucial need for mental and dental health care in refugee camps, and Ben Farhat et 
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al. (2018) examined the harsh conditions for refugees during their journey and stay in Greece 
in terms of violence and mental health. 
In October 2019, the UHNCR published a situation report about dangerously 
overcrowded reception centers on Greek islands after the arrival of over 10,000 new asylum 
seekers and refugees.  In addition, 30,000 people are living in inhumane conditions (UNHCR 
2019f). The situation on Lesvos, Samos, and Kos was critical. The situation of the Moria 
center on Lesvos was especially alarming. Twelve thousand six hundred people lived in 
shelters, which were constructed for only 2,000 to 3,000 people. The report says 100 people 
had to share one toilet, and a fire in a container that killed a woman lead to riots and clashes 
with the local police. On Samos, another Greek island, 5,500 people lived in a space designed 
for only 700-800 people without access to proper nutrition or medical care. On Kos, 3,000 
people had to stay in an area planned for 700. The UHNCR called this situation ‘inadequate,’ 
‘insecure,’ and ‘inhumane’ and demanded that at least 5,000 people needed to be transferred 
from the islands to the mainland for further asylum procedures. New and more 
accommodation was asked for, too. Again, a long-term solution and a concept for the 
integration of refugees were completely missing. Four thousand four hundred unaccompanied 
children lived in these worrying conditions by considering that most of the shelters were not 
supposed to house children. Hundreds of children had no other choice than to live with 
strangers in a warehouse on Moria. On Samos, children even were forced to sleep on 
container roofs. The UHNCR describes this situation as ‘extremely risky’ and ‘potentially 
abusive’ for unaccompanied children in Greece and continued by criticizing the EU migration 
policy for not allowing these children to reunite with their families in the EU.  
 The Tagesschau (German State Television) reported in November 2019 that the Greek 
government had decided to shut down the camps on Lesvos, Samos, and Kos. The current 
reception centers would be replaced by new container facilities used as ‘Identification and 
Departure Centers’ with 5,000 people. These new facilities provide water, electricity, and 
sanitation. These spaces are designed for people who have no chance to get asylum status. 
The inhabitants of the containers will not be allowed to leave the new camps. The Greek 
government speaker said that the original concept was to send a message: people should not 
come to Greece after the country further restricted its immigration laws. At the same time, 
Greece wants to transfer at least 20,000 people from the islands to the mainland and 
accommodate them in apartments or former military facilities. 
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Nevertheless, people continue arriving on the islands, and it is still not clear what 
should happen to them. Some smaller camps are planned on Greek islands, but the UNHCR is 
skeptical if the new plans comply with the UN charter. In December 2019, Caritas 
International reported in ZEIT ONLINE that the number of people in Moria Lesvos had 
increased to 15,000 (5,000 of them children). The migrants in camps are suffering more 
because of the cold winter. Many people are physically and psychologically sick due to 
inhumane conditions. The Commission was anxious about the situation, but other member 
states still refused to accept relocated people, even not the children. Thus, at the end of 
November, there was only space for 2,216 children, according to the National Center for 
Social Solidarity. Approximately 3,000 children were still without proper accommodation. 
Deutschlandfunk came to a similar assessment (Göbel 2019) in December 2019. Christos 
Christou from Medicins Sans Frontiers International compared Greece’s situation with war 
zones and stated that EU-Turkey has failed. Critics claim that there is too much bureaucracy 
involved, and the asylum procedures are not efficient. The result is almost no readmission to 
the country of origin can be realized, but the migration flows from Turkey and other states 
continues.  
 The latest update is from February 2020. SPIEGEL ONLINE reported about 
demonstrations on Greek islands, Lesvos in particular, against EU and Greek policy 
(Christides and Lüdke 2020).  The migrants claim that they are held hostage for months or 
years on the islands. There were again clashes with the Greek police. Footage showed 
children trying to escape teargas and several arrests of demonstrators. 
Furthermore, Greek citizens from the island demonstrated against the situation on the 
island. The atmosphere is tense and described as ‘everyone against everyone’ since the 
number of migrants has increased to 42,000 on the islands (20,000 on Lesvos). The 
conservative Greek government has applied its new migration system, which says the asylum 
decision must be made within 25 days for new arrivals. The consequence is more deportations 
without sufficient examination of the cases. 
On the other hand, people already on the island still have to wait for months or years 
until their asylum decision is made because of the Greek asylum procedures' changes. Since 
January, the UNHCR reports that people are getting arrested and immediately have to defend 
themselves in court without legal assistance. The goal of the government is to deport, every 
week, 200 people. There are currently nearly 100 new arrivals on Greek islands every day, 
which is an extraordinarily high number for February. The predictions are that this number 
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will increase in the upcoming months when the weather gets warmer. Further escalation in- 
and outside the camps is feared. Greece has still not the capacity to manage these substantial 
migration flows.  
One year ago, The Time (magazine) reported that UNHCR called for ‘emergency 
measures’ and The Guardian (2020b) published an interview with Dr. Hana Pospisilova, who 
volunteers on Lesvos, with the following quotes:  
‘I am an experienced doctor. I have seen many patients in my life, but what I saw there had me 
crying. I saw many children I was worried about would die because they were suffering from 
malnutrition. I met a baby who smelled bad; his mother had not washed him for weeks 
because there was only cold water, and she was worried he would die.’  
She concludes with a warning regarding the risk of disease outbreaks:  
‘People come and go to the medical facilities, they take antibiotics, they are still coughing, 
they still have a temperature. If you read about Spanish flu, it was exactly like this that is 
began to spread, in overcrowded facilities where people had a viral infection that became a 
bacterial infection that killed them.’ 
Conclusion 
The situation in Greece remains disturbing. Since the refugee crisis outbreak in 2015, neither 
the EU nor Greece has developed the right strategies to deal with mass migration and asylum 
seekers in significant numbers. Even though the new conservative Greek government follows 
a more restrictive migration policy, the number of arrivals on Greek islands is still high. Some 
could also argue Greece has lost control over its islands. Demonstrations and confrontations 
with administration and Greek citizens have become daily events. The Greek example 
additionally leaves some doubts if the EU-Turkey statement is functioning. The bureaucratic 
obstacles for deportations back to Turkey or elsewhere are not easy and fast to overcome.  
Meanwhile, thousands of people are locked in no man’s land and do not have any 
prospects. Most of them are treated as criminals, and even children are no exception from 
these harsh policy measurements. Volunteers report catastrophic scenarios. Basic human 
needs are not satisfied (nutrition and freshwater supply), and disease outbreaks are not an 
unrealistic prediction.  
 In general, the whole Greek disaster also opens the discussion about funding and 
policy efficiency. Theoretically, Europe is one of the richest, maybe the wealthiest continent 
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on the planet, but the conditions on the Greek islands are, at least to a certain extent, worse 
than in third-world countries despite all the funding, emergency mechanisms, and other policy 
measures like the EU-Turkey deal. None of them were successful or helped to improve the 
situation. Recently, the situation even has become, once again, worse. The latest reports warn 
about the consequences of a possible outbreak of the Coronavirus on the Greek islands 
(Grillmeier 2020; Pouplier 2020). Does the question remain how this is possible?  
Moreover, what can be done about that? Indeed, Greece is a special case in itself. The 
debt crisis has never been overcome, and, therefore, the country still suffers from its austerity 
policy. Nevertheless, it does not explain why all the funding and financial support do not help 
change the camps’ conditions. At the moment, it seems like further escalation is just a matter 
of time with unpredictable consequences for the whole European Union. 
5.2.2 Italy 
Figures, Numbers, and Statistics 
Italy is another country that has a long tradition of migration, especially because of its 
Mediterranian location and proximity to the African continent. The most common way 
migrants arrive in Italy is by sea. Even before the outbreak of the European refugee crisis, 
Italy was one of the main destinations for refugees and asylum seekers. In 2014, 170,100 
people arrived by sea, followed by 153,842 in 2015, 181,436 in 2016, 119,360 in 2017, 
23,370 in 2018, and 11,471 (UNHCR 2020e). Regarding the demographics, 70 percent are 
male, 10 percent female, and 20 percent children. In the same period, approximately 16,000 
people died or are still missing in the Mediterranian Sea on their way to Europe.  
In November 2019, there were 95,020 asylum seekers and refugees in Italy (UNHCR 
2019g). They are accommodated across the country in reception facilities. Sixty-seven 
thousand nine hundred seventy-one people are in first-line reception facilities in Lombardy, 
Emilia-Romagna, and Piedmont. Another 24,568 people live in second-line facilities, which 
are primarily in Sicily and Latium. Four hundred eighty-one persons lived in so-called 
hotspots regions, in particular, Sicily. From January 1st until the 30th  of October, Italy has 
received 29,526 new asylum applications. Thus, the number of asylum applications decreased 
by 38 percent compared to the previous year's same period (47,475). By far, the largest group 
of asylum applicants comes from Pakistan (20 percent), followed by Nigeria (8 percent) and 
Bangladesh (6 percent), with Syria nowhere near the top. Lampedusa registers most sea 
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arrivals. The latest numbers are from February 2020; there are already 2,072 sea arrivals since 
January 1st (UNHCR 2020e). 
Funding 
Italy benefits from the same EU funds as Greece. From 2015 until May 2019, Italy received 
EU support from AMIF and ISF (EC 2019b). The aim was to strengthen Italy’s borders and to 
help Italian authorities to manage migration inflows. In total, Italy has received 950.8 million 
EUR. 519.9 million EUR came from the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund, and 434.9 
million EUR from the Internal Security Fund. The vast majority of the money was awarded 
under the roof of EU long-term funding and national programs (724.4 million EUR). The 
funding is allocated at the beginning of each EU budget period (2014-2020) and is managed 
and implemented in compliance with the Commission. The other 226.4 million EUR are 
awarded as EU short-term funding in the framework of ‘Emergency Assistance,’ which can 
be requested by every EU member state under certain circumstances or urgent needs. The 
institutions and organizations that benefited most from EU funding are the Ministry of 
Interior, Coast Guard, Financial Police, Navy, and the Ministry of Defence Italian Navy. 
The Situation in the Camps 
Recent publications concerning refugee camps mainly focused on the outbreaks of disease. 
Ciervo et al. (2016) identified poor living conditions, famine, war, and refugee camps as 
‘major risk factors for epidemics’ by analyzing cases of louseborne relapsing fever and its 
connection with asylum seekers who stayed for a while in camps in Africa and Sicily, Italy. 
Stefanelli et al. (2017) contributed similar research by investigating infection cases with 
serogroup X meningococci, another infectious disease. The spread of the disease was 
observed in Italian refugee camps, respectively, reception centers. The authors conclude that 
diseases like this are an ‘emerging health threat for persons arriving from Africa.’  
 The Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), located in Italy, 
provided a comprehensive overview of the living conditions in refugee camps and reception 
centers in Italy on the Asylum Information Database (2020)42 website. The general regulation 
 
 
42 The Asylum Information Database website is financed by the EU AMIF fund.  
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says people should be treated with respect regarding private life, gender, age, physical and 
mental health, family, and vulnerable persons. Nevertheless, the reception centers’ conditions 
can vary significantly between reception centers, and unfortunately, annual reports about the 
circumstances in reception centers for Italy are not available. Asylum seekers usually have to 
stay for several months in one of the facilities. The system is divided into ‘First Reception 
Centers’ and ‘Temporary Centers.’ First reception centers are described as big, overcrowded, 
and isolated facilities with almost no connection to Italian urban centers or the outside world. 
Usually, these places do not have the same standards as smaller reception centers. Limitations 
of these centers are, for example, limited space, legal advice, and social life. The Italian NGO 
LasciateCIEntrare visited the first reception centers in Sant’Anna (Crotone, Calabria), Mineo 
(Catania, Sicily), Villa Sikania (Agrigento, Sicily), Cavarzerani (Udine, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia), and Friuli (Udine, Friuli-Venezia Giulia) in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. In 
Sant’Anna, doors could not be closed, and bathrooms had to be shared, unaccompanied 
children were treated as accompanied, and medication in the hospitals was insufficient.  In 
Mineo, probably the most famous camp, people lived isolated entirely from the outside world, 
the sanitation was precarious, and infrastructure, in total, was ailing. 
Furthermore, security was a big issue considering black markets, exploitation, 
prostitution, and drug trafficking. The camp in Cavarzerani was overcrowded, people even 
had to live in tents (no light and heating), and the hygienic conditions were critical. In 2018 
an Afghan Dublin returnee committed suicide in the camp. The Friuli camp in Udine opened 
as a response to the adverse conditions in Cavarzerani. 
 Temporary centers should guarantee the same standards as the first reception centers. 
However, NGOs and reporters criticized the facilities’ conditions, lack of hygiene, and 
insecure environment. In Enea (Rome, Lazio), 316 persons had to share three washing 
machines, and there was no hot water. In Roggiano Gravina (Cosenza, Calabria), everyone 
received the same medicine for different health issues. In Piano Torre di Isnello (Palermo, 
Sicily), the camp administration did not heat the buildings, and there were not enough clothes 
available for the cold winter months. In Telese (Campania), there were similar problems. 
Other temporary centers are located in Milan (Lombardy), Casotto (Veneto), Cona (Venezia, 
Veneto), and Montalto Uffugo (Calabria). 
Moreover, in 2018, over 10,000 asylum seekers lived in makeshift camps and were not 
allowed to participate in the reception system. These camps are described as improvised and 
are spread across the country, including Piedmont, Lazio, Apulia, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. 
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Some of them had to close by the end of the year 2018. The inhabitants received the warning 
only two days before the evacuation, and it remained unclear if the people were transferred to 
other facilities or not.  
 In the summer of 2019, the Italian government announced the reception center's 
closure in Mineo, Sicily, which was once the largest refugee camp in Europe with over 4,000 
people (UNHCR 2019h). Wallis (2019) called the camp on InfoMigrants.net43 a synonym for 
‘crime, overcrowded, and mismanagement.’ Violence, rape, and murder happened in Mineo. 
Even crime gangs were operating from there. Some further reports suggest that the camp 
administrator has cut costs to make a profit from the camp (mishandling of EU funds). Human 
rights organizations criticized the camp’s shutdown as another form of profit-maximation 
since the Italian state would save millions of Euros without the camp. Many people might 
have to stop their psychological or medical treatments because of the camp’s shutdown. 
Despite all the criticism, the Italian government executed the shutdown.  
 A few months before these developments, a German reporter team from Monitor 
(2019)44 (German state television) investigated Italy's situation. It showed the consequences 
of the shutdown of camps and how harsh the living conditions for refugees and asylum 
seekers in Italy are. The camp reported on in South Italy is called ‘The Slum,’ and 
approximately 1,000 people live there. There is no freshwater, and self-constructed 
improvised ‘houses’ even do not have functional toilets. The report says Italian state 
authorities are refusing to provide proper accommodation. Some people in camps complain 
the situation is worse than in Africa. People are living like homeless, and many of them are 
suffering because of Dublin regulations. Specifically, Dublin returnees often do not get any 
state benefits. The current Italian law states that people who have left their camps in Italy for 
unknown reasons might lose their accommodation. Or in other words, they become homeless 




43 A parternship between France Médias Monde (France 24, Radio France International, Monte Carlo Doualiya), 
the German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle, and the Italian press agency ANSA. InfoMigrants is co-
financed by the European Union. 
44 Video footage is available on the Monitor website.  
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Italy is another disturbing case of failures in the EU migration policy. Every year, the result is 
thousands of dead people in the Mediterranean Sea, and even though the Italian state is 
relatively wealthy, refugees and asylum seekers have to suffer from poor living conditions in 
camps. Under far-right Interior Minister Salvini, the former Italian government did not allow 
sea rescue boats filled with survivors to stop at Italian ports. Consequently, the conditions in 
the camps are getting worse, and people live in insecurity.  
 The Italian case also questions the Dublin system, just like the Greek example 
questions the EU-Turkey deal. It cannot be a sustainable solution that Dublin returnees end up 
being on Italy’s street and become homeless. Again, no long-term strategy is applied. The 
contrary is the case. It seems like Italy is following a restrictive migration and asylum policy 
to make the living conditions as bad as possible for as many migrants as possible in the hope 
they voluntarily return to their country of origin. However, in the short-run, the mafia and 
other criminals take advantage of these people’s situations. Furthermore, it also remains 
unclear if people would return to a place where they have to fear torture, arrestment, or worse 
in the long-run. Ironically, one could argue that the Italian migration and camp policy, in 
particular, has eliminated the poor living conditions in the camps by making the whole 
country a big open-air camp for refugees and asylum seekers.  
 The Italian migration policy creates dead people in the Mediterranean Sea, countless 
homeless people, and worsening living conditions in- and outside the camps. A situation 
where nobody wins.  
5.3 Analysis: Conditions in Camps 
The analysis starts with a comparison between non-European camps in Turkey, Lebanon, and 
Jordan. The second part compares the situation in camps in Italy and Greece, and the last 
section compares camps in the EU and camps in non-European countries. The analysis is 
based on the evaluation of the previous sections. Every comparison sets individual priorities 
and focuses on different aspects of the debate since the variables, circumstances, and 
situations are very diverse. In general, this part aims to find distinctions and diversities by 
making comparisons: 
• Comparison between non-European Camps: Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are three 
completely different states, and this fact is reflected in the analysis of the situation in 
the refugee camps. The comparison emphasizes the financial, political, and socio-
economic differences by recognizing and highlighting the most important key aspects 
in discussing living conditions in these camps. 
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• Comparison between Camps in the EU: This compares two EU member states, Greece 
and Italy. Both countries have access to the Mediterranean sea, struggled through 
recent economic crises, and are profoundly affected by migration flows. The chapter 
focuses on economic, geography, refugees’ and asylum seekers’ origin, and policy 
implications. 
• Comparison between non-European and EU Camps: Obviously, the main difference is 
that Greece and Italy are members of the same political union, whereas Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan are not. This circumstance has funding and policy implications 
and shows the different approaches in terms of camps. Nevertheless, comparisons are 
possible regarding the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, the political situation, 
and security (including geopolitics). 
5.3.1 Comparison between non-European Camps 
The best camp conditions are in Turkey. The Turkish state anticipated the upcoming crisis in 
Syria very early and prepared for it properly. However, Turkey also had the financial 
resources to do so as one of the wealthiest countries in the region, which is probably the main 
advantage compared to Lebanon and Jordan. These countries are highly dependent on 
international organizations and funding, while Turkey is not, or only to a certain degree. Thus, 
the living conditions in the camps are on a relatively high level. There is enough nutrition and 
freshwater, children can attend schools, and there are some opportunities for free-time 
activities. By no means is living in a camp in Turkey a luxury lifestyle, but compared to 
Lebanon or Jordan, where it is often a daily fight for survival, at least some minimum 
standards are fulfilled in a secure environment. Starvation, diseases, and other disastrous 
developments are unknown in Turkish camps. The more significant issue is with refugees and 
asylum seekers outside of the camps. Many of them end up homeless on the streets, and 
exploitation, child labor, and prostitution are common. Finally, Turkey financially benefits 
from the EU Turkey deal, another advantage that the other countries do not have. 
 Lebanon, on the other hand, was utterly overwhelmed with the crisis. Although the 
state has a long tradition of hosting Palestinian refugees, the best experience and preparation 
do not help if 20 or 25 percent of the population are refugees. Even international aid 
organizations have given up and moved their activities to Turkey. Nevertheless, the supply of 
nutrition and freshwater in the camps is still highly dependent on their work. Only a minority 
of children can visit schools because the child labor force is needed to support their families. 
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Another difference is the level of repression by state authorities. Undeniably, Turkey has 
changed the rhetoric and policy practices, but the camps’ situation is not profoundly affected. 
At least for the moment, refugees and asylum seekers are safe in the camps. On the contrary, 
in Lebanon, Syrians fear state repression, rising xenophobia, and deportation back to Syria. 
The level of insecurity is tremendously high. 
 The most interesting case may be Jordan. It is hard or even impossible to say if the 
camps’ situation is worse in Lebanon or Jordan. The situation for refugees and asylum seekers 
in- and outside camps is devastating. Nevertheless, it seems like the people in the camps have 
accommodated themselves to a certain extent in their situation. The Zaatari camp is an 
excellent example of that. In only a few years, a completely new ‘city’ has emerged. A city 
that was supposed to be an improvised camp with tents and shelters has developed its own 
infrastructure, market economy, and social life. Frankly, it is still far from being a perfect 
scenario since even terror attacks occur in the camp. However, it shows that people can 
transform the short-term problem into a long-term solution by improving the living 
conditions, of course, with aid organizations' help. Thus, the Zaatari camp is a unique case 
with a distinctive character. That is probably the main difference from other camps in the 
region, respectively, to camps in countries neighboring Syria: the temporary solution is no 
longer only a temporary solution.   
5.3.2 Comparison between Camps in the EU 
The situation in Greece is alarming, and many riots have already occurred in Greek refugee 
camps. All camps are entirely overcrowded, the conditions are adverse, and doctors are even 
warning of the outbreak of diseases. Experts state that the conditions are worse than in Turkey 
(ZDF 2020). Only if people can make it to the Greek mainland can they improve their living 
standards. However, usually, people have to stay for months in the camps. 
On the contrary, Italy’s camp conditions are relatively high compared to Greece, but that 
does not mean they are sufficient. Although the conditions are on a deficient level, sometimes 
below that, there are at least no distribution battles over scarce resources. The Italian state has 
still not lost its control over the ‘official’ camps. The main issue in Italy is the situation of 
homeless refugees or asylum seekers who have lost their right to proper accommodation (due 
to Dublin regulations, for instance) and live in improvised camps. These persons’ situation is 
as concerning as other people's situation, who have to live on Lesvos, for example. The 
differences that we can identify between camps in Greece and Italy are the following: 
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• Economy: The Greek economy is still suffering from the austerity policy during and 
after the ‘Euro crisis’ (Kaplanoglou and Rapanos 2016; Petrova 2017; Perez and 
Matsaganis 2018). Debts are still high and harm the development of the country 
(Statista 2020a). Greece simply does not have the resources to manage the enormous 
migration inflows by itself and is highly dependent on EU funding. Italy, on the other, 
is one of the biggest economies and industries in the world. Indeed, Italy has suffered 
from the debt crisis in the past, and the overall condition of the economy is not good, 
but the country is still in tremendously better shape than Greece. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Italy can provide better living conditions in camps and reception 
centers.  
• Geography: This is the apparent reason. Greece is located much closer to Turkey, and 
Turkey is a significant transit-country for many Syrians on their way to Europe. 
Therefore, Greece is more affected by the (armed) conflicts in the Middle East. 
• Origin of refugees and asylum seekers: The composition of migration flows is entirely 
different between Italy and Greece. While most immigrants in Greece are coming 
from the Middle East, Italy is profoundly affected by migration flows from the African 
continent (many asylum seekers are also coming from Pakistan). 
• Policy implications: Greece is the most important country in terms of applying the 
EU-Turkey deal. The EU has a keen interest in controlling, managing, and limiting 
migration through this agreement. Hence, this policy measure directly influences the 
situation in Greek camps. On the contrary, Italy is not affected by the EU-Turkey deal, 
but the country applies its domestic policies, including making many Dublin returnees 
homeless. 
5.3.3 Comparison between non-European and EU Camps 
In general, we can distinguish between Italy and Turkey on the one side, and Greece, 
Lebanon, and Jordan, on the other. Compared to the other case studies, Italy and Turkey 
provide the highest living conditions in refugee camps. As mentioned before, Turkey was 
well prepared for the crisis and invested a lot in managing and coordinating migration flows 
from Syria. Whereas Italy has always struggled with its role as a destination for migrants, 
Turkey showed political motivation to manage the crisis, at least at the beginning of the civil 
war in Syria. Italy, on the other hand-side, has never accepted its role. However, because of 
its economic power, Italy was still able to run sufficient camps and reception centers 
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compared to other countries. Italy’s and Turkey’s situation is far from perfect, but at least 
people can survive there. 
On the contrary, in Greece, Lebanon, and Jordan, it is a daily fight for survival. Maybe 
the most shocking finding here is that a member state of the EU is running refugee camps that 
are in the same condition.  Some would even argue that they are worse than countries such as 
Lebanon or Jordan. 
 Nonetheless, there are some significant differences between non-European and EU 
camps. The differences are in the following areas: 
• The number of asylum seekers and refugees: It often gets forgotten, but non-European 
countries are still hosting significantly more refugees and asylum seekers than EU 
countries. Turkey is currently worldwide, the number one host country, Lebanon is 
hosting the most people per capita, and the small state of Jordan is hosting over 
650,000 refugees and asylum seekers.  
• The political system: Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are autocratic regimes, while the 
EU is still, in most cases, democratic and provides liberal values, freedom, and 
protection. Indeed, this can be an advantage but also a disadvantage. The EU entails 
much bureaucracy, and the processes are slow since they usually have to pass many 
institutions. However, at the end of the day, the EU stands for stability. On the other 
hand, autocratic regimes can change overnight, and decisions are made quickly, which 
can cause immediate consequences for inhabitants of camps and reception centers, 
negative and positive.   
• Security: Even though the perception of many countries and societies of the EU are 
different, terrorism and radicalization are the exceptions in Europe. Every single 
terroristic act is one too many, but they happen only very rarely. On the contrary, 
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are all surrounded by war and conflict zones. It is more 
likely to become a victim of terrorism in these countries. The security situation is 
arguably better in Europe. Unfortunately, further escalation in European camps could 
change this fact. 
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5.4 Discussion: Conditions in Camps 
5.4.1 The Connection between Aid and Conditions in Camps 
As mentioned above, the case studies emphasize the importance of satisfying basic human 
needs like health care, nutrition, education, et cetera. Additionally, the political, economic, 
cultural, and environmental situations should also be considered when analyzing refugee 
movements from camps, specifically why people do not stay there. Case studies show that 
providing livable conditions to people in camps can improve their situation or eliminate the 
push factors for leaving. In general, we can say that devastating conditions in refugee camps 
significantly increase the probability that people will continue to journey to other destinations. 
The ‘push-stay-pull’ model (see chapter 3.1.6) implements a new dimension in the discussion 
and tries to provide a coherent approach to stop mass migration by making life for people in 
refugee camps reasonably livable in the long-run. Fafo (2019a; 2019b) comes to a similar 
conclusion after analyzing Syrian refugees' situation in Jordan (camps). Improved living 
conditions reduced the push factors for moving to Europe. 
The importance of refugee camps is a factor in the current – and still not solved – 
European refugee crisis. The significant migration movement from Syria and its neighbor 
countries started when the UNHCR and WFP were running out of money and were no longer 
able to provide enough food, clean water, and security to the people outside the camps. In an 
interview with The Guardian newspaper in Britain, the UN high commissioner for refugees, 
Antonio Guterres, explained it in this way: ‘The budgets cannot be compared with the growth 
in need. Our income in 2015 will be around 10% less than in 2014. The global humanitarian 
community is not broken – as a whole, they are more effective than ever before. But we are 
financially broke’ (The Guardian 2015). One of the major counter-arguments concerning this 
issue is that ‘the poorest of the poor’ usually do not migrate due to a lack of (financial) 
resources, which are obligatory for migration (UNDP 2009). Indeed, there has also been some 
discussion in the field of academics that development help may even have the contrary effect 
since financial support from development help is providing these resources (de Haas 2010). 
However, when analyzing the European refugee crisis, the issue is much more complicated. 
First of all, major studies in this field are from 10 to 20 years old and need reviewing. 
In the meanwhile, the world has significantly changed. Now, we live in the 
digitalization era, and, therefore, the forms of communication have transformed completely. 
Even in vulnerable areas of the world, it is not rare for people to own mobile devices. When 
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in 2015, Germany and other European countries opened their borders for asylum seekers, the 
message spread worldwide even to the most outlying regions in the world. The incentive-
effect of this message should not be underestimated. Infrastructure and mobility have made 
significant steps forward in recent years. Whereas in the 1990s and 2000s, traveling around 
the world was very costly, it is nowadays relatively affordable with the emergence of low-cost 
no-frills airlines. The more significant issue remains here: not if the ‘poor of the poorest’ can 
make it to Europe, but rather if they can get the right legal status and pay human traffickers to 
get them there.  
The Dublin II agreement is the last part of what it makes so difficult and costly for 
migrants to reach their country of destination in Europe. The Dublin II agreement, which says 
people have to seek asylum in the country where they first enter European soil, is one of the 
reasons why it has always been so expensive to come to Europe since most asylum seekers 
prefer to go to Northern Europe (Germany, Benelux, Scandinavia, et cetera). When in late-
summer 2015, the Dublin II agreement became obsolete, this obstacle did not exist anymore.  
Nevertheless, the situation concerning Syria remains very special. Before the outbreak of the 
civil war, the majority of the population had a relatively comfortable life. Thus, the country 
should not be considered as one of the ‘poorest of the poor.’ At the beginning of the civil war 
in 2011, most people might have still had the illusion that the war would end soon and did not 
intend to go to Europe. However, many people lost everything when they had to flee, but a 
significant number of people had some financial resources (Paul 2019).  
A survey from 2016 by the IAB found out that most refugees who came to Germany 
financed their flight by savings (39%) and by selling goods and property (34%). The costs 
vary significantly from the country of origin, but in general, it was between 5,200 EUR 
(second half of the year 2015) and 7,300 EUR (2013) (IAB 2016). According to this study, 
we can say that the costs were not the biggest problem coming to Europe. At the same time, 
money is not always the means to have a good life, especially not in the crisis regions, since 
distribution battle and scarce resources are also an issue. If there is no food supply, money 
alone does not cover basic human needs like access to nutrition, food, and education. The 
work's limitation is that we cannot measure how much savings remain after fleeing to Europe. 
Furthermore, it is also worth mentioning that the money's origin is not always clear, 
like an inside report from the German news journal SPIEGEL ONLINE demonstrates. 
According to the report, some refugees even sold organs (approximately 7,000 EUR for an 
organ on average) because of financial problems (Putz 2013). The amount of people who did 
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this to flee to Europe remains unclear. Thus, further research is needed. The case studies show 
that proper accommodation and sufficient supplies (like in Turkey) can weaken the crisis if 
the funding requirements are fulfilled efficiently, and NGOs do not have to do the whole work 
alone. 
It is conspicuous that the main focus of the EU was on Turkey (EU-Turkey deal) in the 
past. The actual short-term strategy is that Turkey functions as ‘the bouncer’ of the EU. The 
Turkish state is supposed to absorb all refugee and asylum seeker flows of the region and 
prevent them from moving to Europe by keeping the people in the country. In exchange for 
this service, the EU transfers billions of Euros to Turkey. Even though the deal is not 
sustainable, the EU is not cooperating with other states in the region to the same extent. The 
EU is merely following the approach to reduce migration in the first place, but not improving 
people's living conditions in- and outside of camps. International aid organizations in 
Lebanon and Jordan are underfunded continuously. The EU has the resources and the 
financial power to ameliorate the crisis in these countries. Not only are refugees and asylum 
seekers left alone, but the hosting states are also not receiving enough support to manage the 
emergency.  
The EU migration policy is reactionary and mainly focuses on developing strategies 
after the crisis occurred. Development and foreign aid costs are still underestimated. In this 
context, the EU-Turkey statement is nothing more than a desperate attempt to diminish the 
crisis and is by far not enough. Even among EU member states, there is an ongoing discussion 
about burden-sharing and insufficient solidarity (see chapter 4.3.2). Greece has completely 
lost control over its islands. However, the approach is still the same: Greece should try to 
prevent people from going elsewhere in Europe instead of improving refugees and asylum 
seekers' living conditions. In a nutshell, the push factors increase due to adverse living 
conditions, and the pull factors of other EU countries, especially in the North, remain 
relatively stable. Hence, even if people make it to their destination country, people are sent 
back to Greece or any other state in the South due to Dublin regulations. Back in Greece, the 
situation has not changed in the meanwhile, maybe even has become worse, and Europe tries 
to push these refugees and asylum seekers back to Turkey. A neverending circulation of 
migration is the consequence without solving any of the problems.  
Therefore, wealthy states have to share some of their wealth to support the crisis 
regions. Agreements like the 2016 Turkey deal or deals with other authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle-East and Africa are very risky because these countries' political and economic 
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situation can change instantly. All in all, crisis management was a complete failure, and it 
could have been easily avoided by undertaking the right measures; a more reasonable and 
comprehensive policy concerning the European migration crisis is required, mainly providing 
a long-term strategy.  
The improvement of living conditions in refugee camps around Syria is one possible 
approach. Taylor et al. (2016) analyzed refugees' economic impact in host countries by 
studying economic development in a 10-kilometer radius of three Congolese refugee camps in 
Rwanda. The research results indicate that cash aid to refugees in camps significantly boosts 
the whole economy of the region. The real income of businesses and households in the 
locality increased by 205 USD to 253 USD, and the trade of the local economy with the rest 
of Rwanda increased by 49 USD to 55 USD. The impact of food aid was lower than cash aid. 
Thus, the cooperation between aid organizations, states, and refugee camps can even support 
economic growth.  
In conclusion, the European refugee crisis beginning in 2015 could have been avoided 
by the global community's earlier anticipation. The devastating conditions in refugee camps 
surrounding Syria were very well-known, but the cries for help were mostly ignored. To this 
day, the UNHCR is begging for funding. The amount requested is very moderate compared to 
the consequences of new possible mass migration movements from the Middle-East region to 
Europe. Certainly, funding is not everything but it is the basis for every other improvement. 
The international community, especially Europe, which is mainly affected by refugee 
movements from the Middle East, has to start providing guidance and assistance to give 
people local prospects. This can be done, even when taking soft factors like the human need 
for education, culture, or political participation into consideration. Scarce resources in refugee 
camps remains the biggest issue. 
Nevertheless, this approach has some limitations. The whole European migration crisis 
is still a relatively new phenomenon. Many numbers and figures are hard to evaluate because 
most of the countries are involved in armed conflicts, the propaganda machinery is running, 
and none of these countries are democracies. Furthermore, the political situation can change 
overnight, as Turkey's failed coup a few years ago demonstrates. The recently published study 
about autocracy from Bertelsmann (2018) shows that Turkey and Lebanon and Jordan have 
left the path to democratization. Indeed, there is also the possibility that the civil war in Syria, 
respectively, a proxy war, might stop overnight, and refugees will start going back to their 
country of origin, but this option is not very realistic. The situation remains very fragile and 
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can become worse if more countries get involved in this conflict. Since most hosting countries 
have already reached their limits concerning hosting refugees, there is also the threat that 
distribution battles for the scarce resources will escalate, and new conflicts between host 
communities and refugees will emerge. If that should happen, no international aid 
organization might be able to soften the crisis. However, providing sufficient and proper 
living conditions to asylum seekers and refugees and crisis hotspots is still the best crisis 
prevention. 
5.4.2 Camps, Development, and Urbanization 
Overall, the literature concerning migration theories does cover all relevant parts from forced 
migration to labor migration (see chapter 3), except for the unusual situation in refugee 
camps, which is only barely covered (see section 3.1.7). Refugee camps are relatively new 
phenomena that appeared in the time after the Second World War. Nevertheless, it is not 
extensively discussed in the field of migration theories (Paul 2019). There are almost no 
studies that analyze the process of urbanization from camps. Most of the new research in this 
field focuses on health care (epidemics, diseases, post-traumatic consequences, et cetera). A 
rare exception is ‘Refugia’, the work of Cohen and Van Hear (2019). The war in Syria shows 
that millions of refugees live outside their country of origin in temporary accommodations, 
and the hosting states fail to provide sufficient security, health care, and nourishment. Thus, 
private help organizations and institutions are replacing the functions of the actual states. 
Refugee camps are complex small to medium-size socio-economic systems. Some would 
even argue that refugee camps are even states within a state; or, taking the devastating 
situation for most of the people in those camps into consideration, the term ‘failed’ state 
seems also very reasonable.  
A prevalent example for such a refugee camp is in the Gaza Strip in the West Bank, 
which is, in name, part of the autonomous region of Palestine, but is, in fact, under the control 
of the Israeli state since Israel controls the movement of people, telecommunication, water, 
and energy supply. Without a doubt, the Middle-East conflict is a very complex issue, and it 
will be not part of this dissertation. However, it illustrates a possible development in the 
future of other refugee camps in the region, even when excluding the religious tensions of the 
Middle-East conflict when a state – or other higher authority – is incapable of providing 
enough support. Despite these issues, for some inhabitants of Palestine camps, the camps have 
given them (a) an (new) identity (Farah 2006). Concerning refugee camps, there is a lack of 
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literature in the field of migration studies. Thus, there is further need for research in this 
minor field regarding circumstances in which people prefer to stay in camps rather than 
fleeing to Europe. 
Refugee camps in their current form are not a final solution (Paul 2019). Therefore, a 
new approach is needed. Migration theories, especially in the field of refugee camps, have to 
focus more on the aspect of how to give people prospects locally. Huge investments are 
required to build up a functional economy (including employment, trade, and infrastructure) 
and transform refugee camps into livable areas, providing housing, nutrition, water, et cetera. 
However, this transformation process can only be successful if the people's legal status is 
reconsidered, whether by integrating them in the host country, or by giving them a newly 
created citizenship, and people get the opportunity to participate in society politically and 
culturally. People need the right of self-determination about their lives and future. It is not 
very likely that people will ever integrate into a different society or start building up a new 
identity if they feel that other institutions or states are making decisions concerning them. In 
this context, self-empowerment is an essential factor that should not be underestimated. 
Consequently, refugee camps need to become self-sustaining systems that can be run, in the 
long term, independently from the financial help of international organizations or other states. 
The discussion of urbanization in camps is not new, but it has gained more relevance 
in recent years.45 Lee (2018), who visited the Zaatari camp in Jordan, observed how the camp 
had developed its own infrastructure and market economy (see chapter 5.3.). It is naïve to 
think that people are not inventing their own creative solutions for a more reasonable life if 
they receive only limited support from the international community or the host country. The 
Zaatari camp emerged from scratch and occupied previously empty space without taking 
anything away from the domestic population (financial contribution from the Jordan state is 
not considered). By just allowing people to stay in the camp and the region, nobody was 
worse off. Or in other words: distribution battles over scarce resources with the domestic 
 
 
45 The science of urbanization is a whole discipline in itself. Nevertheless, it has also always been highly related 
to migration theories. The whole neoclassical approach in chapter three of this dissertation can be considered in 
this context, especially Ravenstein’s ‘laws of migration’. Due to the limitation of this work, I will only focus on 
urbanization in terms of refugee camps.  
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population could be avoided. Indeed, an approach like this is not promoting integration 
practices, but, on the other hand, potential conflicts are also not very likely to occur. 
Nonetheless, two essential requirements are necessary so that an urbanization process 
like this can begin. First of all, accepting the situation that the origin country is indefinitely 
not accessible, or even lost forever. Secondly, the host country's willingness to let 
development and urbanization like this happen by relinquishing some of its territory or giving 
individual camps or regions autonomy and the right of self-determination. In exchange, the 
host country could benefit from higher tax-income since many of the actual businesses in the 
camps are not ‘official.’ Any other forms of equalization payments, for instance, by involving 
the international community, are also conceivable after the successful implementation of an 
autonomous approach. The execution of this plan is, as shown in Palestine, very difficult. In 
Paestine, international law and agreements are violated almost daily.  
At the moment, most camps are improvised constructions. The vast majority of people 
live in tents, shelters, or other inadequate buildings. Many camps are also isolated from the 
rest of the host country and do not have access to proper infrastructure (for example, the 
Lesvos camp in Greece). The urbanization process of camps should include the following 
aspects: 
1. Accommodation: Proper housing conditions are crucial. As long as people have to live 
in tents, shelters, or other improvised buildings (e.g., some Favelas in Brazil), the 
urbanization process cannot be successful, or parallel societies might emerge. Even 
though the cases are hard to compare, China has built several mega-cities from scratch 
for its population in a reasonable amount of time in the past decades. The example 
demonstrates that a scenario like this is possible and realistic if funding requirements 
are fulfilled.  
2. Security: The inhabitants’ safety must be guaranteed, and in the long-run, the camp 
must get the opportunity to establish its own security standards. The international 
community or state authorities cannot protect the population if the goal is to build a 
self-sustainable system. Sooner or later, camp police forces are needed for reasons of 
trust alone.  
3. Health care: Hospitals, doctors, and other medical facilities are another crucial point. 
People need the best possible care locally. The reason for that is self-explanatory.  
4. Education: The population of the Zaatari camp in Jordan, for example, is very young. 
Thus, an adequate schooling system is needed. At the moment, many children in 
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camps are excluded from education because parents need their children's labor force to 
make a living for the whole family. This state cannot be tolerated or accepted. In the 
long-run, the establishment of universities should be the objective. Respectively it 
should be at least taken advantage of new online opportunities, such as participating in 
online courses through high-speed internet.  
5. Administration/Government: Coming back to self-determination, people must have a 
voice in which direction their new home should develop, either by allowing them to 
vote who should be their representative or deciding by referendum. If people do not 
have a voice regarding their future, the level of frustration rises again. 
6. Functional (market) economy: The Zaatari camp is, once again, a perfect example of 
this. There are plenty of shops, cafes, restaurants, and many other small businesses. 
People should have opportunities to make a living and create income on a legal basis 
for themselves and their families. Establishing businesses and recruiting employees is 
the foundation for economic growth and long-term independence from aid 
organizations and funding from wealthy states. Moreover, it creates tax-income for the 
host country of the refugees and asylum seekers. 
7. Guarantee of food and water: Sufficient food and water supplies are mandatory. Camp 
residents must produce food to build up a self-sustaining system, including efficient 
use of agriculture, farming, and fishing. 
8. Infrastructure: Most of the camps are entirely isolated from the rest of the world. If 
people are allowed to leave the camps, they are often unable to visit the next town 
because of a lack of infrastructure. This obstacle needs to overcome by connecting 
camps with the rest of the world with streets, railways, train or bus stations, et cetera. 
A functional infrastructure network is also crucial for trade with other regions and 
countries. 
9. Social life: The last aspect is probably the least important for people who have 
suffered from war, being displaced, and living under devastating conditions in camps. 
Nevertheless, this point should also be not underestimated. Humans are social 
characters and need activities for their free-time, including sports, access to the 
internet, and other forms of communication, books, films, et cetera. Therefore, camps 
must provide opportunities for people to structure their social life and free-time 
activities in terms of socializing and infrastructure (libraries, sports pitches and 
equipment, internet cafes, et cetera). 
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5.4.3 Improving Conditions in Camps: Solutions and Recommendations 
The role of refugee camps must be reconsidered (Paul 2019). The original plan that refugee 
camps should be temporary solutions does not work anymore. Indeed, the case of Palestine 
refugees raises the question if it has ever worked sufficiently. The civil war in Syria started in 
2011 and is still far from being resolved. Thus, the forced migration from this region needs to 
stop to give the refugees local opportunites. Refugee camps around Syria can be the solution 
if the world community can implement public assistance, create jobs, and treat the camps as 
small micro-economies to allow them to trade with other countries and regions. To achieve 
this goal, multinational enterprises could start investing in this region by building plants to 
provide jobs to the local community. Tax reduction and a low-tariff policy for trading goods 
could be incentives to bring investors into the region. Since the sun and wind is nearly 
constant, this area is very attractive for regenerative energy producers building solar power 
plants and wind farms. 
The key is the anticipation of future migration flows and responding appropriately and 
sustainably (Paul 2018). For instance, we know which regions will be most affected by 
climate change, and millions of people in Africa will lose their homes (see chapter 3.3). 
Approximately 86 million people in Africa will be forced to flee their country of origin in the 
coming decades (World Bank 2018). Of course, not all of them will want to come to Europe, 
but the actual amount depends hugely on the international community's decision-making 
process in the coming years. The refugee crisis of 2015 already showed that the relatively 
small number of one to two million refugees from the Middle-East overwhelmed European 
countries and the European Union as an entity. A significantly higher number has the 
potential to end the European integration process. The most crucial factor is time to identify, 
locate, and anticipate future refugee movements. Concerning Africa, the Sub-Saharan region 
will be affected very severely by climate change. Early prevention is the most effective way 
to stop mass migration.  
One possible approach could be to rent territory for a certain period from other states, 
as the UNHCR does with renting refugee camps, but on a much bigger scale. The 
international community has to start an urbanization process in less developed and less 
populated North Africa regions to make permanent settlement from the Sub-Sahara possible.  
In the first place, these new urban regions should provide sufficient nutrition, 
freshwater, health care, education, cultural and political participation, and security (including 
against climate change). As a result, new cities and urban regions will emerge without 
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negatively affecting the hosting country's current infrastructure. Beyond that, cultural, 
religious, and political conflicts can be avoided by separating problematic groups from each 
other and supporting homogenous strategies for settlement. Indeed, these projects can only be 
successful if they allow people to determine their lives themselves. Thus, autonomous regions 
have to be created, which gives refugees a new perspective on the African continent, 
including employment and political participation. Otherwise, in the long-run, new political 
and economic problems will occur. 
The migration process to Europe cannot be entirely stopped but can be tremendously 
reduced. However, Europe has to be prepared for a significant number of (climate) refugees 
from the African continent and the Middle East, even if all recommended measures are 
successful. It is impossible to predict the exact number of refugees and how Europe, in effect, 
the EU will change in the coming decades. Still, even when considering the most optimistic 
predictions, millions of people will likely make their way to Europe. The South-East-
European countries (Greece, Italy, and Spain) will be most affected by this influx of people. 
Thus, an allocation formula for the whole EU is still required because none of these countries 
can solve this problem without the solidarity of other EU states. In the long-run, if the rest of 
the EU still resists helping, fences and walls everywhere will be the consequence, and sooner 
or later, distribution battles will follow. The European integration process will end, and  
armed conflicts between EU states become a realistic scenario again since it is the only way to 
stop migration completely. 
As a result, Europe and the European Union need ‘controlled migration.’ The legal 
status of refugees has to be clarified as soon as possible, as well as the terms for asylum. 
Indeed, human rights are not negotiable, but the distribution of natural resources can be. 
Therefore, massive funding and urbanization program are required to give people a viable 
alternative to migration. Furthermore, since not all refugees will stay in their country of 
origin, Europe must be prepared and start developing programs for controlled migration. One 
of the first steps has to be the clarification of the legal status of refugees. Hence, visa and 
migration centers should be established in Africa and the Middle East to find humanitarian 
solutions for asylum seekers without giving them the wrong incentives and false hopes. The 
worst-case scenarios will rapidly overwhelm Europe’s capacities for integration. At the same 
time, it is also the responsibility of Europe to stop the deaths of tens of thousands of refugees 
every year in the Mediterranean Sea, especially by giving people the wrong incentives (e.g., 
denied asylum because of limited capacities). Thus, the establishment of ‘visa/asylum centers’ 
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in North Africa and the Middle East could solve this problem. It is an unsustainable state of 
affairs that, in many cases, refugees have to flee to Europe before their legal status can be 
clarified. Again, a certain quota for how many people Europe can absorb appears to be 
reasonable. If there is no more capacity available for hosting refugees in Europe, people need 
a livable alternative elsewhere, which also guarantees their security. This policy would also 
end the brain drain-effects from other parts of the world to Europe. Indeed, migration flows as 
a consequence of armed conflicts and wars are more difficult to predict than making 
assumptions about the outcomes of global warming regarding migration since many conflicts 
occur overnight. Nevertheless, it is realistic that the Middle East region and certain parts of 
Africa will be, unfortunately, also suffering in the future from instability. Europe needs an 
entirely new approach and concept for the whole Mediterranean region. The strategy 
mentioned above is one possible way to soften the crisis of mass migration. 
Furthermore, the world is at the edge of a new industrial revolution. Digitalization will 
change our understanding of work and labor significantly. According to the Oxford study, 
‘The Future of Employment: how susceptible are jobs to computerization?’ (Frey and 
Osborne 2013), 50 percent of present jobs will vanish by 2030. An unconditional minimum 
income for everybody in the world is the only possible solution to treat that problem. The 
common fear of digitalization is that machines and computers will replace people. However, 
this point of view undermines the vast possibilities of digitalization. There are plenty of jobs, 
which will not be missed without a doubt; those jobs nobody likes to do. The digitalization 
process is the opportunity to get rid of those jobs and free certain parts of society from 
unnecessary labor. The perspective has to change. Instead of thinking that robots are replacing 
humans and only the owners of those machines benefit from this change, we have to 
restructure the organization of our economy and the distribution of wealth. Hence, the 
digitalization process is an excellent opportunity for the world's poorest people, if done in the 
right way, at least in the long-run. An unconditional minimum income could be provided to 
every refugee in the world. If it is high enough, people might stay in their region and start 
building up prospects in their home country or host country. Otherwise, the brain drain effect 
from the poorest regions in the world will never stop. Indeed, well-educated people are 
needed to establish a functional infrastructure and economy. It is not desirable to completely 
bleed the Middle-East by absorbing all young talented people to Europe while the rest are left 
behind. 
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In any case, a more realistic scenario for the near future is to provide more funding for 
the crisis regions. For instance, Germany, which was one of the countries that took the most 
refugees in Europe, plans to increase its military expenditures by almost 50 percent in the next 
years (30 billion USD). Instead of investing in its defense, which is a very controversial topic 
within the German society, Germany alone could provide six times the funding for the 
refugee camps in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan. Consequently, the financial resources to solve 
the European refugee crisis already exist (without even talking about progressive taxation or 
taxation of financial transactions, et cetera), but they are just allocated in the wrong way or 
inefficiently. 
  151 
 
6 Interviews 
6.1 Fully-structured Interviews 
The evaluation of the results starts with the characteristics of the participants. The four main 
categories are ‘Age,’ ‘Gender,’ ‘Citizenship,’ and ‘Profession.’ Thus, the data tells us where 
asylum seekers and refugees come from and to which demographics they belong. 
Table 8: Evaluation of the Characteristics of the Participants 
Characteristics of Participants 
 n %  n % 
Age   Gender   
18 - 29 109 56.8 Male 119 62.0 
30 - 49 49 25.5 Female 73 38.0 
50 - 64 22 11.5    
65 < 12 6.3    
Citizenship   Profession   
Syria 79 41.1 Unemployed 52 27.1 
Iraq 41 21.4 Student 79 41.1 
Eritrea 24 12.5 Farmer 13 6.8 
Afghanistan 9 4.7 Housewife 12 6.3 
Palestine 5 2.6 Soldier 4 2.1 
Jordan 10 5.2 Construction 4 2.1 
Yemen 12 6.3 Salesperson 4 2.1 
Other 12 6.3 Other 24 12.5 
The first noticeable fact is that the vast majority of the migrants are very young. Over 50 
percent are under 30 years of age, and 25.5 percent are between 30 and 49 years. People over 
50 years are already migrating significantly less than the previous categories, and migration 
over 65 becomes very unlikely with under 7 percent. The trend shows that movement is an 
activity of the young, which is not surprising since immigrating to another country requires 
energy, resources, and health. The elderly interviewed in this section were part of family 
reunification processes and had relatively safe ways of entering the EU. Note that the young 
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people took the dangerous paths on their journey to Europe (e.g., crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea).  
The second important observation is that more migrants are male than female. Indeed, 
cultural or religious reasons might have played a role in selecting interview partners as well, 
but, in general, there were more men (62 percent) than women (38 percent) available. This 
could be because mainly young men are fleeing to Europe, who leave their families behind. 
They aim to reach Europe in insecure ways, and after the clarification of their asylum status, 
their families follow on safe routes (e.g., by airplane). These numbers are also consistent with 
findings of the ‘Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF)’ and the ‘Bundeszentrale 
für Politische Bildung (BPB)’ (2020), who investigated the demographics of asylum seekers 
and refugees in Germany. As state institutions, they have, of course, more resources to 
conduct more sophisticated research in this field. According to their statistics, the ratio 
between men and women was approximately always between 60 percent (men) and 40 
percent (women) in recent years. Concerning the age of migrants, the trend that ‘migration is 
for the youth’ is confirmed. The biggest group is between 0 and 15 years old (about 40 
percent).46 The older the demographic gets, the fewer asylum seekers and refugees migrate to 
Europe and Germany. 
 The category ‘Citizenship’ is supposed to localize the origin of the migrants. It does 
not automatically mean that people come from the country where they originated from, but it 
should provide a basic overview.47 The biggest group in this category is by far people with 
Syrian citizenship (41.1 percent), followed by Iraq (21.4 percent) and Eritrea (12.5 percent). 
The other countries reflected in the interviews are Afghanistan, Palestine, Jordan, Yemen, and 
others.  All of these countries suffered tremendously from war, conflicts, and political 
instability. The high number of Syrian asylum seekers are the direct consequence of the 
Syrian Civil War and mass migration movements to the EU since 2015. Again, the interview 
results are in line with the BAMF and the BPB statistics (2020). Syrians are currently, overall, 
the biggest group of asylum seekers in Germany. The interview results’ main difference is that 
official German data also recognizes a relatively high number of asylum seekers from Europe 
 
 
46 A group that is not reflected in the interviews because every interview partner had to be at least 18 years old. 
47 Theoretically, somebody can be a Syrian citizen but live in a different country. 
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(e.g., Russia or Moldova), countries with no priority in this research. Many interview 
participants were still students (41.1 percent), which derives from the interview partners’ 
average young age. Overall, various jobs are represented, including farmers, homemakers, 
construction workers, soldiers, or salespersons. Nevertheless, the second biggest group are 
unemployed persons (27.1 percent), respectively, people with no real profession. Professions 
summarized under ‘other’ are, for example, barbers, tailors, policemen, and teachers. 
 The first two questions of the interviews deal with refugee camps outside of the EU, 
including a simple ‘yes or no’ and a ‘circle all that apply’ question, which should only be 
answered if people lived in a camp before moving to Europe. 
Table 9: Evaluation of Question 1 & Question 2 of the Interviews 
Q1: Were you in a refugee camp before 
coming to the EU? 
Q2: In which country was the refugee 
camp located where you lived before 
coming to the EU? Please circle all that 
apply. (only answer if Q1 is ‘Yes’) 
 n %  n % 
Yes 92 47.9 Turkey 39 42.4 
No 100 52.1 Lebanon 17 18.5 
   Jordan 14 15.2 
   Syria 1 1.1 
   Other countries 21 22.8 
In total, 92 (47.9 percent) people lived in refugee camps before coming to the EU, and 100 
(52.1 percent) did not. Thus, the majority of asylum seekers had no camp experience before 
coming to the EU. An explanation for this is that many people made it to their destination 
without getting interrupted (for example, during the summer of 2015), and family 
reunification played an important role. The primary target for people fleeing was Turkey, with 
42.4 percent. Lebanon (18.5 percent) and Jordan (15.2 percent) were other important refugee 
camp destinations. All of these countries are neighboring countries of Syria. Therefore, the 
probability is very high that the ongoing conflict in Syria caused these movements. The 
reason for Turkey’s ‘popularity’ among refugees is its proximity to Europe and the granting 
of relatively reasonable living conditions in comparison to Lebanon and Jordan. Nevertheless, 
number two in the rankings is ‘other countries’ with 22.8 percent, including African countries 
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like Egypt or Libya. Another aspect is that, in recent years, migration from Eritrea has 
increased, and Eritreans had to live in camps on the African continent on their way to Europe. 
 The next two questions are very similar to the previous ones but focus on camps inside 
the EU. The first question asks if people stayed in a camp in the EU, and the second one (if 
the answer is ‘yes’), in which country.  
Table 10: Evaluation of Question 3 and Question 4 of the Interviews 
Q3: Were you in a refugee camp after 
entering the EU? 
Q4: In which country was the refugee 
camp located, where you lived after 
entering the EU? Please circle all that 
apply. (only answer if Q3 is ‘Yes’) 
 n %  n % 
Yes 91 47.4 Greece 55 60.4 
No 101 52.6 Italy 25 27.5 
   Spain 3 3.3 
   Hungary 0 0.0 
   Other countries 8 8.8 
Compared to non-EU camps, the number of people who lived in EU camps is slightly lower, 
with 91 (47.4 percent). However, more people did not live in a camp in the EU (52.6 percent), 
which could be related to EU-Dublin asylum procedures. It is also essential to mention that 
some asylum seekers spent time in both camps: non-EU camps and EU camps. The main 
destinations for asylum seekers arriving in the EU are Greece and Italy. More than every 
second person (60.4 percent) enters the EU in Greece, and 27.5 percent end up in Italy. In 
total, both countries constitute over 85 percent of all first EU arrivals. The reason for that is, 
obviously, the Mediterranean location of both Greece and Italy. Spain plays only a minor role, 
Hungary functions mostly as a transit country, and the other camps are spread all over Europe 
(e.g., Bulgaria, France, or Cyprus). Countries like Germany (or other Northern EU states) are 
not ‘classic camp countries’ since these countries can provide at least minimum housing 
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standards for asylum seekers. The correct term in this context would be ‘refugee 
accommodation.’48 
 Question number five asks why people went to the camps in these countries and 
improves our understanding of the reasons for this selection. Question number six concerns 
the length of the stay in the camps.  
Table 11: Evaluation of Question 5 and Question 6 of the Interviews 
Q5: Why did you choose a camp in the 
countries from Q2 & Q4? Please circle all 
that apply. 
Q6: For how long did you stay in the 
refugee camp(s) named in Q2 & Q4? 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q2: Non-EU country   
Security 59 47.2 Less than one year 56 60.9 
Accessibility of the country 31 24.8 More than one year, but less 
than three years 
27 29.3 
I was sent to the camp 16 12.8 Three years or more 9 9.8 
Higher living standard 10 8    
Other 9 7.2    
Q4: EU country   Q4: EU country   
Security 88 42.3 Less than one year 58 63.7 
Accessibility of the country 52 25.0 More than one year, but less 
than three years 
27 29.7 
I was sent to the camp 18 8.7 Three years or more 6 6.6 
Higher living standard 20 9.6    
Other 30 14.4    
For both non-EU camps (47.2 percent) and EU camps (42.3 percent), security was the 
dominant factor for choosing these countries and camps, followed by the accessibility of the 
 
 
48 Even during the events of summer 2015, asylum seekers lived in halls or other empty buildings in Germany. 
Usually, people were not forced to live in tents. ‘Tent cities’ like those in other countries never really existed. 
Thus, none of the interview participants reported such adverse living conditions in Germany. 
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country. Hence, the numbers indicate refugees were, in the first place, concerned about their 
lives and were not seeking higher living standards elsewhere. The country’s accessibility 
argues in the same way but tells us also that a significant number of people chose these camps 
only for reasons of proximity. Initially, they had different primary migration destinations, and 
their decisions were made out of extremity. Approximately eight to thirteen percent had no 
choice, and state authorities sent them to the camps after crossing a border during their 
journey. Other causes include, for example, migrants already had friends and family in one of 
those camps (network theory).  
 Regarding the length of the stay in the camps, the EU and non-EU camps’ results are 
almost identical. In each case, more than 60 percent of interview partners stayed less than a 
year, over 29 percent remained over a year, but less than three years, and only a relatively 
small percentage of people lived longer than three years in a camp. Therefore, we find 
evidence for the hypothesis that camps are usually not more than a short-term solution. People 
do not see long-term prospects for them there and decide to move on. Thus, camps were not 
able to reduce the push factors significantly.  
 The next two questions are about personal experience and evaluation concerning 
nutrition supply and health care in the camps; obviously, two crucial factors in assessing the 
situation in the camps. The interview partners had the opportunity to choose from ‘very good’ 
to ‘very bad.’  
Table 12: Evaluation of Question 7 and Question 8 of the Interviews  
Q7: How would you evaluate the nutrition 
situation (food & water supply) in the 
camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
Q8: How would you evaluate the health 
care situation (medicine, doctors, 
equipment, etc.) in the camp(s) in Q2 & 
Q4? 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q2: Non-EU country   
Very good 0 0.0 Very good 3 3.3 
Good 5 5.4 Good 4 4.3 
Sufficient 10 10.9 Sufficient 14 15.2 
Insufficient 28 30.4 Insufficient 26 28.3 
Very bad 49 53.3 Very bad 45 48.9 
Q4: EU country   Q4: EU country   
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Very good 3 3.3 Very good 8 8.8 
Good 9 9.9 Good 17 18.7 
Sufficient 20 22.0 Sufficient 29 31.9 
Insufficient 23 25.3 Insufficient 21 23.1 
Very bad 36 39.6 Very bad 16 17.6 
The results of the interviews are slightly different between non-EU camps and EU camps. 
Overall, the impression of the non-EU camps was quite devastating. Fifty-three point three 
percent evaluated the nutrition situation as ‘very bad’ and another 30.4 percent as 
‘insufficient.’ Only 10.9 percent rated it as ‘sufficient.’ Only five of the interview participants 
gave second-best grade. None of them gave the best grade, which is surprising since many of 
the asylum seekers spent some time in Turkish camps that usually get relatively high ratings 
from experts and aid workers. However, not all Turkish camps can provide the same high 
living standards, and the ‘good’ camps only have limited capacities. Camps from other 
countries than Turkey did not even once receive a ‘sufficient’ rating. 
In comparison, camps in the EU provided better living conditions, but there are 
significant differences between Greece and Italy. While Italian camps got ‘good’ and ‘very 
good’ ratings, Greek camps were usually described as ‘insufficient’ or ‘very bad.’ Still, over 
39 percent of the participants gave a ‘very bad’ evaluation. In general, the allocation of the 
ratings in EU camps is quite diverse, and they range between 3.3 percent ‘very good’ to 39.6 
percent ‘very bad’ (sufficient and insufficient are almost equal). 
 In terms of health care, the perception was, in both cases, more positive. Nevertheless, 
the vast majority of people who lived in non-EU camps gave a negative evaluation (over 48 
percent). Again, there were some differences between Turkey and other countries. A few 
asylum seekers even evaluated Turkish camps’ health care situation as ‘very good’ or ‘good.’ 
Thus, these camps had more medicines and qualified doctors than, for example, in Jordan or 
Lebanon. This aspect could be explained by the Turkish state’s economic power and the 
overall higher education level. In the EU camps, by contrast, we can almost see a normal 
distribution. Again, Italian camps received some positive evaluations (‘very good’ and ‘good’ 
equals 27.5 percent), whereas camps on the Greek islands got the worst ratings (over 40 
percent of negative responses). The rest of the asylum seekers described the health care 
situation in EU camps as ‘sufficient’ (31.9 percent). The reason for that is the presence of aid 
organizations in the EU, a higher level of expertise, and more (financial) resources.  
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 The following section evaluates the educational situation in the camps and asks if 
there were schools for children or other educational institutions. As the interview participants’ 
characteristics showed, the average age of asylum seekers and refugees is very young, and, 
therefore, education is a crucial category in this context. 
Table 13: Evaluation of Question 9 and Question 10 of the Interviews 
Q9: How would you evaluate the 
educational situation in the camp(s) in Q2 
& Q4? 
Q10: Were there schools or other 
institutions, especially for children in the 
camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q2: Non-EU country   
Very good 0 0.0 Yes 31 33.7 
Good 0 0.0 No 61 66.3 
Sufficient 10 10.9    
Insufficient 20 21.7    
Very bad 62 67.4    
Q4: EU country   Q4: EU country   
Very good 3 3.3 Yes 41 45.1 
Good 4 4.4 No 50 54.9 
Sufficient 27 29.7    
Insufficient 31 34.1    
Very bad 26 28.6    
The figures show that non-EU and EU camps struggle to provide proper education to asylum 
seekers. In both cases, interview partners said schools and educational institutions were rare. 
The situation in the EU (45.1 to 54.9 percent) was better than in non-EU countries (33.7 to 
66.3 percent). E-learning and other modern technologies did not exist, although this could be 
an approach to improve the situation. Thus, these facts are also reflected in the individual 
evaluations. The camps outside of the EU received almost 70 percent of ‘very bad’ and 21.7 
percent of ‘insufficient’ ratings. Only ten point nine percent gave a ‘sufficient’ grade, and 
none of the participants answered the question positively. Particularly in the non-EU camps, 
child labor is a common problem, and, therefore, children do not have the time to go to school 
regularly. Even Turkey has some room for improvement in this regard. In the EU, child labor 
is, fortunately, less common. 
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Consequently, the camps’ educational situation is better, but there are still some 
significant differences between Italy and Greece. A majority of the negative responses (62.7 
percent) came from people who experienced terrible living conditions in Greek camps due to 
a lack of capacities and educational staff. The rest of the asylum seekers had fewer bad 
experiences. Seven point seven percent gave positive evaluations, and 29.7 percent said the 
situation was at least ‘sufficient’ in the EU camps. 
 Questions number eleven and twelve focus on job opportunities and (regular) income, 
two fields that are usually related to each other. Creating jobs gives people prospects, and 
income is an incentive to stay. Thus, these topics are relevant to the research. 
Table 14: Evaluation of Question 11 and Question 12 of the Interviews 
Q11: Were there any job 
opportunities in the camp(s) in Q2 
& Q4? 
Q12: Did you receive any income during your 
time in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? If yes, how 
much? 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q2: Non-EU country   
Yes 24 26.1 No income 70 76.1 
Yes, but not in my 
field 
13 14.1 Less than 100 EUR per month 14 15.2 
No 55 59.8 More than 100 EUR per month, 
but less than 200 EUR per 
month 
5 5.4 
   More than 200 EUR per month, 
but less than 300 EUR per 
month 
3 3.3 
   More than 300 EUR per month, 
but less than 400 EUR per 
month 
0 0.0 
   More than 400 EUR per month, 
but less than 500 EUR per 
month 
0 0.0 
   More than 500 EUR per month 0 0.0 
Q4: EU country   Q4: EU country   
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Yes 27 30.0 No income 63 69.2 
Yes, but not in my 
field 
11 12.2 Less than 100 EUR per month 16 17.6 
No 52 57.8 More than 100 EUR per month, 
but less than 200 EUR per 
month 
6 6.6 
   More than 200 EUR per month, 
but less than 300 EUR per 
month 
5 5.5 
   More than 300 EUR per month, 
but less than 400 EUR per 
month 
1 1.1 
   More than 400 EUR per month, 
but less than 500 EUR per 
month 
0 0.0 
   More than 500 EUR per month 0 0.0 
Concerning job opportunities or none, the results are almost identical for both non-EU and 
EU camps. In both cases, roughly 60 percent of the people did not have any job opportunities, 
between 12.2 to 14.1 percent had job opportunities but not in their field, and between 26.1 to 
30 percent found job opportunities. On some rare occasions, people were even running their 
own businesses. However, there are some differences between EU and non-EU camps. 
Outside of the EU, a black labor market was expected. In the EU, there were more legal 
activities for asylum seekers, e.g., food and water distribution in cooperation with 
international organizations. It does not mean that EU camps were free from illegal activities, 
but state authorities were paying less attention to them in other parts of the world.  
Nevertheless, most people had to live without any income, 76.1 percent in non-EU 
camps, and 69.2 percent in EU camps. Approximately 25 to 30 percent could generate a small 
income (in most cases, even less than 100 EUR per month). This is because refugees usually 
have to live from donations, coupons, vouchers, and job opportunities are, as mentioned 
before, minimal. Interview partners also reported some dubious businesses like dealing with 
drugs or prostitution, but these activities and their lucrative possibilities were not discussed. 
On the other hand, people often supported each other without making a profit from it. 
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The subsequent questions deal with often underinvestigated issues in this field: free 
time opportunities and political participation. People are social beings and need more than just 
work to stimulate themselves, and civic engagement is a form of self-determination. 
Table 15: Evaluation of Question 13 and Question 14 of the Interviews 
Q13: How would you evaluate the 
opportunities for free time activities in the 
camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
Q14: Were there any forms of political 
participation in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q2: Non-EU country   
Very good 10 10.9 Yes 15 16.3 
Good 11 12.0 No 77 83.7 
Sufficient 17 18.5    
Insufficient 19 20.7    
Very bad 35 38.0    
Q4: EU country   Q4: EU country   
Very good 2 2.2 Yes 13 14.3 
Good 3 3.3 No 78 85.7 
Sufficient 14 15.4    
Insufficient 20 22.0    
Very bad 52 57.1    
The free-time activities in non-EU camps received over 50 percent negative evaluations 
(‘very bad’ and ‘insufficient’), 18.5 percent of the ratings were sufficient, and 22.9 percent 
positive (‘very good’ and ‘good’). The allocation in the EU camps is similar, but there are 
some crucial differences. Seventy-nine point one percent see the free-activities negatively, 
and only 5.5 percent rate them positively. Thus, the overall perception is that free-time 
activities in non-EU camps are better than in EU camps. One possible explanation for this 
circumstance could be the duration of non-EU camps. Many of them had already existed 
before the significant mass migration movements to Europe started. 
Consequently, some of them have established more long-term infrastructures, 
including appropriate opportunities for free-time activities. Another explanation is that in 
neighboring countries, the communities are more homogenous, which might improve social 
life, as well as spare-time activities. The same applies to questions of political participation. 
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The civic involvement opportunities were slightly higher in non-EU camps (16.3 percent) 
than in EU camps (14.3 percent).  
 The next two questions evaluate the security situation in the camps and ask the critical 
question, ‘Why did people leave the camp(s)?’. Thus, question number 15 evaluates another 
push factor, and question number 16 goes deeper into the decision-making process behind the 
choice leaving the camp(s). 
Table 16: Evaluation of Question 15 and Question 16 of the Interviews  
Q15: How was the security situation (high 
or low crime rate) in the camp(s) in Q2 & 
Q4? 
Q16: Why did you leave the camp(s) in Q2 
& Q4? Please circle all that apply. 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q2: Non-EU country   
Very high crime rate 10 10.9 Poor living conditions 49 43.0 
High crime rate 11 12.0 Seeking a better life in 
the host country 
24 21.1 
Normal crime rate 46 50.0 Seeking a better life in 
the EU 
36 31.6 
Low crime rate 13 14.1 Other 5 4.3 
Very low crime rate 12 13.0    
Q4: EU country   Q4: EU country   
Very high crime rate 4 6.8 Poor living conditions 66 47.1 
High crime rate 4 6.8 Seeking a better life in 
the host country 
24 17.1 
Normal crime rate 51 45.5 Seeking a better life in 
the EU 
43 30.7 
Low crime rate 27 34.1 Other 7 5.0 
Very low crime rate 5 6.8    
The ratio regarding the crime rate in non-EU camps is well-balanced between negative 
responses (22.9 percent; very high and high crime rate), normal crime rate (50 percent), and 
positive ratings (27.1 percent). Therefore, EU camps perform significantly better. Over 40 
percent evaluated the crime rate as ‘very low’ or ‘low,’ 45.5 percent said the crime rate was 
‘normal,’ and 13.6 percent perceived a ‘very high’ or ‘high’ crime rate. Indeed, the perception 
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of such factors is personal and depends on personal experiences. However, the security 
standards in Europe are, to a certain extent, higher, and state authorities and politicians see 
asylum seekers very often as a threat. Consequently, they increase the security situation at the 
border and in camps, which also positively affects the crime rate. Non-EU countries, on the 
other hand, often do not have the necessary workforce and resources to act in the same way. 
 The results of why people decided to leave the camp(s) are pretty much identical 
between non-EU and EU countries. For approximately 43 to 47 percent of the answers, the 
dominant factor was ‘poor living conditions,’ followed by ‘seeking for a better life in the EU’ 
(about 30 percent), and ‘seeking for a better life in the host country’ (17 to 21 percent). Only 
four to five percent had other reasons. Of course, there is never the ‘one’ factor, but it is, 
instead, a mix of various reasons. Nevertheless, the trend is undeniable. Neither the non-EU 
camps nor the EU camps could reduce serious push factors by improving living conditions. In 
general, people had no reason to stay in the camps and sought different solutions elsewhere. 
The second observation is that the pull factors also remained high since a substantial number 
hoped to find a better life in the EU elsewhere, and staying in the host country was only an 
option for a relatively small number of people. The results suggest refugee camps failed to 
limit migration movements, externally and internally. 
 The upcoming question goes in the same direction and asks, not why people left the 
camp(s), but under which circumstances they might have stayed.  
Table 17: Evaluation of Question 17 of the Interviews 
Q17: Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
Please circle all that apply. 
 n %  n % 
Q2: Non-EU country   Q4: EU country   
Long-term prospects in 
the country 
21 16.4 Long-term prospects in 
the country 
40 29.4 
Higher satisfaction of 
basic human needs 
(water, food, medicine, 
etc.) 
33 25.8 Higher satisfaction of 
basic human needs 
(water, food, medicine, 
etc.) 
24 17.6 
I would not have stayed 
under any circumstances 
56 43.8 I would not have stayed 
under any circumstances 
53 39.0 
Other 18 14.1 Other 19 14.0 
Again, the results are similar for both non-EU and EU camps. The biggest group of asylum 
seekers answered the question by stating they would not have stayed in the camps under any 
circumstances (43.8 percent and 39 percent). People had already made their decisions and 
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followed their aspirations (e.g., if migrants aimed from the beginning to move to Germany, 
many of them did not change their mind). These answers reflect the substantial pull factors 
that, without a doubt, do exist, including economic reasons, free society, network effects, et 
cetera. At a certain point in the journey, ‘staying’ is no longer an option. However, the 
findings suggest that there are circumstances under which people might have changed their 
minds. People living in non-EU camps report ‘higher satisfaction of basic human needs’ (25.8 
percent) and ‘long-term prospects in the country’ (16.4 percent).  These factors are significant 
aspects of the debate. Inside the EU, the priorities slightly change, and ‘long-term prospects in 
the country’ (29.4 percent) becomes more important, whereas ‘higher satisfaction of basic 
human needs’ (17.6 percent) becomes less influential regarding decision-making. An 
indicator of these changes could be that the supply of food, water, and medicine are more 
limited in non-EU countries than in EU countries. In EU camps, asylum seekers already made 
it to Europe and, therefore, they seek long-term prospects, while camps in non-EU countries 
were just a stopover during their journey. Other circumstances were also popular answers 
(approximately 14 percent each). Usually, these arguments were related to financial and 
family reasons. In general, there is evidence that refugee camps could soften migration 
movements under the right circumstances. 
 The next question does not distinguish between non-EU and EU specific aspects and 
asks asylum seekers about the reasons for leaving their country of origin.  
Table 18: Evaluation of Question 18 of the Interviews 
Q18: What was the (major) reason for you leaving the country of your origin? Please 
circle all that apply. 
 n % 
(Civil) War or Armed Conflict(s) 134 36.9 
Political Persecution 77 21.2 
Discrimination 29 8.0 
Natural Disasters 18 5.0 
Economic Reasons / Poverty 34 9.4 
Climate change-related reason 7 1.9 
Seeking a higher living standard in the EU 30 8.3 
Other 34 9.4 
Unfortunately, wars and armed conflicts (36.9 percent) are, by far, the main reason for people 
leaving their country of origin. 134 out of 192 participants chose this option. Notably, many 
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Syrian asylum seekers were profoundly affected by the (civil) war in Syria and decided to 
migrate to Europe. Still, almost from every country in the study, people suffered from violent 
conflicts, which is consistent with previous research (Davenport et al. 2003; Melander and 
Öberg 2007). 
The second primary reason is political persecution (21.2 percent), which is often 
related to autocratic regimes and armed conflicts. ‘Economic reasons and poverty’ were the 
third most common response, together with ‘other’ (9.4 percent). Thus, the research shows 
that the vast majority had severe reasons for fleeing. The claims of nationalist governments in 
the EU, who refer to refugees as ‘economic migrants,’ are not valid. These findings are in line 
with research results from Neumayer (2004; 2005), Moore and Shellman (2007), and Tétényi 
et al. (2018). Indeed, there is never only ‘one’  reason to flee any situation, and various sets of 
different variables influence asylum seekers in their decision-making process regarding 
migration. There are other pull and push factors, as well. Wealthy and economically 
successful states are, of course, attractive destinations for migrants, but the dominant factors 
remain significant threats to the life and well-being of individuals. Natural disasters (5 
percent) and climate change (1.9 percent) played only a minor role, as well as ‘discrimination’ 
(8 percent) and ‘seeking a higher living standard in the EU’ (8.3 percent). The other reasons 
included, for example, family or network-related answers. 
 Hence, it is also necessary to ask the question the other way around by identifying the 
main reasons for asylum seekers coming to Europe, respectively, to understand the pull 
factors behind the decision-making process. 
Table 19: Evaluation of Question 19 of the Interviews 
Q19: What was the main reason for you coming to the EU? Please circle all that apply. 
 n % 
Peaceful and secure environment 113 31.5 
Political stability 62 17.3 
Human rights (open and free society) 65 18.1 
Cultural aspects 34 9.5 
Higher living standard 52 14.5 
Other 33 9.2 
Overall, as mentioned above, the question's responses correspond with the results of the 
previous section. Consequently, a ‘peaceful and secure environment’ dominates with 31.5 
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percent of the total answers given, followed by ‘political stability’ (17.3 percent) and ‘human 
rights’ (18.1 percent). Since armed conflicts and political prosecution dominate the 
interviews' dominating flight factors, the answers meet the expectations. First and foremost, 
asylum seekers in the EU are seeking security. Luckily, the EU exists in a period of peace. 
Any form of military confrontation among Member states is unlikely, which increases the 
European Union's popularity tremendously as a destination for migrants suffering from war. 
Moreover, the EU guarantees freedom, stability, and human rights. Political 
persecution is very unlikely. ‘Higher living standard’ (14.5 percent) is only of relatively small 
relevance in this context. Some of the interview partners even appreciate the cultural diversity 
in Europe (9.5 percent), and other reasons include, again, mostly family and networks. 
 According to the Dublin system, asylum seekers have to apply for asylum where they 
step foot for the first time in the EU. Therefore, the question of where people entered the EU 
is crucial. 
Table 20: Evaluation of Question 20 of the Interviews 
Q20: What was the country where you entered the EU for the first time? 
 n % 
Greece 101 52.6 
Italy 58 30.2 
Spain 9 4.7 
Bulgaria 4 2.1 
Hungary 2 1.0 
Other countries 18 9.4 
The main destinations for asylum seekers are, not surprisingly, Greece (52.6 percent) and Italy 
(30.2 percent). Due to their Mediterranean Sea location, the accessibility of these countries 
makes them EU hotspots for asylum seekers' arrivals. Whereas Greece is attractive for 
refugees and migrants from the Middle East, Italy has always been a destination for Africa’s 
migration movements. However, in recent years, Greece has been more affected by migration 
influx because of the civil war in Syria and other armed conflicts in the Middle East region. 
Spain (4.7 percent), Bulgaria (2.1 percent), and Hungary (1 percent) as destination countries 
only play minor roles in this regard. The relatively high number of other countries (9.4 
percent) can be explained mainly by family reunification and people who entered the EU via 
tourist visas but decided to stay.  
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 Consequently, question number 21 asks how people come to the EU, and question 
number 22 tackles the issue of smuggling. 
Table 21: Evaluation of Question 21 and Question 22 of the Interviews  
Q21: How did you arrive in the EU? Q22: Did you pay any smugglers to enter 
the EU? 
 n %  n % 
By land 38 19.8 Yes 123 65.8 
By sea 130 67.7 No 64 34.2 
By airplane 21 10.9    
Other 3 1.6    
The most common way of entering the EU is by sea (67.7 percent), followed by land (19.8 
percent) and airplanes (10.9 percent). The Mediterranean countries are mostly affected by sea 
arrivals. Greece and Bulgaria are often entered by land due to their border with Turkey, even 
though the EU’s external borders are highly protected. Entering the EU by flight is less 
common but still happens. Again, family reunification and tourist visas make this possible and 
allow people to enter their destination country without going through other EU states. 
The majority (65.8 percent) paid smugglers to enter the EU and to reach their 
destination. The difference between smuggling and human trafficking is the exploitive 
character of human trafficking (Herkes 2018). Moreover, there is very often a misperception 
of smuggling. Whereas smuggling is often described as responsible for massive human rights 
violations (EC 2020), the reality is more complex and nuanced. Smugglers are often friends or 
family members of migrants who are not necessarily interested primarily in profit-
maximization but rather try to help people during their journey (Zhang et al. 2018; Achilli, 
2018; Maher 2018; Mengiste 2018). Many of the interview partners were able to confirm 
these impressions. People described the relationship with their smugglers as ‘trustworthy’ and 
‘friendly.’ Unfortunately, black sheep do exist in this field. They were mostly concerned about 
their profit instead of focusing on safe entry opportunities for their clients. Orientation issues 
can explain the two answers in the category ‘other.’ Sometimes, people do not realize when, 
where, and how they cross a border. Uncertainty always remains, and, therefore, these people 
did not know if they entered the EU first by land or by sea since perfect border controls do not 
exist. 
 The last question asks asylum seekers if they intend to go back to their country of 
origin in the future.  
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Table 22: Evaluation of Question 23 of the Interviews 
Q23: Did/do you have any intention of going back to your country of origin? 
 n % 
Yes 15 7.8 
No 158 82.3 
I do not know yet 19 9.9 
The response to this question was overwhelmingly negative (82.3 percent). Only a small 
minority of 7.8 percent intends to return to the country of origin, and 9.9 percent are 
undecided. Indeed, ‘returning’ means migrating back and not just visiting family or friends. 
Many more would like to return as visitors to their home country if the situation should 
significantly change one day. In general, once people have decided to immigrate, they are 
unwilling to go back, especially not after all they went through to build up a new life 
elsewhere. Asylum seekers and refugees want stability, security, and long-term prosperity, 
and these things cannot be guaranteed if they have to move every few years. ‘Permanent 
settling’ reduces mobility. 
In many cases, migrants also establish new structures in their lives and find new 
communities. The children of migrants grow up in this European environment and are more 
likely to integrate themselves. Usually, after several years in Europe, the children of asylum 
seekers get the right to apply for European citizenship. Thus, even though the wars in Syria 
and other conflict regions might end in the future, migrants will not be willing to return to 
their original lands. 
6.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
I conducted 17 semi-structured interviews with asylum seekers and refugees in Germany. All 
of the participants also took part in the quantitative research in the previous section. The 
following table shows the characteristics of the participants. 
Table 23: Characteristics of Participants (Qualitative Research) 
Characteristics of Participants 
 n %  n % 
Age   Gender   
18 - 29 17 100 Male 14 82.4 
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Ø 23.4   Female 3 17.6 
Citizenship   Profession   
Syria 17 100 Unemployed 6 35.3 
   Student 7 41.2 
   Farmer 2 11.8 
   Barber 2 11.8 
The sample size is in qualitative research, of course, much smaller with 17 
participants. This section aimed to extend and complete the evaluation of living conditions in 
camps by getting an in-depth look into camps’ analysis. All the participants have Syrian 
citizenship and are young (on average aged 23.4 years). Thus, over 40 percent of the 
interview partners are students. Another 35 percent are unemployed, and the rest of the 
participants worked as barbers or farmers. The vast majority of the participants were male (14 
out of 17), and it is also important to note that people were even several years younger when 
they talk about their camp experiences. Since most of the big migration movements took 
place in 2015, many participants were still teenagers or children during that period.  
 In the process of evaluating the fully-structured interviews, I defined the following six 
themes for qualitative research.  
Table 24: Questions and Themes for Qualitative Research 
Questions and Themes for Qualitative Research 
Conditions in non-EU camps 
Conditions in EU camps 
The Journey to Europe 
Reasons for Leaving the Country of Origin/Syria 
Reasons for Coming to Germany/Europe 
Stay Factors in the Camps 
Conditions in non-EU camps 
Once again, we have to differentiate between Turkish camps and camps in Lebanon and 
Jordan. Whereas the Turkish camps provided reasonable living conditions for its inhabitants, 
Lebanon and Jordan were overwhelmed by people. One of the interview partners stated: 
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“The life in the camps was ok. This is what you can expect when you live as a refugee in a 
different country. I was glad to be there. Outside of the camp, the conditions were way worse.” 
(P1, 25, male) 
Indeed, the living conditions were still relatively low compared to European standards. 
For example, people had to share rooms with other refugees and strangers and used public 
toilets. Nonetheless, the camps had very often playgrounds for children, education facilities, 
sufficient health care, and adequate food and water. Overall, the camps were secure and safe 
places, and international aid organizations, as well as Turkish aid organizations, were present. 
However, not all Turkish camps fulfilled these high standards. P11 (27, female) draws a 
different picture from her camp experience: 
“The conditions were unreasonable. There were no free time opportunities, no education for 
children, and only minimal health care. Even the food and water supply were insufficient. 
Sometimes I went to bed without a meal.” 
On the contrary, even though not all Turkish camps were ‘perfect,’ the situation in 
camps in Lebanon and Jordan can only be described as absolutely devastating. P3 (21, male), 
who lived for three months in 2015 in a Lebanese camp, reported no real accommodation, an 
insecure environment, almost no nutrition supply, and terrible living conditions (e.g., no 
health care and no schools). The person stated: 
“I did not feel safe in the camp. Even some terrorists were trying to recruit people. I had to 
live in an improvised shelter since accommodation opportunities did not exist. Every day, I 
struggled to find food and water. There were no international aid organizations in the camp.” 
The same applies to Jordan camps. P9 (28, male), who lived in 2015 for two months in 
a camp in Jordan, reported similar impressions: 
“I lived in an improvised shelter. I was just glad to escape the military conflict in Syria. 
However, life in the camp was devastating — no schools, no playgrounds, no food, no 
housing, simply nothing. Once I felt sick, but I could not find a doctor or medicine. I was just 
glad to leave the place.” 
Thus, qualitative research confirms the impressions from the quantitative section. 
Many Turkish camps provided reasonable living conditions, but less wealthy states such as 
Lebanon or Jordan failed to provide the same standards. 
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Conditions in EU camps 
All the participants of the sample came from Syria. Due to Greece's Mediterranean location 
and proximity to Turkey or the crisis region, all the interview partners stayed in a Greek 
camp. Thus, first-time arrivals in the EU usually happen by the sea, and very often, Greece is 
the destination for entering the EU. 
 According to the participants, the conditions in camps on the Greek islands were, 
again, absolutely devastating. None of the people I interviewed for the qualitative research 
had a positive impression about these camps. The contrary is the case. Some people even 
argued the conditions were at the same level or worse than in Lebanon or Jordan, and the 
Turkish camps were usually in better shape. People reported living in improvised shelters, no 
sanitation, no health care, and no education for children. International aid organizations and 
Greek state authorities were overwhelmed by the situation. There was a shortage of food and 
water, but sometimes local community members brought nutrition or clothes and toys for 
children. P2 (20, male) described the situation in the Greek camps as follows: 
“It was a daily fight for survival – pure chaos and anarchy. For weeks I was sleeping on the 
street, and for one week, I had to survive with just a few chocolate bars and four bottles of 
water, during the summer and without any protection from the heat. I was starving and afraid 
not to survive. Aid workers could not provide sufficient nutrition and health care. I 
immediately fled from the camps when I had the chance.” 
A slightly better impression came from P7 (25, male), who observed little health care 
and nutrition. In his opinion, the living conditions were still bad, but he recognized the work 
of international aid workers: 
“These people tried to do their best, but they simply had not the capabilities and resources to 
improve the situation significantly. The nutrition distribution did not work sufficiently. Other 
inhabitants of the camp taught children, and a few doctors checked people regularly.” 
However, it is worth mentioning that P7 lived in a camp in Lebanon before coming to 
Europe. Thus, he was already used to dire conditions in camps. In conclusion, the conditions 
on the Greek islands were not reasonably livable.  
The Journey to Europe 
Regarding their journey to Europe, almost all the participants had the same story to tell. All of 
them came to Greece by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, which is not surprising. Indeed, all 
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of the participants engaged smugglers to manage their arrival in Europe. The prices and costs 
of going to the EU vary significantly from smuggler to smuggler – from free to several 
thousand EUR. Usually, people had to spend several hundreds of EUR. The smuggler’s 
intention can explain the wide price ratio. Not all of them run a profit-orientated business 
model, but rather have a genuine interest in helping people, who are sometimes even friends, 
family members, or members from the same network of the refugees (see also table 16). Non-
profit-orientated smugglers usually asked for a lower price. 
 Nonetheless, most participants had a traumatic journey experience. The boats for 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea were too small and overcrowded. Sometimes the event took 
place at night, so the coast guards had a more difficult job stopping the crossing. Thus, 
arriving by sea to the EU is dangerous and life-threatening. Two examples illustrate this: 
“We were on a boat with approximately 1,000 people, but the boat was conceptualized for 
maybe 200 or 300 people. The smuggler was one of our group, which is the reason why it was 
so cheap (100,- EUR each). The crossing happened in the middle of the night, and not all of us 
made it to the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. There were many waves; we felt sick and 
had no orientation. It was a wonder that we survived this trip.” (P15, 20, female); (P16 18, 
female) – sisters 
And: 
“The price for crossing the Mediterranean Sea was incredibly low (100,- EUR), but I was with 
several hundred people on a boat that was designed for 50 people. I did not know the 
smuggler, and he put as many people as possible on the boat. It was reckless. I risked my life, 
and I thought I would have to die. Luckily, we made it to Greece, but at least three persons fell 
from the boat and died in the sea.” (P8, 19, male) 
The interviews confirm the observation that not all smugglers are ruthless people (see 
chapter 4.1.3). Some smugglers have good intentions, but ‘black sheeps’ exist, of course, too. 
At any rate, the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea is dangerous and life-threatening.  
Reasons for Leaving the Country of Origin/Syria 
All the participants gave the same reasons for leaving the country of origin. The outbreak of 
the civil war in Syria was the main reason. In this context, terrorism and (state) persecution 
(from the Assad regime) are factors as well. P1 (25, male) said: 
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“I liked my life in Syria before the outbreak of the civil war. I worked as a barber, and I have 
never had the intention of leaving the country. However, the situation changed tremendously, 
and I decided to leave. I did not have a luxury life, but it was okay. I had friends and family in 
Syria. As a consequence of the armed conflict, I lost my flat and all my savings. I had to 
restart my whole life.”  
Of course, the civil war in Syria also had economic consequences, including the 
destruction of the whole infrastructure and high unemployment. Some of the participants also 
mentioned ‘unemployment’ as a push factor. Thus, ‘unemployment’ played a minor role. P17 
(22, male) expressed it this way: 
“The main reason for leaving Syria was, of course, the war. (…) Nevertheless, I lost 
everything, including my job in the oil business. I had no more reason to stay since I was not 
only struggling financially (no functional social-welfare system) but also risking my life every 
day.” 
Again, the results of the quantitative and qualitative research are almost identical. 
Armed conflicts are by far the main reason for people fleeing to Europe. Economic factors, 
such as unemployment, have only a small impact. 
Reasons for Coming to Germany/Europe 
In general, all participants were looking for a peaceful and secure destination, which makes 
Europe attractive. Another important aspect was the overall higher living standard in 
Germany compared to other countries. Therefore, one could argue that when people decide to 
leave their country of origin (for severe threats to their life or not), they are influenced by 
factors of attractiveness and aim to get to the destination which guarantees the highest living 
standard.  However, ‘higher living standard’ cannot only be determined by economic factors. 
Even though economic factors are relevant, the majority said they played only a minor role in 
the semi-structured interviews.  
 Furthermore, this section produced two new findings regarding the so-called ‘open-
border policy’ of Angela Merkel and family and networks. Every interview partner stressed 
the importance of fewer migration barriers. For example, P2 (20, male) said: 
“I can only move to a destination that is accessible and where I am welcome. Germany always 
had the reputation of being a free, liberal, and open state. After refugees were welcome in 
Germany, immediately, everyone knew about the open border policy and wanted to go there.” 
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The other significant factor is the role of family and networks. Since many of the 
interview partners were still children or teenagers when they lived in camps and migrated to 
Germany, they came together with their family and friends or followed their networks. Of 
course, people preferring moving to places where they find (personal) networks: 
“I already had family members and friends in Germany. Without a doubt, this was a major 
reason for me going to Germany. I wanted to be reunited with the people that are important to 
me.” (P6, 24, male) 
Hence, Germany’s open border policy influenced migration decisions and was a 
decisive pull factor. The same applies to family and friends (networks). 
Stay Factors in the Camps 
It is one of the research questions of this dissertation if camps can decrease the push factors in 
the migration process to Europe. Although many people do not see any incentives for staying 
in the camps or would not have stayed under any circumstances in the camps, I found, again, 
little evidence for the hypothesis that camps can reduce push factors.  
 According to P3 (21, male), camps need to provide acceptable living conditions and a 
(long-term) prospects: 
“If camps would provide proper living conditions, I would have considered staying. There are 
some things that I do not like in Germany, for example, the bad weather. Nonetheless, I want 
security, education, employment, and sufficient health care. I do not want to be worried about 
food and water supply or housing. If camps could offer prospects for me, my family, and 
friends, I might not have moved to Germany.” 
P10’s response goes in a similar direction. He adds: 
“I do not really feel at home in Germany. The culture and lifestyle are completely different. 
Under different circumstances, I think I might feel more comfortable in the south or southeast 
of Europe. However, in the camp was no prospects. If camps became small Syrian cities with 
significantly improved living conditions, I would consider living there.” 
In conclusion, camps are not a (long-term) solution. At the moment, camps fail to 
provide at least minimum standards. Nevertheless, acceptable living conditions and factors 
such as prospects, education, employment, sufficient health care, satisfactory nutrition, proper 
housing, and security have the potential to change the situation. Indeed, not all refugees and 
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asylum seekers are willing to move back since they have already established their new life 
elsewhere, but this is also not the goal, nor should it be. In the framework of early anticipation 
of refugee movements and urbanization, camps can manage migrants’ influx, specifically 
from the Middle East. Therefore, improved living conditions in camps are a convenient way 
to save lives without jeopardizing the EU's unity in the migration question. 
6.3 Conclusion  
In total, I conducted 192 fully-structured and 17 semi-structured interviews with asylum 
seekers and refugees in Germany. Even though everyone had his own story to tell, there are 
some findings and conclusions that we can derive from the interviews. The average age of the 
interview participants was very young, and the majority were male. Migration is a discipline 
of the youth and requires a lot of health, endurance, and resources. As people become older, 
they are less likely willing to move. In many cases, young males migrate first on very 
insecure routes and try later, after they have successfully migrated to their destination, to 
encourage their families and friends to follow them (network theory). Increased mobility and 
communication infrastructure fuel this development. The actual (mass) migration movements 
that have started in 2015 mainly originate from the Middle East and the African continent. By 
far, the biggest group of migrants are currently Syrian refugees in this context. Other 
countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Eritrea, are also profoundly affected by people’s mass 
exodus. The main fleeing reasons for asylum seekers in Germany are wars, armed conflicts, 
and political persecution. In contradiction to nationalistic governments' claims in the EU 
economic reasons, there was a relevant pull factor, but not a significant push factor. Most of 
the migrants who moved to Germany had to face severe threats to their lives. Thus, people are 
seeking peace, stability, and (long-term) prospects in the EU. 
 According to the Dublin system and their Mediterranean geographic position, Greece 
and Italy are the most affected states in the EU by migration from the Middle East and Africa 
for first-time arrivals by sea, which is the most common way to enter the EU for fleeing 
persons. Hence, on their journey to Europe, migrants are forced to pay smugglers to cross the 
EU border. Outside of the EU, Syria’s neighboring countries are the primary destination for 
refugees: Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. A large portion of refugees ended up living in camps 
in these countries. Consequently, the role of refugee camps is of extraordinary importance in 
terms of migration to Europe. The interviews aimed to shed light on the camps’ living 
conditions by asking people about their personal experiences there. Moreover, the conducted 
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research makes a comparison between non-EU and EU camps possible. Were camps able to 
soften the crisis? Did they stop or accelerate migration to the EU? Did camps improve the 
living conditions of people or not? The interviews provide a unique insight into the life of 
asylum seekers and refugees and their journey to Europe.  
 The findings of the study correspond to the research questions ‘How does the 
devastating situation in the perceived reality of asylum seekers and refugees in camps 
(including undernourishment, poverty, disease, et cetera) affect migration movements to 
Europe?’ and ‘How does the camp experience [experiences gained in camps] contribute to 
refugees’ and asylum seekers’ decision-making process in the context of migration to 
Europe?’. The questionnaire's first 17 questions of the fully structured interviews are camp 
specific topics and evaluated the situation in the non-EU and EU camps in terms of nutrition, 
health care, education, labor market, income, spare-time activities, political participation, and 
crime rate. In both cases, the overall perception of the camps was overwhelmingly 
devastating. Indeed, there are exceptions, and the ratings vary from camp to camp and from 
country to country (Italy and Turkey usually received better grades). Still, most camps fail to 
provide at least minimum living standards for their inhabitants. Often, people find themselves 
under lockdown and have to survive somehow without proper accommodation, nourishment, 
and medical treatment. The push factors in the camps remain high, and even if people can 
enter the EU, their situation does not change tremendously. If people move from Turkish to 
Greek camps, the situation might become worse. Until this day, the EU has not found a 
solution to improving living conditions in camps, and member states are left alone with this 
issue. The other interview questions evaluated why people left the camps and under which 
circumstances they would have stayed in the camps.  
Besides, I conducted additional 17 semi-structured interviews concerning conditions in 
non-EU camps, conditions in EU camps, the journey to Europe, reasons for leaving the 
country of origin/Syria, and reasons for coming to Germany/Europe and stay factors in the 
camps. These questions address, among others, the hypothesis of the research that people 
would not flee to Europe in significant numbers if the situation in refugee camps in the EU 
and outside of the EU (Middle East) were reasonably livable (reduce the push factors). The 
interviews show evidence that camps' appropriate living conditions can reduce the push 
factors and significantly impact migration decisions. Therefore, improving living conditions 
in refugee camps could be a long-term approach to stop (mass) migration movements to 
Europe by increasing migrants’ life quality. In the past, the case of refugee camps has been 
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widely ignored by the literature and researchers with some rare exceptions, such as the work 
of Fafo (2019a; 2019b). However, the research sample sizes are still too small since I had 
only limited financial and personal resources. Indeed, interviews and questionnaires with 
hundreds or thousands of people with camp experience should be the goal, as well as more 
actual field studies in the camps. A higher budget and more human resources would be a 
valuable contribution to the study of refugee camps, not only in the context of migration 
movements to Europe but worldwide. There is a further need for research. Hopefully, future 
scholars will get this opportunity and enhance the discussion with new findings. 
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7 Conclusion 
In 2015, the EU faced one of the biggest challenges in its history, with the influx of over one 
million refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East and the African continent. The 
migration topic damaged unity and showed cracks in the European integration process. 
Whereas some member states in the North were willing to accept migrants, many others were 
not. For an extended period, especially the Mediterranean sea countries, namely Greece and 
Italy, missed European solidarity and had to deal alone with that issue. At the same time, the 
rise of the anti-migration movement has started everywhere in Europe. Since then, many 
things have changed, but migration remains a controversial and emotional topic for many 
people, even though migration to Europe has significantly decreased due to restrictive policy 
measures in recent years. 
 Now, in 2020, migration is still one of the most current topics in media, EU policies, 
and domestic political debates. This dissertation aimed to elaborate on the role of refugee 
camps in the context of migration to Europe, which is an oft-ignored issue in the literature. 
For that purpose, I developed a questionnaire and had 192 fully-structured and 17 semi-
structured interviews with asylum seekers and refugees in Germany. The main focus of the 
conversations was on the evaluation of living conditions in camps. How did they contribute to 
the ‘migration crisis’ in Europe?  
Thus, the dissertation answers the following research questions: ‘How does the 
devastating situation in the perceived reality of asylum seekers and refugees in camps 
(including undernourishment, poverty, disease, et cetera) affect migration movements to 
Europe?’ and ‘How does the camp experience [experiences gained in camps] contribute to 
refugees’ and asylum seekers’ decision-making process in the context of migration to 
Europe?’. The research results indicate that refugee camps’ poor living conditions are an 
essential push factor and cause migration movements to Europe. Hence, the dissertation is 
built around the theory and hypothesis that reasonable living conditions in refugee camps in 
the EU and outside of the EU have the potential to reduce (mass) migration movements. 
 The first chapter of the dissertation is a comprehensive literature review in the field of 
migration studies. Over 100 years of theories are included in this section. After a short 
discourse of what migration theory is, the chapter explains from a theoretical standpoint why 
people move. The most influential methods in this regard are the neoclassical approach, 
migration, transitions, and development, the historical-structural approach, systems and 
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networks, and the new economics of labor migration. All these theories are very much 
economics orientated and argue that people mainly move because of possible financial 
benefits. Armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other severe push factors played a minor role in 
migration studies for decades. The discipline of asylum seekers and refugee studies emerged 
over time and became more significant in the last 20 years. The aspiration and ability model 
(including drivers of migration) answers the questions ‘Why and where do asylum seekers 
and refugees move?’. This approach is more flexible and comprehensive by considering 
various factors that affect primary asylum seekers and refugees (e.g., armed conflicts or 
political persecution). Severe threats to life and health are getting more attention. However, a 
comprehensive and coherent approach for refugee camps was missing, which is why I 
established the ‘Push-Stay-Pull Model.’ The chapter concludes with the current status of 
migration studies, future challenges, and some critical remarks.  
 The next chapter reviews migration in terms of EU policy implications, security and 
borders, and policy situations. First of all, the chapter defines legal and irregular migration 
before explaining the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), Schengen, counter-
terrorism and radicalization, organized crime and human trafficking, EU agencies, and the 
EU-Turkey deal. All essential EU migration policy agencies are summarized and evaluated. 
This section’s main findings are that EU policy has become more restrictive in recent years, 
and agreements with non-EU countries have priority. The last part of the chapter includes the 
actual policy situation (growing populism and human rights), burden-sharing, and borders 
from a security standpoint. Thus, the current ongoing discussions in EU policy are 
discerningly reflected. The current debates show that reducing migration is more important 
than preserving human rights, and the lack of solidarity among EU member states remains a 
significant issue. All efforts for finding fair distribution and allocation solutions have failed so 
far, and refugee camps are almost entirely ignored in EU policies, except for some financial 
contribution from EU funds. In reality, some states are still left alone with asylum seekers and 
refugees (for example, Greece and Italy), which makes burden-sharing insufficient. 
 The following section is an in-depth analysis of non-EU and EU refugee camps. The 
selection of case studies consists of the countries most affected by asylum seekers and refugee 
movements from the Middle East and the African continent. Outside of the EU, Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan are part of the analysis. In the EU, the focus is on camps in Greece and 
Italy. All camps are analyzed by the same pattern: figures, numbers, statistics, and funding 
requirements. Furthermore, each case study includes a full description of the refugee camps’ 
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situation in these countries, followed by comparisons between non-European camps, camps in 
the EU, and between non-European and EU camps. The analysis shows that some countries 
struggle more than others and that the living condition can vary from camp to camp 
significantly. Whereas Turkey can provide, overall, sufficient conditions in its camps, 
Lebanon and Jordan's situation is devastating. In the EU, Italian camps are in better shape 
than those in Greece. In the comparison between non-EU and EU camps, Turkey is even 
doing better than Greece. In general, the situation in camps depends on migrants’ influx and 
the country’s economic power. Other factors, such as early crisis anticipation or cooperation 
with international aid organizations, play a role as well. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion part about the conditions in camps. The connection between aid and conditions in 
camps is discussed, and the perspective of camps in terms of development and urbanization is 
explained. The chapter finishes with some recommendations and solutions on how the 
situation in the camps could be improved. This section shows that a new approach for camps 
is needed, and the improvement of living conditions is a promising way to prevent mass 
migration movements from happening.  
 The last chapter of the dissertation is the interview section. In total, I conducted 192 
fully structured (quantitative research) and 17 semi-structured (qualitative research) 
interviews with asylum seekers and refugees in Germany. This section provides a 
comprehensive overview of asylum seekers’ characteristics in Europe and their journeys, 
aspirations, and motivations. The interview findings confirm the devastating conditions in 
camps in- and outside of Europe and make them comparable. The vast majority of the 
interview partners evaluated the camps’ situation in terms of nutrition, health care, education, 
job opportunities, income, security, political participation, and spare time activities 
negatively. 
Additionally, I could not find any evidence for nationalistic European governments’ 
claims that asylum seekers are not refugees but economic migrants. Hence, most people fled 
to Europe because of severe threats to their life and health. On the other hand, the study found 
evidence for the hypothesis that reasonable living conditions in refugee camps in the EU and 
outside of the EU have the potential to reduce (mass) migration movements. Since the 
interviewer asked why people leave the camps and under which circumstances they would 
have stayed, the responses indicate improved living conditions, long-term prospects, and 
security are a sustainable approach for reducing mass migration movements to Europe. 
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 Nevertheless, the dissertation has, of course, also some weaknesses and shortcomings. 
The study of the ‘migration crisis’ is still a relatively new field, and not many policy-makers 
and scholars have addressed the camps’ situations since 2015. Access to available sources is 
limited or are out-dated. Another issue is the absence of field studies. Unfortunately, I was not 
able to visit any of the camps myself. The primary sources for the evaluation of the situation 
came from reports, journalists, and interviews. The example of Turkey shows that perceptions 
can be very different. Whereas the media coverage of Turkish camps was widely positive, the 
interviews revealed a different picture since there are many different camps. Different camps 
can lead to different experiences in the same country. A distinction between various camps of 
the same country might increase the quality of the research. Alternatively, there are many 
more camps that are worth studying. With sufficient funding, I would love to continue my 
research in this field.49 
Regarding the interviews, the sample sizes could always be more significant; 
respectively, a representative study would be a desirable goal. There are probably more 
efficient ways to do interviews with more financial resources. Interview with asylum seekers 
and refugees from other European countries than Germany would also enhance the study, as 
well as interviews with aid workers in the camps and other experts. 
The current research can be only a starting point for further research. There is always 
room for improvement, and I am quite sure that I have only scratched the surface of a field 
that is still barely covered by scholars. Migration movements have always existed, do exist, 
and will continue to exist. According to several studies, e.g., climate change will have a 
severe impact on migration worldwide in the future. Therefore, refugee camps’ role needs to 
be globally reconsidered since camps are a sustainable approach to weaken forced 
displacement. The outbreak and spread of the Coronavirus Sars-CoV-2 also raise attention to 
security issues and how inhabitants in camps can be appropriately protected. Moreover, the 
consequences of pandemics on migration will very likely become an important discussion in 
migration studies.  
 
 
49 Beginning in September 2020, I have been working at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European 
Studies in Regensburg (Germany) as a researcher and continuing my own research on migration. 
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I hope I have enhanced the discussion in the field of migration and refugee camp studies 
with new ideas and concepts and that present and future scholars and students will benefit 
from my research.   
Thank you very much for reading my dissertation.             
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Appendix 1: Interview-Questionaire (English) 
Refugee & Aslyum Seekers Survey 
Situation in Refugee Camps 
Questionnaire 
 
ASSESSING SITUATION OF PEOPLE, WHO HAVE BEEN LIVING IN REFUGEE 
CAMPS 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take this survey. The survey is being done by Sebastian Paul (Ph.D. 
candidate in International Relations at the Corvinus University of Budapest) and is part of his final 
Ph.D. thesis.  
 
The purpose of the survey is to collect information from refugees or asylum seekers, who have been 
living for a certain period of time in refugee camps, before and/or after coming to Europe, in order to 
get a more comprehensive overview about the living conditions there.  
 
All of the answers you provide in this survey will be kept confidential. No identifying information will be 
provided to the Corvinus University of Budapest or any other institution. The survey data will be 
reported in a summary fashion only and will not identify any individual person.  
 
















In which country was the refugee camp located where you lived before coming to the EU? 






E) Other Country 
 
Q3: 
Were you in a refugee camp after entering the EU?  
 






In which country was the refugee camp located, where you lived after entering the EU? 






E) Other Country 
 
Q5: 
Why did you choose a camp in the countries from Q2 & Q4? Please circle all that apply. 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
A) B) C) D) E) 
Security Accessibility of 
the country 
 









    
 
Q4: EU country 
A) B) C) D) E) 
Security Accessibility of 
the country 
 









    
 
Q6: 
For how long did you stay in the refugee camp(s) named in Q2 & Q4? 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
A) B) C) 
Less than one year More than one year, but less 
than three years 






Q4: EU country 
A) B) C) 
Less than one year More than one year, but less 
than three years 







How would you evaluate the nutrition situation (food & water supply) in the camp(s) in Q2 & 
Q4? 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
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Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q8: 
How would you evaluate the health care situation (medicine, doctors, equipment, etc.) in the 
camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q9: 
How would you evaluate the educational situation in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4?  
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q10:  
Were there schools or other institutions, especially for children in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 









Were there any job opportunities in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
A) Yes 
B) Yes, but in not in my field of work 




Q4: EU country 
A) Yes 




Did you receive any income during your time in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? If yes, how much? 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
A) No income 
B) Less than 100 EUR per month 
C) More than 100 EUR per month, but less than 200 EUR per month 
D) More than 200 EUR per month, but less than 300 EUR per month 
E) More than 300 EUR per month, but less than 400 EUR per month 
F) More than 400 EUR per month, but less than 500 EUR per month 
G) More than 500 EUR per month 
 
Q4: EU country 
A) No income 
B) Less than 100 EUR per month 
C) More than 100 EUR per month, but less than 200 EUR per month 
D) More than 200 EUR per month, but less than 300 EUR per month 
E) More than 300 EUR per month, but less than 400 EUR per month 
F) More than 400 EUR per month, but less than 500 EUR per month 
G) More than 500 EUR per month 
 
Q13: 
How would you evaluate the opportunities for free time activities in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU country 
Very good Good Sufficient Insufficient Very bad 
 
 
    
 
Q14: 
Were there any forms of political participation in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? 
 









How was the security situation (high or low crime rate) in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4?  
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Q2: Non-EU country 
A) B) C) D) E) 
Very high crime 
rate 
 





Low crime rate 
 





    
 
Q4: EU country 
A) B) C) D) E) 
Very high crime 
rate 
 





Low crime rate 
 





    
 
Q16: 
Why did you leave the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? Please circle all that apply. 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
A) Poor living conditions 
B) Seeking a better life in the host country 
C) Seeking a better life in the EU 
D) Others 
 
Q4: EU country 
A) Poor living conditions 
B) Seeking a better life in the host country 




Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camp(s) in Q2 & Q4? Please circle 
all that apply. 
 
Q2: Non-EU country 
A) Long-term prospects in the country 
B) Higher satisfaction of basic human needs (water, food, medicine, etc.) 
C) I would not have stayed under any circumstances 
D) Other 
 
Q4: EU country 
A) Long-term prospects in the country 
B) Higher satisfaction of basic human needs (water, food, medicine, etc.) 




What was the (major) reason for you leaving the country of your origin? Please circle all that 
apply. 
 
A) (Civil) War or Armed Conflict(s) 
B) Political Persecution  
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C) Discrimination 
D) Natural Disasters 
E) Economic Reasons / Poverty 
F) Climate change-related reason 




What was the main reason for you coming to the EU? Please circle all that apply. 
 
A) Peaceful and secure environment 
B) Political stability 
C) Human rights (open and free society) 
D) Cultural aspects 











F) Another country 
 
Q21: 
How did you arrive in the EU? 
 
A) By land 
B) By sea 














C) I do not know yet 
 
 
I appreciate your response.  I am seeking to get a better understanding of the situation 
of people living in camps. Thank you for your time.  
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9.2 Appendix 2: Interview-Questionaire (German) 
Umfrage mit Flüchtlingen und Asylsuchenden 
über die Situation in Flüchlingslagern 
Umfrage 
 
BEWERTUNG DER LEBENSBEDINGUNGEN VON MENSCHEN, DIE IN 
FLÜCHTLINGSLAGERN GELEBT HABEN 
 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie zustimmen, an dieser Umfrage teilzunehmen. Die Umfrage wurde von 
Sebastian Paul (Doktorand an der Corvinus Universität in Budapest im Studienfach International 
Relations) erstellt und ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil seiner Doktorarbeit. 
 
Das Ziel dieser Umfrage besteht darin, Informationen über Flüchtlinge und Asylsuchende zu sammeln, 
die für einen bestimmten Zeitraum auf ihrer Reise nach Europa in einem Flüchtlingslager gelebt 
haben, um einen umfassenden Überblick über die dortigen Lebensbedigungen zu erhalten. 
 
Alle Antworten, die im Zuge dieser Umfrage gegeben warden, werden vertraulich behandelt. Keine 
Informationen, die Rückschlüsse auf die Identität eines Umfrageteilnehmers zulassen, werden an die 
Corvinus Universität oder an irgendeine andere Insitution weitergegeben. Die Umfrageergebnisse 
werden lediglich in einer zusammenfassenden Form verarbeitet.  
 
















In welchen Land befindet sich das Flüchtlingslager, in dem Sie gelebt haben, bevor Sie in die 
EU eingereist sind? Kreuzen Sie bitte alle zutreffenden Antworten an. (antworten Sie bitte 






E) Ein anderes Land 
 
Q3: 








In welchen Land befindet sich das Flüchtlingslager, in dem Sie gelebt haben, nachdem Sie in 
die EU eingereist sind? Kreuzen Sie bitte alle zutreffenden Antworten an. (antworten Sie bitte 






E) Ein anderes Land 
 
Q5: 
Warum haben Sie ein Flüchtlingslager aus Q2 & Q4 ausgewählt? Kreuzen Sie bitte alle 
zutreffenden Antworten an. 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 













    
 
Q4: EU-Land 













    
 
Q6: 
Für wie lange sind Sie in einem der Flüchtlingslager aus Q2 & Q4 geblieben? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
A) B) C) 
Weniger als 1 Jahr Mehr als 1 Jahr, aber 
weniger als 3 Jahre 







A) B) C) 
Weniger als 1 Jahr Mehr als 1 Jahr, aber 
weniger als 3 Jahre 







Wie würden Sie die Versorgung mit Lebensmitteln (Essens- und Wasserversorgung) in den 
Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4 bewerten? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
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Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q8: 
Wie würden Sie Gesundheitsversorgung (Medikamente, Ärzte, Ausstattung, etc.) in den 
Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4 bewerten? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q9: 
Wie würden Sie die Bildungssituation in den Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4 bewerten? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q10:  












Gab es irgendwelche Möglichkeiten zur Ausübung einer beruflichen Tätigkeit in den 
Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
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A) Ja 









Haben Sie während Ihrer Zeit in den Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4 irgendein Einkommen 
bezogen? Wenn ja, wie hoch? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
A) Kein Einkommen 
B) Weniger als 100 EUR im Monat 
C) Mehr als 100 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 200 EUR im Monat 
D) Mehr als 200 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 300 EUR im Monat 
E) Mehr als 300 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 400 EUR im Monat 
F) Mehr als 400 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 500 EUR im Monat 
G) Mehr als 500 EUR im Monat 
 
Q4: EU-Land 
A) Kein Einkommen 
B) Weniger als 100 EUR im Monat 
C) Mehr als 100 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 200 EUR im Monat 
D) Mehr als 200 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 300 EUR im Monat 
E) Mehr als 300 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 400 EUR im Monat 
F) Mehr als 400 EUR im Monat, aber weniger als 500 EUR im Monat 
G) Mehr als 500 EUR im Monat 
 
Q13: 
Wie würden Sie die Möglichkeiten zur Ausübung von Freizeitaktivitäten in den 
Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4 bewerten? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q4: EU-Land 
Sehr gut Gut Zufriedenstellend Unzureichend Sehr schlecht 
 
 
    
 
Q14: 














Wie würden Sie die Sicherheitslage (hohe oder niedrige Kriminalitätsrate) in den 
Flüchtlingslagern aus Q2 & Q4 bewerten? 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 


















    
 
Q4: EU-Land 


















    
 
Q16: 
Warum haben Sie die Flüchtlingslager aus Q2 & Q4 verlassen? Kreuzen Sie bitte alle 
zutreffenden Antworten an. 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
A) Schleche Lebensbedigungen 
B) Auf der Suche nach einem besseren Leben im Aufnahmeland 
C) Auf der Suche nach einem besseren Leben in der EU 
D) Andere Gründe 
 
Q4: EU-Land 
A) Schleche Lebensbedigungen 
B) Auf der Suche nach einem besseren Leben im Aufnahmeland 
C) Auf der Suche nach einem besseren Leben in der EU 
D) Andere Gründe 
 
Q17: 
Unter welchen Umständen wären Sie in einem der Flüchtlingslager aus Q2 & Q4 geblieben? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte alle zutreffenden Antworten an. 
 
Q2: Nicht-EU-Land 
A) Langfristige Perspektive im Aufnahmeland 
B) Höhere Befriedigung von grundlegenden menschlichen Bedürfnissen (Wasser, 
Essen, Medizin, etc.) 
C) Ich wäre unter keinerlei Umständen geblieben 
D) Andere Umstände 
 
Q4: EU-Land 
A) Langfristige Perspektive im Aufnahmeland 
B) Höhere Befriedigung von grundlegenden menschlichen Bedürfnissen (Wasser, 
Essen, Medizin, etc.) 
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C) Ich wäre unter keinerlei Umständen geblieben 
D) Andere Umstände 
 
Q18: 
Was war für Sie die Hauptursache, warum Sie Ihr Herkunftsland verlassen haben? Kreuzen 
Sie bitte alle zutreffenden Antworten an. 
 
A) Bürgerkrieg oder bewaffnete Konflikte 
B) Politische Verfolgung 
C) Diskriminierung 
D) Naturkatastrophe(n) 
E) Wirtschaftliche Gründe / Armut 
F) Ursachen, die mit der Klimaerwärmung zusammenhängen 
G) Auf der Suche nach einem höheren Lebensstandard in der EU 
H) Andere Ursachen 
 
Q19: 
Was war für Sie der Hauptgrund in die EU zu kommen? Kreuzen Sie bitte alle zutreffenden 
Antworten an. 
 
A) Friedliches und sicheres Umfeld 
B) Politische Stabilität 
C) Menschenrechte (offene und freie Gesellschaften) 
D) Kulturelle Aspekte 
E) Höherer Lebensstandard 
F) Andere Gründe 
 
Q20:  







F) Ein anderes EU-Land 
 
Q21: 
Wie haben Sie die EU erreicht? 
 
A) Über den Landweg 
B) Über den Seeweg 
C) Mit einem Flugzeug 
D) Auf eine andere Art und Weise 
 
Q22: 






Hatten oder haben Sie die Absicht jemals in Ihr Herkunfsland zurückzukehren? 
 




C) Ich weiß es noch nicht 
 
 
Ich weiß Ihre Antworten sehr zu schätzen. Ich erhoffe mir dadurch, ein besseres 
Verständnis für die Situation von Menschen in Flüchtlingslagern zu bekommen. Vielen 
Dank für Ihre Zeit. 
9.3 List of the Semi-structured Interviews and Notes 
Qualitative Research - Notes 
Participant Date and place 
of the interview 





P1 21st of May, 
Skype (online) 
27 minutes and 
36 seconds 
25, male Barber 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 2 years (2013 – 2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 3 other people; shared toilets 
for 50 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 3 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
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• Paid smugglers; only 500,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 200 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P2 21st of May, 
Skype (online) 
34 minutes and 
12 seconds 
20, male Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 6 months (2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 7 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
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• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 800,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 300 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P3 21st of May, 
Skype (online) 
32 minutes and 
48 seconds 
21, male Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a camp in Lebanon for 3 months (2015) 
• No real accommodation or housing facilities 
• Unsafe and insecure camps; terrorism; crime 
• Almost no food and water supply 
• Devastating living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; no health care (no medicines and only a few 
doctors); no international aid organizations 
• People had to live and sleep in improvised shelters 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
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• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 150,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 600 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, perspective 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P4 29th of May, 
Skype (online) 
41 minutes and 
01 seconds 
22, male Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 1 year (2013) 
• The person had to share the room with 5 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
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• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 1 year in a camp on the Greek islands (2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 200,- EUR; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 400 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P5 29th of May, 
Skype (online) 
29 minutes and 
55 seconds 
29, male Barber 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a camp in Lebanon for 3 months (2015) 
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• No real accommodation or housing facilities 
• Unsafe and insecure camps; terrorism; crime 
• Almost no food and water supply 
• Devastating living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; no health care (no medicines and only a few 
doctors); no international aid organizations 
• People had to live and sleep in improvised shelters 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 200,- EUR; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 400 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, perspective 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
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• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P6 3rd of June, Skype 
(online) 
35 minutes and 
39 seconds 
24, male Unemployed 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 2 years (2012 – 2014) 
• The person had to share the room with 8 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 3 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; 1,200,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 350 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
• Poor economy, high unemployment 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
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• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played a significant role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, perspective 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P7 3rd of June, Skype 
(online) 
34 minutes and 
22 seconds 
25, male Farmer 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a camp in Lebanon for 6 months (2015) 
• No real accommodation or housing facilities 
• Unsafe and insecure camps; terrorism; crime 
• Almost no food and water supply 
• Devastating living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; no health care (no medicines and only a few 
doctors); no international aid organizations 
• People had to live and sleep in improvised shelters 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 3 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were insufficient 
• Sufficient nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• Little health care, little education for children 
• Some housing opportunities, but many people lived in improvised 
shelters 
• Aid organizations and Greek state authorities improved living 
conditions 
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The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; 1,200,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 300 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
• Poor economy, high unemployment 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P8 3rd of June, Skype 
(online) 
42 minutes and 
03 seconds 
19, male Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 6 months (2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 4 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
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• The conditions were insufficient 
• Sufficient nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• Little health care, little education for children 
• Some housing opportunities, but many people lived in improvised 
shelters 
• Aid organizations and Greek state authorities improved living 
conditions 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 100,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 500 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Family and friends 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P9 15st of June, 
Skype (online) 
39 minutes and 
08 seconds 
28, male Unemployed 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a camp in Jordan for 2 months (2015) 
• No real accommodation or housing facilities 
• Unsafe and insecure camps; terrorism; crime 
• Almost no food and water supply 
• Devastating living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; no health care (no medicines and only a few 
doctors); no international aid organizations 
• People had to live and sleep in improvised shelters 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 2 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
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(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; 3,000,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 50 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
• Poor economy, high unemployment 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• The economic situation played a significant role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P10 15st of June, 
Skype (online) 
27 minutes and 
30 seconds 
23, male Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 1 year (2014 - 2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 5 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
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institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 50,- EUR; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 300 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, perspective 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P11 28th of May, 
Skype (online) 
36 minutes and 
33 seconds 
27, female Unemployed 
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Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 1 year (2014 - 2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 25 other people; shared toilets 
for 200 people 
• Unsafe and insecure camps 
• Insufficient food and water supply 
• Unreasonable living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; insufficient health care (no medicines and 
only a few doctors; no international aid organizations 
• Some people had to sleep on the street 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were insufficient 
• Sufficient nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• Little health care, little education for children 
• Some housing opportunities, but many people lived in improvised 
shelters 
• Aid organizations and Greek state authorities improved living 
conditions 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; 1,000,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 200 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• The economic situation played a significant role 
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Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P12 4th of July, Skype 
(online) 
42 minutes and 
53 seconds 
26, male Unemployed 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 6 months (2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 8 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 3 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; for free; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 700 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Appendices  230 
 
• Poor economy, high unemployment 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P13 13th of July, 
Skype (online) 
31 minutes and 
41 seconds 
22, male Unemployed 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 1 year (2014) 
• The person had to share the room with 50 other people; shared toilets 
for 500 people 
• Unsafe and insecure camps 
• Insufficient food and water supply 
• Unreasonable living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; insufficient health care (no medicines and 
only a few doctors; no international aid organizations 
• Some people had to sleep on the street 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were insufficient 
• Sufficient nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• Little health care, little education for children 
• Some housing opportunities, but many people lived in improvised 
shelters 
• Aid organizations and Greek state authorities improved living 
conditions 
The Journey to Europe 
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• Paid smugglers; 1,400,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 100 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• The economic situation played a significant role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Under no circumstances 
P14 13th of July, 
Skype (online) 
29 minutes and 
57 seconds 
27, male Farmer 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 2 years (2013 - 2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 50 other people; shared toilets 
for 500 people 
• Unsafe and insecure camps 
• Insufficient food and water supply 
• Unreasonable living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; insufficient health care (no medicines and 
only a few doctors; no international aid organizations 
• Some people had to sleep on the street 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 6 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
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• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; 2,000,- EUR; not local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 100 people on one small boat 
• Brought to camps by Greek state authorities 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P15 11th of August, 
Skype (online) 
43 minutes and 
24 seconds 
20, female Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 6 months (2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 7 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 1 month in a camp on the Greek islands (2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
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• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 100,- EUR; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 1,000 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, perspective 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P16 11th of August, 
Skype (online) 
36 minutes and 
47 seconds 
18, female Student 
Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 6 months (2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 7 other people; shared toilets 
for 100 people 
• Safe and secure camps 
• Sufficient food and water supply 
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• Reasonable conditions; playgrounds for children and educational 
institutions; sufficient health care; international aid organization plus 
Turkish organizations 
• Outside of the camps, people had to live on the streets 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 1 month in a camp on the Greek islands (2015) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 100,- EUR; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 1,000 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played only a minor role 
Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, prospects 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
P17 25th of August, 
Skype (online) 
38 minutes and 
28 seconds 
22, male Unemployed 
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Notes Conditions in non-EU camps 
• The person lived in a Turkish camp for 1 year (2015) 
• The person had to share the room with 20 other people; shared toilets 
for 300 people 
• Unsafe and insecure camps 
• Insufficient food and water supply 
• Unreasonable living conditions; no playgrounds and no educational 
institutions for children; insufficient health care (no medicines and 
only a few doctors; no international aid organizations 
• Some people had to sleep on the street 
Conditions in EU camps 
• The person lived for 2 months in a camp on the Greek islands 
(2016) 
• The conditions were absolutely devastating 
• It was a daily fight for survival 
• Almost no nutrition and water supply; high crime rates 
• No health care, no education for children 
• No housing; people lived in improvised shelters 
• Aid organizations and the Greek state were overwhelmed 
The Journey to Europe 
• Paid smugglers; only 200,- EUR; local community 
• Crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Europe 
• Life-threatening journey; 400 people on one small boat 
• Came in a group to the camps 
Why did you leave Syria? 
• Civil war, terrorism, Assad 
Why did you come to Germany/Europe? 
• Safe and secure environment 
• Higher living standard 
• Open borders; Merkel 
• Family and friends 
• The economic situation played a significant role 
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Under which circumstances would you have stayed in the camps? 
• Family, network, prospects 
• Education, employment 
• Sufficient health care and nutrition 
• Security 
• Acceptable living conditions 
 
